Sunday, February 25, 2007

Secretary General's Jan. 25 Report on Sudan


United Nations S/2007/42
Security Council
Distr.: General
25 January 2007
Original: English
07-21186 (E) 300107
*0721186*
Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council
resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested me to keep it regularly
informed of progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, respect
for the ceasefire and the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations
Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The report also provides an assessment of the
overall situation in the country since the previous report to the Council, dated
12 September 2006 (S/2006/728).
II. Implementation of the major elements of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
2. Two years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on 9 January
2005, implementation has not progressed as effectively as was hoped. While the
basic constitutional framework envisaged in the Agreement is in place, some of the
political and security institutions are functioning, and the National Congress Party
(NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) have continued to
assert their commitment to full implementation; in reality, both parties have proved
reluctant to take the difficult steps required to move towards sustainable peace, and
critical aspects of the Agreement remain well behind schedule. Of central concern,
the principles of the Agreement related to political inclusion and “making unity
attractive” have yet to be fully upheld, and much remains to be done if the parties
are to achieve their ambitious goals set out in the Machakos Protocol and in
subsequent protocols.
Security aspects
3. The period under review witnessed the most serious violation of the ceasefire
since 2002. In Malakal, Upper Nile, heavy fighting between elements of the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
from 27 to 30 November killed at least 150 people, including civilians. The conflict
erupted after a long-running dispute over the commissionership of a county in
neighbouring Jonglei State triggered a series of skirmishes between the SPLA Joint
Integrated Unit contingent and SAF-aligned other armed groups. Fighting then
escalated into a full-scale confrontation between SPLA forces and SAF. The
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UNMIS-chaired Ceasefire Joint Military Committee played a key role in bringing
the fighting to a halt, and the parties subsequently withdrew to their pre-conflict
positions. While the city remains tense, Joint Integrated Unit forces involved in the
fighting have been rotated out of the area, and a buffer zone is being monitored by
joint patrols, including UNMIS observers.
4. Redeployment of the parties’ armed forces continues, although delays in the
formation of Joint Integrated Units are now holding up the redeployment of SPLA
forces from the transitional areas, originally to have been completed in the second
quarter of 2007. With the SAF redeployment deadline of 9 July 2007 approaching,
both parties face considerable challenges if redeployment is to be accomplished as
agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Both parties continue to maintain a
substantial armed presence in sensitive oil-rich areas, including Upper Nile, and the
1 January 1956 border area remains highly militarized.
5. On 18 November, President Al-Bashir called for better cooperation between
NCP and SPLM on security matters, particularly the problem of other armed groups,
and stressed the need for the Joint Integrated Units to function in order to secure the
border areas and oil installations. The failure to integrate other armed groups into
existing military structures and to create functioning Joint Integrated Units, as
required under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, has left the parties facing a
growing security problem, where militia violence as witnessed in Malakal can easily
erupt and spiral out of control.
6. Elsewhere in Southern Sudan, unidentified armed men, allegedly belonging to
SAF-aligned militia groups, were also held responsible for attacks on arterial roads
outside Juba in October and December, killing some 75 people.
7. At the same time, recent months have witnessed increased instability in
Northern and Southern Kordofan States, where civilian discontent has led to strike
action, and attacks by armed militia groups and tribal violence represent a growing
security threat. While some of the violence has spilled over from neighbouring
Darfur, tribal disputes and other armed group activities further fuel tensions. For
example, in the area of Meiram, south of Abyei, clashes between SPLA forces and
SAF related to the integration of erstwhile other armed groups resulted in the
displacement of approximately 2,000 people.
8. Efforts to resolve the problem posed by other armed groups remain stymied by
mistrust between the parties, as reflected in the state of the Other Armed Groups
Collaborative Committee. While its members met regularly during the reporting
period, it remained mired in disputes over its rules of procedure, and there is as yet
no plan to deal with armed militia groups that are aligned with SAF but that are
reluctant to redeploy north of the 1 January 1956 border by 9 July 2007.
9. At the same time, the formation of Joint Integrated Units continued to be
delayed, owing in part to a lack of logistical support for moving troops, a shortage
of working and living accommodations and irregular and insufficient budgetary
assistance. Efforts by the Joint Defence Board to agree to a single doctrine and
training programme have foundered, partly over cultural and religious differences.
In several areas, poorly disciplined Joint Integrated Unit elements were responsible
for deteriorating security. Disputes over the payment of salary arrears to SPLA
members of Joint Integrated Units triggered demonstrations in Juba on 9 December.
While the presidency should take the steps necessary to provide a regular budget to
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the Units, there is also a need for bilateral donors to step forward and assist the
Units to perform the security functions envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and for the parties to be open to such assistance.
10. More positively, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and Area Joint
Military Committees played an important role during the reporting period, helping
to de-escalate tension between forces on the ground. This was critical during the
Malakal crisis, during which the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee convened
emergency sessions, on 29 November and 3 December, facilitating an immediate
ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. The body, which is chaired by UNMIS, has
proved to be a highly effective forum for frank discussion between the parties, as
well as the mechanism for resolving military violations of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. I commend the Chairman of the Committee and its members for the
positive role the mechanism is playing.
Political aspects
11. During celebrations marking the second anniversary of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in Juba on 9 January, President Al-Bashir and First Vice-President
Kiir publicly aired their grievances over the failures of each other’s party to
implement key aspects of the Agreement. The accusations traded are a direct result
of the parties’ lack of success in effectively using the joint mechanisms set up in the
Agreement to resolve contentious issues. I am hopeful, however, that this open
stocktaking might revitalize the two leaders’ determination to overcome their
difficulties, and I very much welcome the strong commitment of both leaders to the
Agreement.
