Iraq Study Group Report

Iraq Study Group Report
Fantasy Baseball
Las Vegas
Education

The IraqStudy GroupReport
Printable PDF
James A. Baker, III, andLee H. Hamilton, Co-ChairsLawrence S. Eagleburger,Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III,Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb,Alan K. SimpsonContentsLetter from the Co-ChairsExecutive SummaryI. AssessmentA. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq1. Security2. Politics3. Economics4. International Support5. ConclusionsB. Consequences of Continued Decline in IraqC. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq1. Precipitate Withdrawal2. Staying the Course3. More Troops for Iraq4. Devolution to Three RegionsD. Achieving Our GoalsII. The Way Forward—A New ApproachA. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus1. The New Diplomatic Offensive2. The Iraq International Support Group3. Dealing with Iran and Syria4. The Wider Regional ContextB. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves1. Performance on Milestones2. National Reconciliation3. Security and Military Forces4. Police and Criminal Justice5. The Oil Sector6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review8. U.S. Personnel9. IntelligenceAppendicesLetter from the Sponsoring OrganizationsIraq Study Group Plenary SessionsIraq Study Group ConsultationsExpert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor PanelThe Iraq Study GroupIraq Study Group Support
Letter from the Co-Chairs
There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests.Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq but with the state ofour political debate regarding Iraq. Our political leaders must build a bipartisan approach tobring a responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our country deserves adebate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and Congress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright with the American people in order to win their support.
No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this point will stop sectarianwarfare, growing violence, or a slide toward chaos. If current trends continue, the potentialconsequences are severe. Because of the role and responsibility of the United States in Iraq, and the commitments our government has made, the United States has special obligations. Our country must address as best it can Iraq’s many problems. The United States has long-term relationships and interests at stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged.
In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq Study Group present a new approachbecause we believe there is a better way forward. All options have not been exhausted. Webelieve it is still possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an opportunity for abetter future, combat terrorism, stabilize a critical region of the world, and protect America’scredibility, interests, and values. Our report makes it clear that the Iraqi government and theIraqi people also must act to achieve a stable and hopeful future.
What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous amount of political will andcooperation by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It demandsskillful implementation. It demands unity of effort by government agencies. And its successdepends on the unity of the American people in a time of political polarization. Americans canand must enjoy the right of robust debate within a democracy. Yet U.S. foreign policy isdoomed to failure—as is any course of action in Iraq—if it is not supported by a broad,sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country toward such a consensus.
We want to thank all those we have interviewed and those who have contributed informationand assisted the Study Group, both inside and outside the U.S. government, in Iraq, and around the world. We thank the members of the expert working groups, and staff from the sponsoring organizations. We especially thank our colleagues on the Study Group, who have worked with us on these difficult issues in a spirit of generosity and bipartisanship.
In presenting our report to the President, Congress, and the American people, we dedicateit to the men and women—military and civilian—who have served and are serving in Iraq, andto their families back home. They have demonstrated extraordinary courage and made difficultsacrifices. Every American is indebted to them.
We also honor the many Iraqis who have sacrificed on behalf of their country, and themembers of the Coalition Forces who have stood with us and with the people of Iraq.James A. Baker, III Lee H. Hamilton
Executive Summary
The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved.
In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to be taken in Iraq, theUnited States, and the region. Our most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another. If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and America’s credibility, interests, and values will be protected.
The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing in scope and lethality. It is fedby a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespreadcriminality. Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability. The Iraqi people have ademocratically elected government, yet it is not adequately advancing national reconciliation,providing basic security, or delivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive.If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe. A slide towardchaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq’s government and a humanitarian catastrophe.Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of operations. The global standing of the United States could be diminished. Americans could become more polarized.
During the past nine months we have considered a full range of approaches for movingforward. All have flaws. Our recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly believe thatit includes the best strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and theregion.
External Approach
The policies and actions of Iraq’s neighbors greatly affect its stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in the long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting stability.The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build aninternational consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic effort should includeevery country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors.Iraq’s neighbors and key states in and outside the region should form a support group toreinforce security and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on itsown.
Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest inavoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively. In seekingto influence the behavior of both countries, the United States has disincentives and incentivesavailable. Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq’s sovereignty andterritorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage nationalreconciliation. The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the fivepermanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.
The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly withthe Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustainedcommitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and Syria.
As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle East, the UnitedStates should provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan,including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved out of Iraq.
Internal Approach
The most important questions about Iraq’s future are now the responsibility of Iraqis. TheUnited States must adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of theirown destiny.
The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security byincreasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way, andto facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. militarypersonnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As theseactions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move out of Iraq.
The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqiarmy, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarterof 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq.
It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the United States for sometime to come, especially in carrying out security responsibilities. Yet the United States mustmake it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, includingplanned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not implement their planned changes.The United States must not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers ofAmerican troops deployed in Iraq.
As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize training and education offorces that have returned to the United States in order to restore the force to full combatcapability. As equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficientfunds to restore the equipment over the next five years.
The United States should work closely with Iraq’s leaders to support the achievement ofspecific objectives—or milestones—on national reconciliation, security, and governance.Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress.The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens of the United States and other countries—that it deserves continued support.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United States, has put forward aset of milestones critical for Iraq. His list is a good start, but it must be expanded to includemilestones that can strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people. President Bush and his national security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward the achievement of these milestones.
If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress towardthe achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the UnitedStates should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’ssecurity forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi governmentdoes not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on nationalreconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military,or economic support for the Iraqi government.
Our report makes recommendations in several other areas. They include improvements tothe Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq, theU.S. budget process, the training of U.S. government personnel, and U.S. intelligence -capabilities.
Conclusion
It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these recommendations offer a new wayforward for the United States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and need to beimplemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in isolation.
The dynamics of the region are as important to Iraq as events within Iraq.The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days ahead. But by pursuing this newway forward, Iraq, the region, and the United States of America can emerge stronger.
I Assessment
There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in Baghdad and several provinces is dire. Saddam Hussein has been removed from power and the Iraqi people have a democratically elected government that is broadly representative of Iraq’s population, yet the government is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering essential services. The level of violence is high and growing. There is great suffering, and the daily lives of many Iraqis show little or no improvement. Pessimism is pervasive.
U.S. military and civilian personnel, and our coalition partners, are making exceptionaland dedicated efforts—and sacrifices—to help Iraq. Many Iraqis have also made extraordinaryefforts and sacrifices for a better future. However, the ability of the United States to influenceevents within Iraq is diminishing. Many Iraqis are embracing sectarian identities. The lack ofsecurity impedes economic development. Most countries in the region are not playing aconstructive role in support of Iraq, and some are undercutting stability.
Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability, and is critical to U.S. interests. It runsalong the sectarian fault lines of Shia and Sunni Islam, and of Kurdish and Arab populations. Ithas the world’s second-largest known oil reserves. It is now a base of operations for international terrorism, including al Qaeda.
Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing how the United States isviewed in the region and around the world. Because of the gravity of Iraq’s condition and thecountry’s vital importance, the United States is facing one of its most difficult and significantinternational challenges in decades. Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy.
An assessment of the security, political, economic, and regional situation follows (allfigures current as of publication), along with an assessment of the consequences if Iraq continues to deteriorate, and an analysis of some possible courses of action.
A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq
1. SecurityAttacks against U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi security forces are persistent and growing. October2006 was the deadliest month for U.S. forces since January 2005, with 102 Americans killed.Total attacks in October 2006 averaged 180 per day, up from 70 per day in January 2006. Dailyattacks against Iraqi security forces in October were more than double the level in January.Attacks against civilians in October were four times higher than in January. Some 3,000 Iraqicivilians are killed every month.
Sources of Violence
Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality. There are multiple sources ofviolence in Iraq: the Sunni Arab insurgency, al Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiitemilitias and death squads, and organized criminality. Sectarian violence—particularly in andaround Baghdad—has become the principal challenge to stability.
Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency. The insurgencycomprises former elements of the Saddam Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals. It has significant support within the Sunni Arab community. Theinsurgency has no single leadership but is a network of networks. It benefits from participants’detailed knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure, and arms and financing are supplied primarily fromwithin Iraq. The insurgents have different goals, although nearly all oppose the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. Most wish to restore Sunni Arab rule in the country. Some aim at winning local power and control.
Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq, but that includes someof the more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks on significant -religious or political targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of SunniArabs. Foreign fighters—numbering an estimated 1,300—play a supporting role or carry outsuicide operations. Al Qaeda’s goals include instigating a wider sectarian war between Iraq’sSunni and Shia, and driving the United States out of Iraq.
Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi civilian casualties. Iraq is in the gripof a deadly cycle: Sunni insurgent attacks spark large-scale Shia reprisals, and vice versa. Groups of Iraqis are often found bound and executed, their bodies dumped in rivers or fields. The perception of unchecked violence emboldens militias, shakes confidence in the government, and leads Iraqis to flee to places where their sect is the majority and where they feel they are in less danger. In some parts of Iraq—notably in Baghdad—sectarian cleansing is taking place. The United Nations estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 million Iraqis have fled the country.
Shiite militias engaging in sectarian violence pose a substantial threat to immediate andlong-term stability. These militias are diverse. Some are affiliated with the government, someare highly localized, and some are wholly outside the law. They are fragmenting, with anincreasing breakdown in command structure. The militias target Sunni Arab civilians, and some struggle for power in clashes with one another. Some even target government ministries. They undermine the authority of the Iraqi government and security forces, as well as the ability of Sunnis to join a peaceful political process. The prevalence of militias sends a powerful message: political leaders can preserve and expand their power only if backed by armed force.
The Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, may number as many as 60,000 fighters. It hasdirectly challenged U.S. and Iraqi government forces, and it is widely believed to engage inregular violence against Sunni Arab civilians. Mahdi fighters patrol certain Shia enclaves,notably northeast Baghdad’s teeming neighborhood of 2.5 million known as “Sadr City.” Asthe Mahdi Army has grown in size and influence, some elements have moved beyond Sadr’scontrol.
The Badr Brigade is affiliated with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq(SCIRI), which is led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. The Badr Brigade has long-standing ties withthe Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Many Badr members have become integrated into theIraqi police, and others play policing roles in southern Iraqi cities. While wearing the uniform ofthe security services, Badr fighters have targeted Sunni Arab civilians. Badr fighters have alsoclashed with the Mahdi Army, particularly in southern Iraq.
Criminality also makes daily life unbearable for many Iraqis. Robberies, kidnappings, andmurder are commonplace in much of the country. Organized criminal rackets thrive, particularlyin unstable areas like Anbar province. Some criminal gangs cooperate with, finance, or purport to be part of the Sunni insurgency or a Shiite militia in order to gain legitimacy. As oneknowledgeable American official put it, “If there were foreign forces in New Jersey, TonySoprano would be an insurgent leader.”
Four of Iraq’s eighteen provinces are highly insecure—Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salahad Din. These provinces account for about 40 percent of Iraq’s population of 26 million. InBaghdad, the violence is largely between Sunni and Shia. In Anbar, the violence is attributableto the Sunni insurgency and to al Qaeda, and the situation is deteriorating.
In Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. In Basra and the south,the violence is largely an intra-Shia power struggle. The most stable parts of the country are the three provinces of the Kurdish north and parts of the Shia south. However, most of Iraq’s cities have a sectarian mix and are plagued by persistent violence.
U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi Forces Confronting this violence are the Multi-National Forces–Iraq under U.S. command, working in concert with Iraq’s security forces. The Multi-National Forces–Iraq were authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1546 in 2004, and the mandate was extended in November 2006 for another year.
Approximately 141,000 U.S. military personnel are serving in Iraq, together withapproximately 16,500 military personnel from twenty-seven coalition partners, the largestcontingent being 7,200 from the United Kingdom. The U.S. Army has principal responsibilityfor Baghdad and the north. The U.S. Marine Corps takes the lead in Anbar province. TheUnited Kingdom has responsibility in the southeast, chiefly in Basra.