12. Some welcome progress was made on the legislative agenda. The National
Constitutional Review Commission drafted several important bills for consideration
by the National Assembly, including those required to establish the long-overdue
National Human Rights Commission and National Civil Service Commission. Other
critical commissions, including the National Electoral Commission and the
Commission for the Protection of the Rights of non-Muslims in the National
Capital, also have yet to be established.
13. The National Assembly has now passed a political parties law and the National
Civil Service Commission Act. Meanwhile, consultations on a draft elections bill
are at an early stage, and the work of the Population Census Council has also been
proceeding slowly. More must be done to accelerate the work of the Council, whose
national census is critical not only for the electoral process, but also for long-term
development planning.
14. The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly has approved a number of bills
relating to the criminal code. However, commissions on land, the civil service,
human rights, anti-corruption, relief and rehabilitation and disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration have yet to be formally established, although
commissioners have been appointed to many of them. While six southern states
signed their constitutions into law during the reporting period, the Ministry of
Justice of the Government of National Unity declared the moves unconstitutional.
Meanwhile, in Southern Kordofan State, the presidency resolved a lengthy deadlock
over the draft constitution, which was eventually signed into law in December.
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15. There are particular concerns over the slow progress of the technical ad hoc
border committee, which is supposed to demarcate the 1 January 1956 border
between north and south. The committee has completed its review of maps and
started work with local communities; it has not, however, begun physical
demarcation. Consensual demarcation of this border would go a long way to
resolving a number of potentially serious Comprehensive Peace Agreement
problems, including the redeployment of military personnel, the distribution of oil
revenues, the formation of Joint Integrated Units and, later, preparations for
elections.
16. The Abyei issue remains extremely contentious and has been referred to a joint
high political committee of the parties. However, despite appeals to the presidency
for guidance, no progress has been made. On 9 January 2007, First Vice-President
Kiir appealed to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well
as the IGAD Partner’s Forum, to assist the parties in implementing the Protocol on
the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area.
17. On the ground in Abyei, a temporary relaxation of freedom-of-movement
restrictions has made the entire region accessible to the United Nations. This has
assisted its monitoring efforts and humanitarian activities, as well as inter-tribal
negotiations and other reconciliation activities. I urge the authorities to continue to
allow the Mission and all United Nations personnel to carry out their important
tasks throughout the region.
18. The Ceasefire Political Commission met on 28 September and 9 November,
although without the full participation of its international members. The
Commission has failed to gain traction as a decision-making body, and it has rarely
been able to resolve issues referred to it by the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee.
Meanwhile, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission also met regularly during
the reporting period and received special briefings from the Central Bank on
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, legislative transformation and the
work of the border committee.
Wealth-sharing aspects
19. On the wealth-sharing agenda, the parties reached agreement on rules of
procedure for the National Petroleum Commission. They also agreed to establish an
independent technical secretariat of the Commission, which should help to ensure
complete impartiality concerning the distribution of oil revenues. However,
increasing concerns arose regarding the displacement of populations in areas of oil
exploration. Provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, requiring
consultation with and compensation of populations affected by resource exploitation
are not systematically understood or enforced in Southern Sudan, with serious
consequences for human rights and environmental protection.
20. A new national currency was launched on 9 January, marking the second
anniversary of the signing of the Agreement. The new Sudanese pound will initially
be distributed in Southern Sudan, replacing the multiple currencies currently in
circulation. This is a big step forward, and I congratulate both parties on this
achievement.
21. The roll-out of the new national currency will have an important impact on
economic recovery and reconstruction. Donor support will be critical to making this
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effort a success. Assistance will be especially required to sensitize the public and to
support the timely and efficient distribution of the new currency.
III. Implementation of other peace processes in the Sudan
22. On 14 October, the Eritrean-mediated talks between the Sudanese Government
and the Eastern Front rebel movement culminated in the signing of the Eastern
Sudan Peace Agreement. So far, implementation has progressed slowly, due in part
to the failure of the Eastern Front to present a list of nominees for the posts
allocated to it under the Agreement. However, the state of emergency was lifted in
Kassala State and Red Sea State one week after the signing, and the Agreement was
passed into law by the National Assembly on 6 November. Its incorporation into the
Constitution is pending discussions between NCP and its allies regarding the
allocation of parliamentary seats.
23. Peace talks between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) continued sporadically under the mediation of the Government of
Southern Sudan. The Juba talks led to an extension of the ceasefire until
28 February 2007. However, late in the reporting period, LRA made it clear that it
would no longer accept the Government of Southern Sudan as mediator and wished
to relocate the talks. I regret this delay. I am, however, confident that my Special
Envoy for the LRA-affected areas, former Mozambican President Chissano, will
play an important role in assisting the parties to this conflict to resolve their bitter
20-year struggle. I strongly urge the parties to remain committed to finding a
peaceful solution quickly.
24. As noted in the report on the latest events in Darfur (S/2006/1041), the
security situation in the region remains extremely volatile, as civilian populations
continue to be targeted in violation of international humanitarian and human rights
law. In recent months, tens of thousands of people have been forced to flee their
homes, and the total number of internally displaced persons has reached its highest
level since the conflict flared up in 2003. While fighting has continued amid shifting
factional allegiances, efforts to conclude local ceasefire arrangements were
undermined by continued aerial bombardment of rebel positions by the Government.
Violence also surged along the Chad-Sudan border, as Chadian armed opposition
groups launched attacks from Darfur into Chad. Meanwhile, implementation of the
Darfur Peace Agreement made only halting progress.
25. UNMIS is currently working to finalize the implementation of the “light
support package” of assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS).
The first part of a three-phase approach that will culminate in a hybrid African
Union/United Nations mission in Darfur, the package includes United Nations
military and police advisory personnel, as well as material and equipment for AMIS.
On 26 December, the tripartite mechanism established by the United Nations, the
African Union, and the Government of National Unity to facilitate implementation
of the three-phase approach resolved several outstanding issues, including the attire
of United Nations military and police personnel deployed under the light support
package, who will wear their national uniforms, blue berets and African Union
armbands.
26. The United Nations and the African Union held a final round of consultations
in Khartoum from 18 to 20 January to finalize the “heavy support package”, the
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second step of the three-phase approach. The package, which includes a range of
force enablers, three formed police units, civilian personnel and mission support
items, was transmitted to President Al-Bashir on 24 January in separate letters from
African Union Chairperson Konaré and the Secretary-General. It is expected that the
tripartite mechanism will also facilitate the implementation of this package. The
African Union and the United Nations held additional consultations from 22 to
24 January on their hybrid operation. The consultations focused on the basic
requirements of the operation, including its essential characteristics such as
mandate, force size and command and control arrangements.
IV. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations
Mission in the Sudan
Political support and reconciliation
27. As part of its good offices mandate to help resolve ongoing conflicts in the
Sudan, UNMIS worked with politicians and local communities in Southern Sudan to
promote the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Southern Sudan Interim
Constitution. Peace and reconciliation efforts continued, especially following
tensions in Juba, Rumbek and Malakal. In Abyei, UNMIS undertook a three-day
helicopter peace mission with Misseriya and Dinka Ngok traditional leaders to
promote peaceful coexistence along nomadic migration routes. In the peace process
between the Government of Uganda and LRA, UNMIS provided aviation support to
Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team patrols as well as flights to the assembly
areas for the parties or associated individuals when necessary.
28. UNMIS also remained actively engaged in the efforts to find a political
solution to the conflict in Darfur (see S/2006/1041). Further to the high-level
discussions held in late November in Addis Ababa, UNMIS and the African Union
are working to chart a course to re-engage the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace
Agreement in the political process. UNMIS has also held events throughout Darfur
to disseminate the Agreement and plan for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and
Consultation. Meanwhile, my new Special Envoy, Jan Eliasson, visited the region,
and will be working closely with the African Union over the coming weeks and
months to move the peace process forward.
Military deployment and activities
29. As at 10 January, 94 per cent of mandated UNMIS military personnel (9,322
out of a total of 9,831) had been deployed, including 579 United Nations military
observers, 181 staff officers and 8,514 troops from troop-contributing countries.
While team sites have now been established throughout the Mission’s area of
operations, planning is under way to set up three additional sites at Raga in Western
Bahr Al Ghazal, Talodi in Southern Kordofan and Baw in Blue Nile State. In line
with the Security Council’s request to reduce the military component, taking into
account progress made on the ground, UNMIS has now fully withdrawn the
Nepalese component that had been based in eastern Sudan, and is also adjusting its
number of military observers from 750 to 625.
30. The military component continues its monitoring and verification activities
throughout its area of operations. The increased tension where other armed groups
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continue to operate and the growing number of violent clashes has stretched the
force in some areas, especially where additional team sites have been established.
The force has increasingly played a proactive arbitration and humanitarian role in
resolving other armed group and ethnic clashes in the Malakal region and elsewhere.
It also provided river transport and escort for a Government of Southern Sudan
investigative and reconciliation committee having the task of resolving an intratribal
dispute in Jonglei State.
31. At the same time, the military component has been undertaking civil-military
cooperation tasks in support of local communities, including the building and
equipping of a medical clinic, the construction and grading of roads and the building
of ablution facilities. With the start of the dry season, temporary repairs to sections
of the Ed Damazin-Dindirou-Kurmuk road by UNMIS force engineering assets
assisted in the return of refugees from Ethiopia. Wherever possible, local labour is
trained to carry out such tasks, enabling individuals to gain vocational training and
experience.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
32. The parties have made some progress on the planning of disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programmes. The National Council for
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination, decreed by the
presidency in February 2006, finally met in December. It requested the submission
of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for
the north and the south, and started to give much-needed attention to the problem of
the armed militia. The Council is key to creating a favourable political and
operational environment for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. It
should now establish appropriate eligibility criteria for entry into the programme
and oversee the ongoing registration of members of SAF and SPLA.
33. There continues to be modest progress in the interim disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programme, focusing on special groups (women,
children and the disabled). During the reporting period, 211 children were
demobilized and reunited with their families, the majority of which are enrolled in
school and benefit from community-based child protection network programmes.
Continued national and international support is required to strengthen the northern
and southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions
in order to better implement the interim programme and plan for the next phase of
the programme focusing on SAF, SPLA and the other armed groups.