Along with this military presence, the United States is building its largest embassy inBaghdad. The current U.S. embassy in Baghdad totals about 1,000 U.S. governmentemployees. There are roughly 5,000 civilian contractors in the country.
Currently, the U.S. military rarely engages in large-scale combat operations. Instead,counterinsurgency efforts focus on a strategy of “clear, hold, and build”—“clearing” areas of -insurgents and death squads, “holding” those areas with Iraqi security forces, and “building”areas with quick-impact reconstruction projects.
Nearly every U.S. Army and Marine combat unit, and several National Guard and Reserveunits, have been to Iraq at least once. Many are on their second or even third rotations; rotations are typically one year for Army units, seven months for Marine units. Regular rotations, in and out of Iraq or within the country, complicate brigade and battalion efforts to get to know the local scene, earn the trust of the population, and build a sense of cooperation.Many military units are under significant strain. Because the harsh conditions in Iraq arewearing out equipment more quickly than anticipated, many units do not have fully functionalequipment for training when they redeploy to the United States. An extraordinary amount ofsacrifice has been asked of our men and women in uniform, and of their families. The American military has little reserve force to call on if it needs ground forces to respond to other crises around the world.
A primary mission of U.S. military strategy in Iraq is the training of competent Iraqisecurity forces. By the end of 2006, the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraqunder American leadership is expected to have trained and equipped a target number ofapproximately 326,000 Iraqi security services. That figure includes 138,000 members of theIraqi Army and 188,000 Iraqi police. Iraqis have operational control over roughly one-third ofIraqi security forces; the U.S. has operational control over most of the rest. No U.S. forces areunder Iraqi command.
The Iraqi Army The Iraqi Army is making fitful progress toward becoming a reliable and disciplined fighting force loyal to the national government. By the end of 2006, the Iraqi Army is expected to comprise 118 battalions formed into 36 brigades under the command of 10 divisions. Although the Army is one of the more professional Iraqi institutions, its performance has been uneven.
The training numbers are impressive, but they represent only part of the story.Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition and loyalties of some Iraqiunits—specifically, whether they will carry out missions on behalf of national goals instead of asectarian agenda. Of Iraq’s 10 planned divisions, those that are even-numbered are made up of Iraqis who signed up to serve in a specific area, and they have been reluctant to redeploy to other areas of the country. As a result, elements of the Army have refused to carry out missions.The Iraqi Army is also confronted by several other significant challenges: Units lack leadership. They lack the ability to work together and perform at higher levels of organization the brigade and division level. Leadership training and the experience of leadership are the essential elements to improve performance.
Units lack equipment. They cannot carry out their missions without adequate equipment.Congress has been generous in funding requests for U.S. troops, but it has resisted fullyfunding Iraqi forces. The entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion)is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq every two weeks.Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a month so that they can visit theirfamilies and take them their pay. Soldiers are paid in cash because there is no bankingsystem. Soldiers are given leave liberally and face no penalties for absence without leave. Unitreadiness rates are low, often at 50 percent or less.Units lack logistics and support. They lack the ability to sustain their operations, thecapability to transport supplies and troops, and the capacity to provide their own indirect firesupport, close-air support, technical intelligence, and medical evacuation. They will dependon the United States for logistics and support through at least 2007.The Iraqi PoliceThe state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi PoliceService currently numbers roughly 135,000 and is responsible for local policing. It has neitherthe training nor legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower to take onorganized crime, insurgents, or militias. The Iraqi National Police numbers roughly 25,000 andits officers have been trained in counterinsurgency operations, not police work. The BorderEnforcement Department numbers roughly 28,000.Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in sectarian violence,including the unnecessary detention, torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. Thepolice are organized under the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by corruption andmilitia infiltration and lacks control over police in the provinces.The United States and the Iraqi government recognize the importance of reform. Thecurrent Minister of the Interior has called for purging militia members and criminals from thepolice. But he has little police experience or base of support. There is no clear Iraqi or U.S.agreement on the character and mission of the police. U.S. authorities do not know withprecision the composition and membership of the various police forces, nor the disposition oftheir funds and equipment. There are ample reports of Iraqi police officers participating intraining in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for use in sectarian violence.Some are on the payroll but don’t show up for work. In the words of a senior American general,“2006 was supposed to be ‘the year of the police’ but it hasn’t materialized that way.”Facilities Protection ServicesThe Facilities Protection Service poses additional problems. Each Iraqi ministry has an armedunit, ostensibly to guard the ministry’s infrastructure. All together, these units total roughly145,000 uniformed Iraqis under arms. However, these units have questionable loyalties andcapabilities. In the ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Transportation controlled by Moqtadaal-Sadr the Facilities Protection Service is a source of funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army.One senior U.S. official described the Facilities Protection Service as “incompetent,dysfunctional, or subversive.” Several Iraqis simply referred to them as militias.The Iraqi government has begun to bring the Facilities Protection Service under thecontrol of the Interior Ministry. The intention is to identify and register Facilities Protectionpersonnel, standardize their treatment, and provide some training. Though the approach isreasonable, this effort may exceed the current capability of the Interior Ministry.Operation Together Forward IIIn a major effort to quell the violence in Iraq, U.S. military forces joined with Iraqi forcesto establish security in Baghdad with an operation called “Operation Together ForwardII,” which began in August 2006. Under Operation Together Forward II, U.S. forces areworking with members of the Iraqi Army and police to “clear, hold, and build” inBaghdad, moving neighborhood by neighborhood. There are roughly 15,000 U.S. troopsin Baghdad.This operation—and the security of Baghdad—is crucial to security in Iraq moregenerally. A capital city of more than 6 million, Baghdad contains some 25 percent of thecountry’s population. It is the largest Sunni and Shia city in Iraq. It has highconcentrations of both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. Both Iraqi and Americanleaders told us that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq.The results of Operation Together Forward II are disheartening. Violence inBaghdad—already at high levels—jumped more than 43 percent between the summer andOctober 2006. U.S. forces continue to suffer high casualties. Perpetrators of violence leaveneighborhoods in advance of security sweeps, only to filter back later. Iraqi police havebeen unable or unwilling to stop such infiltration and continuing violence. The Iraqi Armyhas provided only two out of the six battalions that it promised in August would joinAmerican forces in Baghdad. The Iraqi government has rejected sustained securityoperations in Sadr City.Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both the capability to hold areas thathave been cleared and the will to clear neighborhoods that are home to Shiite militias.U.S. forces can “clear” any neighborhood, but there are neither enough U.S. troops presentnor enough support from Iraqi security forces to “hold” neighborhoods so cleared. Thesame holds true for the rest of Iraq. Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. andIraqi military forces are fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging the sectarianviolence, U.S. forces seem to be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end.2. PoliticsIraq is a sovereign state with a democratically elected Council of Representatives. A governmentof national unity was formed in May 2006 that is broadly representative of the Iraqi people. Iraqhas ratified a constitution, and—per agreement with Sunni Arab leaders—has initiated a processof review to determine if the constitution needs amendment.The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and key players within thegovernment too often act in their sectarian interest. Iraq’s Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leadersfrequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq’s national interest, and too manyIraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively. The result is an even weaker centralgovernment than the constitution provides.There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international agreement on the key issuesconfronting the Iraqi government: national reconciliation, including the negotiation of a“political deal” among Iraq’s sectarian groups on Constitution review, de-Baathification, oilrevenue sharing, provincial elections, the future of Kirkuk, and amnesty; security, particularlycurbing militias and reducing the violence in Baghdad; and governance, including the provisionof basic services and the rollback of pervasive corruption. Because Iraqi leaders view issuesthrough a sectarian prism, we will summarize the differing perspectives of Iraq’s main sectariangroups.Sectarian ViewpointsThe Shia, the majority of Iraq’s population, have gained power for the first time in more than1,300 years. Above all, many Shia are interested in preserving that power. However, fissureshave emerged within the broad Shia coalition, known as the United Iraqi Alliance. Shia factionsare struggling for power—over regions, ministries, and Iraq as a whole. The difficulties inholding together a broad and fractious coalition have led several observers in Baghdad tocomment that Shia leaders are held “hostage to extremes.” Within the coalition as a whole,there is a reluctance to reach a political accommodation with the Sunnis or to disarm Shiitemilitias.Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has demonstrated an understanding of the key issues facingIraq, notably the need for national reconciliation and security in Baghdad. Yet strains haveemerged between Maliki’s government and the United States. Maliki has publicly rejected aU.S. timetable to achieve certain benchmarks, ordered the removal of blockades around SadrCity, sought more control over Iraqi security forces, and resisted U.S. requests to move forwardon reconciliation or on disbanding Shiite militias.Sistani, Sadr, HakimThe U.S. deals primarily with the Iraqi government, but the most powerful Shia figures inIraq do not hold national office. Of the following three vital power brokers in the Shiacommunity, the United States is unable to talk directly with one (Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani) and does not talk to another (Moqtada al-Sadr).GRAND AYATOLLAH ALI AL-SISTANI: Sistani is the leading Shiite cleric in Iraq.Despite staying out of day-to-day politics, he has been the most influential leader in thecountry: all major Shia leaders have sought his approval or guidance. Sistani hasencouraged a unified Shia bloc with moderated aims within a unified Iraq. Sistani’sinfluence may be waning, as his words have not succeeded in preventing intra-Shiaviolence or retaliation against Sunnis.ABDUL AZIZ AL-HAKIM: Hakim is a cleric and the leader of the Supreme Council forthe Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest and most organized Shia politicalparty. It seeks the creation of an autonomous Shia region comprising nine provinces in thesouth. Hakim has consistently protected and advanced his party’s position. SCIRI hasclose ties with Iran.MOQTADA AL-SADR: Sadr has a large following among impoverished Shia,particularly in Baghdad. He has joined Maliki’s governing coalition, but his Mahdi Armyhas clashed with the Badr Brigades, as well as with Iraqi, U.S., and U.K. forces. Sadrclaims to be an Iraqi nationalist. Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was followingthe model of Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political party that controls basic serviceswithin the government and an armed militia outside of the government.Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditional position of power in Iraq. Theyare torn, unsure whether to seek their aims through political participation or through violentinsurgency. They remain angry about U.S. decisions to dissolve Iraqi security forces and topursue the “de-Baathification” of Iraq’s government and society. Sunnis are confronted byparadoxes: they have opposed the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq but need those forces to protectthem against Shia militias; they chafe at being governed by a majority Shia administration butreject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see a Sunni autonomous region as feasible forthemselves.Hashimi and DhariThe influence of Sunni Arab politicians in the government is questionable. The leadershipof the Sunni Arab insurgency is murky, but the following two key Sunni Arab figures havebroad support.tariq al-hashimi: Hashimi is one of two vice presidents of Iraq and the head of the IraqiIslamic Party, the largest Sunni Muslim bloc in parliament. Hashimi opposes theformation of autonomous regions and has advocated the distribution of oil revenues basedon population, a reversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of Shiite militia fightersfrom the Iraqi security forces. Shiite death squads have recently killed three of his siblings.sheik harith al-dhari: Dhari is the head of the Muslim Scholars Association, the mostinfluential Sunni organization in Iraq. Dhari has condemned the American occupation andspoken out against the Iraqi government. His organization has ties both to the Sunni Arabinsurgency and to Sunnis within the Iraqi government. A warrant was recently issued forhis arrest for inciting violence and terrorism, an act that sparked bitter Sunni protestsacross Iraq.Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in presenting a united front of two main political blocs—theKurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurds havesecured a largely autonomous Kurdish region in the north, and have achieved a prominent rolefor Kurds within the national government. Barzani leads the Kurdish regional government, andTalabani is president of Iraq.Leading Kurdish politicians told us they preferred to be within a democratic, federal Iraqistate because an independent Kurdistan would be surrounded by hostile neighbors. However, amajority of Kurds favor independence. The Kurds have their own security forces—thepeshmerga—which number roughly 100,000. They believe they could accommodate themselvesto either a unified or a fractured Iraq.Barzani and TalabaniKurdish politics has been dominated for years by two figures who have