34. In planning for the main disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
programme, UNMIS supported the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Commission in the pre-registration of 60,477 soldiers and members of other armed
groups for voluntary disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. This included
22,026 regular SAF soldiers, 17,000 members of the Popular Defence Forces, 5,000
disabled soldiers and 16,451 members of other armed groups aligned with SAF. In
the south, SPLA continues to finalize its list of combatants. Once the lists have been
completed, UNMIS will assist the two Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Commissions in verifying the numbers. Eventual acceptance into the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme needs to be based strictly
on properly formulated eligibility criteria established by the National Council.
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Proper vetting during the planning stage will yield significantly better results when
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme commences.
Electoral assistance
35. With the midterm elections set for 2008 or 2009, UNMIS is starting to build its
capacity to meet the technical assistance requirements in support of electoral
preparations. As noted above, the requisite electoral legislation remains to be
passed. The Mission’s electoral activities have thus far focused on tracking and
monitoring progress in developing the legal framework for elections, particularly
the draft elections law, rules for the registration of political parties and the
establishment of the National Electoral Commission, as required by the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. A mechanism for coordination of international
assistance was established in early December, which will aim to identify areas of
cooperation and optimize resource allocation among donors and international
partners.
Police
36. As at 5 January, UNMIS had deployed 662 United Nations police officers from
44 countries, who are currently stationed at 19 team sites, representing 93 per cent
of the authorized strength.
37. UNMIS continued to support the development of the Southern Sudan Police
Service, working with the newly established Police Development Committee (PDC),
including through the registration of police officers. During the reporting period, the
Mission began to implement its strategy of co-locating its police advisers with local
police forces. By early December, 74 United Nations police advisers were based at
27 local police stations in Southern Sudan, and additional advisers were located at 8
police stations in the transitional areas, proactively assisting local counterparts to
perform their duties and carrying out on-site training activities. Senior United
Nations police advisers were also attached to senior Southern Sudan Police Service
officers responsible for planning. UNMIS is widening its community policing
programmes, including within transit camps for internally displaced persons.
38. The Mission has also worked to deepen its engagement with the police service
in northern Sudan. In December, UNMIS, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and the police service signed a letter of collaboration enabling
the provision of police training in northern Sudan. The Government of National
Unity Ministry of Interior also agreed to establish a Police Development Committee
to coordinate cooperation with United Nations police and donors. Detailed training
needs and requests to donors can now be discussed in the Police Development
Committee forum, and the Governments of Norway and Denmark have already
offered assistance. As noted in previous reports, other donors are strongly urged to
come forward to assist in this critical aspect of the UNMIS mandate.
Human rights
39. UNMIS continued active human rights monitoring during the reporting period.
Particular human rights abuses occurred during the hostilities in Malakal, when
SAF, its allied armed groups and SPLA failed to discriminate between combatants
and non-combatants and used disproportionate violence resulting in a high toll on
civilians. Meanwhile, chronic concerns over the proliferation of weapons, the
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continuing existence of other armed groups, weak command and control among
armed elements and a lack of rule of law added to the insecurity, which continues to
expose civilians to unnecessary and unpredictable violence.
40. Particular concerns surround the displacement of civilians associated with oil
development. An UNMIS analysis of the impact of oil exploration found that
companies were employing environmentally unsound methods. Hazardous waste is
regularly dumped into civilian water supply areas, while roads to oil installations
destroy farmland and livelihoods. At the same time, commitments under the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement relating to consultation and compensation for land
confiscation and displacement are not being implemented.
41. UNMIS continued to support the formation of human rights mechanisms
provided for in the Agreement and held a number of workshops over the reporting
period. In Southern Sudan, UNMIS supported commissioners appointed to the
Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission, including in the development of
enabling legislation and an annual budget and in strategic planning. Work was
adversely affected by the expulsion of a staff member in October.
Rule of law
42. UNMIS continued to support parties, parliamentarians and civil society
engaged in law reform, including through the organization of workshops and
seminars. In that connection, UNMIS supported a seminar on parliamentary
oversight of the security sector ahead of the upcoming debate on a new security bill
and provided technical assistance in the drafting of the Khartoum State children’s
bill. The Mission also provided substantive advice to the drafting of the prison
services bill for Southern Sudan. UNDP continued to provide capacity-building
support to legal professionals, including paralegals, lawyers, police, prosecutors,
judges and prison service personnel.
43. In response to a request by UNMIS, the Governments of Ghana and Kenya
have offered to assist in training Southern Sudan prison staff in Accra and Nairobi.
In November, UNMIS initiated the establishment of a Prisons Development
Committee in Juba to provide policy direction to prison officials regarding reform in
Southern Sudan. In collaboration with Government of Southern Sudan authorities,
the Mission has started registering all staff of the Prisons Service of Southern Sudan
and is providing training on minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners and
on basic prison management.
Public information
44. UNMIS Radio (Miraya/Mirror FM) continued to build listenership in the
south. Repeater stations are now operating in Wau and Malakal. Miraya FM is also
producing programmes on the Comprehensive and Darfur Peace Agreements for
rebroadcast on some state radio stations in the south, in Southern Kordofan and, in
cooperation with AMIS, in Darfur. The United Nations station is also assisting
southern state radio stations through quick-impact projects and technical advice.
Plans to boost listenership through short-wave radio and via a website with audio
capability are ongoing. However, despite regular meetings with the Government,
UNMIS still has no agreement to broadcast.
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45. UNMIS has continued to provide public information support to AMIS with the
loan of staff and equipment, website support and presentations on the Darfur Peace
Agreement. This support will build with the recruitment of additional public
information staff within the light support package. In the south, regular CPA
presentations and workshops with community leaders on the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement have continued, along with United Nations police and military training
in the dissemination of information on the Agreement. In the north, in spite of
positive interaction with some individuals and universities on issues pertaining to
the Agreement and the role of UNMIS in the country, there remains an overall
reluctance on the part of northern institutions and individuals to embrace the United
Nations message.
Humanitarian assistance
46. The 2007 United Nations and partners’ workplan was launched in Geneva on
14 December. The workplan focuses on continued support for the implementation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, expanded recovery and development
activities, an increased emphasis on reintegration initiatives for returning
populations and the continued provision of humanitarian assistance. The total cost
of assistance is some $1.26 billion for humanitarian activities and $560 million for
recovery and development. Relative to 2006, the workplan reflects an increased
focus on the delivery of an assistance package for the reconstruction and economic
development of the Sudan.
47. In October, violence along roads east of Juba in Southern Sudan severely
impeded access for aid workers. The clashes in Malakal in November led the United
Nations to relocate temporarily 230 non-essential United Nations and nongovernmental
organization personnel. Civilian displacement also occurred and,
although many people have returned, some civilians still seek help to move north.
Humanitarian agencies rapidly undertook the disposal of bodies, the provision of
water points and chlorine and the restocking of hospital medicine and supplies in the
aftermath of the ceasefire.
48. In Darfur (see S/2006/1041), humanitarian access was significantly curtailed
and aid workers were increasingly targeted. Because of ongoing fighting,
humanitarian staff frequently had to be relocated temporarily, and organizations’
operational capacities and access to populations were seriously reduced. However,
mortality rates in Darfur have dropped for the second consecutive year, and
malnutrition rates remain under control.
Protection of civilians
49. As noted above, widespread insecurity continued to adversely affect civilian
protection. During the fighting in Malakal in November, UNMIS personnel worked
to identify and refer emergency needs of the civilian population and to establish
casualty figures and damage assessments. Elsewhere, the reporting period saw rising
tensions within ethnic and tribal communities and placed at-risk civilian populations
out of the reach of humanitarian assistance. Protection staff provided early warning
and analysis of those issues and forged joint responses with agencies and nongovernmental
organizations through protection working groups.
50. Children continue to be associated with armed forces and groups. United
Nations field teams identified scores of child soldiers in the ranks of the Pibor
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Defence Forces in Jonglei State and in the Southern Sudan Defence Forces in Upper
Nile State. Targeted efforts to sensitize stakeholders in the affected areas were
stepped up in Pibor. Child protection staff facilitated the release of children in Wau
and remain on standby as efforts to demobilize children in Bentiu proceed.
Meanwhile, despite assurances to the former Emergency Relief Coordinator that it
would release its considerable number of women and children, the Lord’s Resistance
Army has shown no sign of doing so. Work was adversely affected by the expulsion
of a staff member in October.
51. The situation in Darfur diverted valuable protection resources from the chronic
problems in Southern Sudan and the transitional areas. In Darfur, advocacy on
protection issues has been ill received by the local authorities, and dialogue has
become increasingly confrontational, as witnessed in particular by the ejection of
the Norwegian Refugee Council. As non-governmental organizations reduced their
protection activities, joint United Nations protection working groups sought to
maintain accurate reporting and identify alternative channels for assistance.
Returns
52. The start of the dry season in November marked the beginning of the 2006/07
return season. In an unprecedented development, the Government of National Unity,
the Government of Southern Sudan, UNMIS and the United Nations country team
agreed to a single joint plan for the organized return of some 200,000 internally
displaced persons. By December 2007, the three parties aim to return 150,000
people from Khartoum and other northern states and a further 48,000 people from
other locations to Southern Sudan and Blue Nile State. In a demonstration of the
seriousness of their commitment, the Government of National Unity and the
Government of Southern Sudan have together contributed $51 million towards the
operation, $24 million of which has already been allocated by the Government of
Southern Sudan. This operation is seen by all parties as a significant step forward.
53. In greater Khartoum, the United Nations pursues its efforts to monitor the
conditions of internally displaced persons through community-based mechanisms,
specific assessments and dialogue with the competent authorities. In Darfur, as the
dry season begins, state authorities have begun to apply pressure on the United
Nations to begin returns. This year the context in Darfur makes returns even less
appropriate than in 2006. However, the United Nations continues to engage the
Government and has agreed to jointly assess areas to which returns may be feasible,
in accordance with existing policies.
Mine action
54. Landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to present a major threat to the
population in many parts of the Sudan, as well as to United Nations and
non-governmental organization personnel operating on the ground. Although
severely hampered by rains at the beginning of the reporting period, UNMIS mine
action teams have made steady progress. Over 9.5 million square metres of
suspected dangerous areas have been cleared, as well as some 2,500 anti-personnel
mines, 1,000 anti-tank mines and some 500,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance and
small arms ammunition. UNMIS and the United Nations Children’s Fund provided
mine-risk education to more than 950,000 people. UNMIS provided briefings on
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landmine safety to over 6,200 Mission staff, agencies and non-governmental
organizations and trained more than 200 staff as trainers.
55. UNMIS mine action teams continued to work on roads and in communities
that have been prioritized in the Nuba Mountains, Juba, Rumbek, Wau, Yei,
Malakal, Ed Damazin, Darfur and Kassala. For the first time, a United Nations mine
action team was able to survey the roads around Hameshkoreib in eastern Sudan
after the SPLA withdrawal and identified several dangerous areas for further
clearance. All five UNMIS demining contingents from Bangladesh, Cambodia,
Egypt, Kenya and Pakistan have commenced operations. Demining activity, which
is a prerequisite for further development activities in the Sudan, requires continuous
support from the international community.
Economic recovery and reconstruction
56. Economic recovery and reconstruction is a critical activity in Southern Sudan
and the transitional areas. The United Nations has increased its programming
significantly in support of Government counterparts and local actors, including
through the multi-donor trust fund for Southern Sudan. The trust fund has approved
projects worth $235.3 million to support Government capacity-building, reform of
the judiciary, health, education, water and sanitation, infrastructure development,
livestock and the census. There are also projects planned for support for the states,
agriculture, the rule of law, HIV/AIDS programmes and private sector development.
Although progress in the transitional areas has been slower, the World Bank reports
that over 40 per cent of total national multi-donor trust fund project commitments
are earmarked for those areas ($38 million out of about $90 million total). Specific
programmes focusing on capacity-building and basic social services for Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile States are currently under development.
57. Although the delivery of these and other peace dividends has been offset by
slower than expected disbursement through the multi-donor trust funds, the
achievements made so far in Southern Sudan give cause for optimism. These include
an expansion of markets and an increase in trade, with a significant reduction in the
cost of basic items in key locations, such as Juba. The opening of roads has also led
to an increased movement of people and investment in the private sector in Southern
Sudan. There has also been significant progress in establishing key Government
functions and bodies, although functions relating to payroll, procurement and
treasury systems have yet to become fully operational. The roll-out of the new
national currency in 2007, which will focus in the initial stages on the south, will
give a further boost to private sector development. Overall, economic indicators
relating to growth, inflation and foreign direct investment remain strong.
58. Further to the signature of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, the 2007
United Nations and partners’ workplan includes a focus on recovery and
development of the eastern states, including alignment with priorities set out in the
Agreement and the Government’s five-year plan. Progress in Darfur with respect to
the joint assessment mission came to a halt because of the prevailing insecurity. The
assessment mission will be concluded when conditions improve.
Gender
59. In connection with the upcoming elections in 2008-2009, the Gender Unit
initiated an assessment of the technical support needs of prospective women
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candidates from political parties in both the north and the south. In Southern Sudan,
UNMIS has been promoting implementation of the 25 per cent quota for women
stipulated in the Southern Sudan Interim Constitution. The Unit is also
strengthening dialogue and cooperation with the AMIS gender office. In Darfur,
UNMIS continues to advocate for effective mechanisms to prevent and respond to
gender-based violence. Training activities targeting mission personnel and national
partners were also undertaken, including for police personnel of the Government of
Southern Sudan. The Unit also conducted activities to mark the sixth anniversary of
the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 1325 (2000).
HIV/AIDS
60. The HIV/AIDS Unit conducted further training of HIV/AIDS peer educators,
bringing the total number of trained educators to 154, and sensitized 2,000
peacekeepers. Voluntary confidential counselling and testing services were offered
to 70 Mission personnel. Through its six regional HIV committees, the Unit helped
to sensitize some 61,690 members of the uniformed services and the general
population in the Sudan in 2006. UNMIS also organized workshops throughout the
Mission area marking World AIDS Day.
Conduct and discipline
61. During the reporting period, 29 new cases of misconduct were reported to the
conduct and discipline team, two of which were classified as serious misconduct and
referred to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) for investigation.
Delays in reporting the outcome of OIOS investigations need to be addressed to
build confidence and avoid impunity. The conduct and discipline team also
continued its activities to ensure that all Mission personnel complied with the
United Nations code of conduct for the Sudan. Newly deployed civilian staff,
military observers and police personnel received briefings on United Nations
standards of conduct and the United Nations policy of zero tolerance for sexual
exploitation and abuse. UNMIS, United Nations agencies and international
non-governmental organizations began a joint assessment of southern communities’
perceptions and risk factors conducive to misconduct.
62. At the end of the reporting period, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse
were levelled at UNMIS personnel in Juba. I wish to make clear that I will not
tolerate this behaviour within the United Nations. The zero-tolerance policy,
meaning zero complacency and zero impunity, will be strictly enforced. I pledge
that all allegations will be followed up systematically by relevant United Nations
mechanisms, working with local authorities and other partners, including troopcontributing
countries, to ensure that this kind of behaviour is rooted out wherever it
exists. When necessary, strong disciplinary action will be taken. In this connection, I
would call upon all peacekeeping partners, including members of the press, to come
forward with any information they may have in their possession to help us deal with
the problem.
Civilian staffing
63. UNMIS continues to face serious problems in recruiting and retaining wellqualified
international and nationally recruited staff members. The Mission carried
out aggressive recruitment campaigns for international and national staff with the
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assistance of Department of Peacekeeping Operations recruitment teams, as well as
staff temporarily assigned from other missions. As a result, civilian staff strength
rose to 827 international staff (out of a total of 1,139 posts), 2,229 national staff (out
of a total of 3,342 posts) and 177 United Nations Volunteers (out of a total of 231
posts).
V. Challenges in mandate implementation
64. UNMIS continues to face considerable challenges in carrying out its mandate
and daily tasks. Since its inception, the Mission has had to operate in an atmosphere
of opposition on the part of some political forces to the multidimensional mandate
given to it by the Security Council in its resolution 1590 (2005). The Government’s
overall attitude towards the Mission has been considerably amplified as a result of
the intense discussions that have unfolded over recent months concerning a possible
United Nations peacekeeping role in Darfur. UNMIS regularly faces bureaucratic
obstacles from the authorities, an alarming number of crises and forced evacuations
from its offices in Darfur and in Southern Sudan, a latent terrorist threat and
multiple mission support and logistical problems due in part to the difficult
environment in which the Mission operates, as well as the increasing demands
supporting its growing role in Darfur.
65. On 22 October, the Government informed my predecessor that it had decided
to “terminate” the mission of Special Representative Jan Pronk and requested him to
leave the Sudan within 72 hours. The United Nations strongly protested that
decision and made it clear that only the Secretary-General could decide on the
tenure of his Special Representatives. The unfortunate episode amplifies the
imperative to resolve existing issues through dialogue and consultation. Mr. Pronk
later returned to the Sudan for a short farewell visit prior to the expiration of his
contract at the end of the year.
66. There are other concerns about the commitment to the letter and spirit of the
agreement that governs relations between the Mission and the Sudanese authorities.
On 26 September, two staff members, while monitoring demonstrations at Khartoum
University, were detained and threatened, and United Nations equipment was
confiscated by unidentified security personnel. They were subsequently declared
personae non gratae and required to leave the Sudan. I specifically appeal to the
Government of National Unity to allow those two staff members back into the
country in a spirit of good faith and understanding.
67. Meanwhile, recurring restrictions on local freedom of movement hindered the
work of both UNMIS, in parts of its area of operations south of Khartoum, and other
United Nations and non-governmental organization partners in Darfur, which were
often not authorized to operate without travel permits from the authorities.
68. At the same time, delays in clearing UNMIS materiel through customs
continued to create serious problems for the Mission, which have occasionally left
the military component short of vital rations and communications equipment.
Despite frequent discussions with the Government, no lasting solution to this
problem has been found.
69. In the context of the intense international focus on Darfur, as well as the daily
challenges faced by UNMIS on the ground, the Mission has at times found it
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difficult to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in carrying out
their considerable commitments. The sheer size of the country, as well as the lack of
transport and communications infrastructure on the ground, have stretched United
Nations support mechanisms and require the decentralization of some functions
from Khartoum to the regions. I have initiated preliminary steps in that direction by
appointing a senior official who will be responsible for coordinating all Mission
activities in Southern Sudan and representing the Head of Mission on a day-to-day
basis with the Government of Southern Sudan. The implications of this
decentralization, which would delegate increased levels of authority to the field,
will be met from existing resources for the immediate period. Any future changes
having an impact on current administration and support structures will be reflected
in future reports to the Security Council and subsequent budgetary submissions.
VI. Financial implications
70. The General Assembly, by its resolution 60/122 B, appropriated the amount of
$1,079,534,400, equivalent to $89,961,200 per month, for UNMIS for the period
from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. Should the Security Council decide to extend the
mandate of UNMIS beyond 30 April 2007, the cost of maintaining the Mission until
30 June 2007 would be limited to the amounts approved by the Assembly.
71. As at 31 October 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account
for UNMIS amounted to $524.0 million. The total outstanding assessed
contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,541.8
million.
72. Reimbursement of troop- and contingent-owned equipment costs have been
made for the period up to 31 October 2006, in accordance with the payment
schedule.
VII. Observations
73. While the parties have achieved significant progress in implementing the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, much remains to be done if they are to establish
an inclusive and constitutional democracy in which unity is made attractive to voters
in Southern Sudan. On the second anniversary of the Agreement, I am concerned
that the “spirit of Naivasha”, which resulted in a historic agreement two years ago,
has been somewhat elusive, especially in recent months, and that the consensus
created by the accords has been overshadowed by distrust and uncertainty.
74. The recent crisis in Malakal is a reminder that the hard-won Agreement is not
yet stable or self-sustaining, but needs constant encouragement. Mistrust between
the parties remains a serious obstacle, potential spoilers still exist and the war in
Darfur has diverted international attention and support from implementation of the
Agreement. In the context of rising tensions in the region, peace in Southern Sudan
needs renewed and sustained attention. The coming year should be a year of
increased focus on the Agreement to protect the gains made so far and to give the
Sudan a stable basis on which to move forward. I pledge my personal commitment
to this goal.
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75. In that regard, there is a critical nexus of security issues where progress is
required if peace is to hold in 2007. By 9 July, SAF must complete its redeployment
north of the 1 January 1956 border. While redeployment of SPLA is predicated on
the formation of Joint Integrated Units, this is now behind the schedule set out in the
Agreement. The parties need to resolve this issue and keep to their redeployment
commitments. Importantly, the redeployment targets do not apply only to regular
forces, but also to other armed groups aligned with the parties.
76. The violence in Malakal underscored not only the need for other armed groups
to be integrated as a matter of priority, but also that Joint Integrated Units do not yet
function as the foundation of a possible future national army and as guarantors of
security and stability. The need to ensure security around sensitive areas, including
oil installations, is particularly pertinent. Unfortunately, there remains an acute
security dilemma for both parties over the management of strategic areas. There is
significant risk that what happened in Malakal could happen in other areas of
Southern Sudan.
77. Both parties must cease using militias as proxy forces and make the integration
of other armed groups a top priority. Building on the commitment to a joint solution
agreed during President Al-Bashir’s visit to Juba in November 2006, the parties
should establish the ad hoc incorporation and reintegration committees provided for
in the Agreement and work in earnest through the Other Armed Groups
Collaborative Committee and the National Council for Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination for the integration or
demobilization of all armed militias. As noted in paragraph 33 above, international
support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mechanisms will
continue to be critical to implementation.
78. Equally urgent is the agreement of a joint doctrine and training programme for
Joint Integrated Units. As the Sudanese Armed Forces depart Southern Sudan, the
ability of the Units to provide security will be critical. If the Units are not
integrated, professional and well regulated, they risk becoming part of the problem
rather than part of the solution. The Joint Defence Board has previously requested
help from the international community to develop the Joint Integrated Units. The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement also specifically states that the parties would call
upon the international community to provide technical, material and financial
support to assist in forming and training the Units. I call upon Member States with
experience and expertise in security sector reform to urgently second experts to
assist UNMIS in this area, working with the Joint Defence Board to develop an
integrated programme of assistance.
79. I urge the parties to begin in earnest the demarcation of the 1 January 1956
border and to agree the status of Abyei. It must be recognized that if the border issue
is not resolved expeditiously, it might be difficult to verify full redeployment in July
2007. Where it is required, the international community should provide financial
and technical support to the technical ad hoc border committee.
80. The commitment of both parties to develop professional and accountable
police services in line with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is a most welcome
sign. The Police Development Committee in Southern Sudan and the newly created
Police Development Committee in the north are important forums that bring
together the respective police experts from the Sudan, the United Nations,
non-governmental organizations and representatives of donor countries. I encourage
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the Committees to work energetically to identify training and logistical needs and
urge donors to liaise closely with them to ensure that capacity-building assistance to
the police is well coordinated and targeted.
81. Some of the central institutions within the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
need to be more effective than they have been so far. One such institution is the
Assessment and Evaluation Commission, which has a critical oversight function
over the Agreement and has been given the task of supporting the parties in their
commitment to “make unity attractive”. Equally, the Ceasefire Political Commission
must function more effectively, and the parties should use the planned review of its
activities to revitalize this important forum in 2007. It is recognized that UNMIS
could play a more prominent role within the Assessment and Evaluation
Commission, and I intend to actively support this. So too should the broader
international community, and especially those countries with an interest in Sudanese
peace and development, become more active in both Commissions, as well as
outside their framework.
82. Despite the public airing of disagreements during the celebrations marking the
second anniversary of the Agreement, there seems to be a generally improved
partnership in recent weeks between NCP and SPLM, which has enabled progress
on important areas, like the National Petroleum Commission. I am concerned,
however, that the parties still appear reluctant to tackle resolutely difficult issues in
the institutions provided for in the Agreement, preferring instead to resort to
informal discussions. If the Agreement is to take deeper root, more must be done to
improve transparency in political decision-making and to improve the capacity of all
parties to participate in the political process. Donor support in building the capacity
of political parties and parliamentary institutions will also remain essential.
83. It is time to begin the process of ensuring that conditions are in place for a free
and fair electoral process, expected in 2008 or 2009. The enactment of electoral
legislation and the establishment of the Electoral Commission are long overdue. I
hope that the parties will move forward rapidly with the creation of the
Commission, which will then need the political, financial and technical support of
donors to prepare for the polls.
84. Two years after the signing of the Agreement, it is particularly crucial to
provide tangible benefits of peace to the people of the Sudan. In its resolution 1590
(2005), the Security Council urged rapid delivery of an assistance package for the
reconstruction and economic development of the Sudan. In practice, progress has
been slower than expected, especially in Southern Sudan. I welcome the discussions
now under way with the Government of Southern Sudan and other key stakeholders
to establish a “second window” for the multi-donor trust fund for Southern Sudan,
which would be administered by the United Nations and which would emphasize
expeditious implementation in areas of urgent need. At the same time, the wider
exploitation of resources in Southern Sudan must be carried out responsibly, so that
accelerating economic development results in a genuine peace dividend for the
population at large.
85. International concern with the situation in Darfur in the past two years has,
understandably, diverted significant attention, as well as human and financial
resources, away from implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In
this respect, Darfur is not just a human tragedy, it also reflects negatively on the
central precept of the Agreement, that Sudanese unity should be made attractive to
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Southern Sudanese voters. A swift, peaceful resolution to the conflict in Darfur
could go a long way towards restoring trust between the parties to the Agreement.
Conversely, the longer the conflict drags on, the harder it will be to persuade the
Southern Sudanese that their best interests lie within a united Sudan.
86. It is also crucial to remember that the Agreement is the bedrock and foundation
of all subsequent agreements, including the Darfur Peace Agreement. Therefore,
sustained international support for this complex Agreement will be indispensable. I
am convinced that 2007 should be a year of renewed support and engagement on the
Agreement. As a centrepiece, I fully support the recent announcement by IGAD that
it, as sponsor and mediator of the Agreement, plans to convene a major meeting to
assess implementation of the Agreement in July 2007.
87. While calling for additional support for the Agreement, I request that both
parties continue to give their full support to the United Nations in its efforts to assist
them in implementing the Agreement. As I begin my term as Secretary-General, I
want to assure both parties that the Organization will remain an entirely impartial
arbiter, committed to bringing peace and development to all the Sudanese people. In
return, I ask for fairness from both parties, for dialogue and mutual understanding
and for a commitment to assist the United Nations in carrying out its mandated role.
88. In conclusion, I wish to thank all United Nations personnel in the Sudan for
their tireless service in support of the Agreement and for helping to resolve the
conflict in Darfur. Thanks to their efforts, the United Nations is ready to further
assist the Sudanese people and authorities in implementing their historic
agreements.
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