long-standing tiesin movements for Kurdish independence and self-government.MASSOUD BARZANI: Barzani is the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and thePresident of the Kurdish regional government. Barzani has cooperated with his longtimerival, Jalal Talabani, in securing an empowered, autonomous Kurdish region in northernIraq. Barzani has ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and raising of Kurdish flags inKurdish-controlled areas.JALAL TALABANI: Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and thePresident of Iraq. Whereas Barzani has focused his efforts in Kurdistan, Talabani hassecured power in Baghdad, and several important PUK government ministers are loyal tohim. Talabani strongly supports autonomy for Kurdistan. He has also sought to bring realpower to the office of the presidency.Key IssuesNATIONAL RECONCILIATION. Prime Minister Maliki outlined a commendable program ofnational reconciliation soon after he entered office. However, the Iraqi government has not takenaction on the key elements of national reconciliation: revising de-Baathification, which preventsmany Sunni Arabs from participating in governance and society; providing amnesty for thosewho have fought against the government; sharing the country’s oil revenues; demobilizingmilitias; amending the constitution; and settling the future of Kirkuk.One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Constitution, which created a largely autonomousKurdistan region, allows other such regions to be established later, perhaps including a“Shi’astan” comprising nine southern provinces. This highly decentralized structure is favoredby the Kurds and many Shia (particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim), but it isanathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally Iraqi nationalists, albeit within the contextof an Iraq they believe they should govern. Second, because Iraq’s energy resources are in theKurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible “Sunni region.” Particularlycontentious is a provision in the constitution that shares revenues nationally from current oilreserves, while allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to the regions.The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-drafting process, and acceded toentering the government only on the condition that the constitution be amended. In September,the parliament agreed to initiate a constitutional review commission slated to complete its workwithin one year; it delayed considering the question of forming a federalized region in southernIraq for eighteen months.Another key unresolved issue is the future of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in northern Iraq thatis home to substantial numbers of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. The Kurds insisted that theconstitution require a popular referendum by December 2007 to determine whether Kirkuk canformally join the Kurdish administered region, an outcome that Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkukstaunchly oppose. The risks of further violence sparked by a Kirkuk referendum are great.Iraq’s leaders often claim that they do not want a division of the country, but we foundthat key Shia and Kurdish leaders have little commitment to national reconciliation. Oneprominent Shia leader told us pointedly that the current government has the support of 80percent of the population, notably excluding Sunni Arabs. Kurds have fought for independencefor decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, the leader of the Kurdish region ordered thelowering of Iraqi flags and the raising of Kurdish flags. One senior American general commentedthat the Iraqis “still do not know what kind of country they want to have.” Yet many of Iraq’smost powerful and well-positioned leaders are not working toward a united Iraq.SECURITY. The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support of nationalreconciliation. Shiite leaders must make the decision to demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs mustmake the decision to seek their aims through a peaceful political process, not through violentrevolt. The Iraqi government and Sunni Arab tribes must aggressively pursue al Qaeda.Militias are currently seen as legitimate vehicles of political action. Shia political leadersmake distinctions between the Sunni insurgency (which seeks to overthrow the government) andShia militias (which are used to fight Sunnis, secure neighborhoods, and maximize powerwithin the government). Though Prime Minister Maliki has said he will address the problem ofmilitias, he has taken little meaningful action to curb their influence. He owes his office in largepart to Sadr and has shown little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi Army.Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violent insurgency in favor ofthe political process. Sunni politicians within the government have a limited level of supportand influence among their own population, and questionable influence over the insurgency.Insurgents wage a campaign of intimidation against Sunni leaders—assassinating the familymembers of those who do participate in the government. Too often, insurgents tolerate andcooperate with al Qaeda, as they share a mutual interest in attacking U.S. and Shia forces.However, Sunni Arab tribal leaders in Anbar province recently took the positive step of agreeingto pursue al Qaeda and foreign fighters in their midst, and have started to take action on thosecommitments.Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take on the militias; Shiapoliticians told us that the U.S. military has to help them take out the Sunni insurgents and alQaeda. Each side watches the other. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the Shiamilitias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunni insurgency is destroyed. Toput it simply: there are many armed groups within Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms.GOVERNANCE. The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its people with basic services:electricity, drinking water, sewage, health care, and education. In many sectors,production is below or hovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and other unstable areas, thesituation is much worse. There are five major reasons for this problem.First, the government sometimes provides services on a sectarian basis. For example, inone Sunni neighborhood of Shia-governed Baghdad, there is less than two hours of electricityeach day and trash piles are waist-high. One American official told us that Baghdad is run like a“Shia dictatorship” because Sunnis boycotted provincial elections in 2005, and therefore are notrepresented in local government.Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure. For instance, electricitytransmission towers are downed by explosives, and then sniper attacks prevent repairs frombeing made.Third, corruption is rampant. One senior Iraqi official estimated that official corruptioncosts Iraq $5–7 billion per year. Notable steps have been taken: Iraq has a functioning auditboard and inspectors general in the ministries, and senior leaders including the Prime Ministerhave identified rooting out corruption as a national priority. But too many political leaders stillpursue their personal, sectarian, or party interests. There are still no examples of senior officialswho have been brought before a court of law and convicted on corruption charges.Fourth, capacity is inadequate. Most of Iraq’s technocratic class was pushed out of thegovernment as part of de-Baathification. Other skilled Iraqis have fled the country as violence hasrisen. Too often, Iraq’s elected representatives treat the ministries as political spoils. Manyministries can do little more than pay salaries, spending as little as 10–15 percent of their capitalbudget. They lack technical expertise and suffer from corruption, inefficiency, a banking systemthat does not permit the transfer of moneys, extensive red tape put in place in part to detercorruption, and a Ministry of Finance reluctant to disburse funds.Fifth, the judiciary is weak. Much has been done to establish an Iraqi judiciary, includinga supreme court, and Iraq has some dedicated judges. But criminal investigations are conductedby magistrates, and they are too few and inadequately trained to perform this function.Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary has been ruthless. As one senior U.S. official said to us, “Wecan protect judges, but not their families, their extended families, their friends.” Many Iraqis feelthat crime not only is unpunished, it is rewarded.3. EconomicsThere has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has tremendous potential for growth.But economic development is hobbled by insecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidatedinfrastructure, and uncertainty. As one U.S. official observed to us, Iraq’s economy has beenbadly shocked and is dysfunctional after suffering decades of problems: Iraq had a police stateeconomy in the 1970s, a war economy in the 1980s, and a sanctions economy in the 1990s.Immediate and long-term growth depends predominantly on the oil sector.Economic PerformanceThere are some encouraging signs. Currency reserves are stable and growing at $12 billion.Consumer imports of computers, cell phones, and other appliances have increased dramatically.New businesses are opening, and construction is moving forward in secure areas. Because ofIraq’s ample oil reserves, water resources, and fertile lands, significant growth is possible ifviolence is reduced and the capacity of government improves. For example, wheat yieldsincreased more than 40 percent in Kurdistan during this past year.The Iraqi government has also made progress in meeting benchmarks set by theInternational Monetary Fund. Most prominently, subsidies have been reduced—for instance, theprice per liter of gas has increased from roughly 1.7 cents to 23 cents (a figure far closer toregional prices). However, energy and food subsidies generally remain a burden, costing Iraq $11billion per year.Despite the positive signs, many leading economic indicators are negative. Instead ofmeeting a target of 10 percent, growth in Iraq is at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above50 percent. Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. The investmentclimate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do notsee tangible improvements in their daily economic situation.Oil SectorOil production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq’s GDP, and more than 95 percentof government revenues. Iraq produces around 2.2 million barrels per day, and exports about 1.5million barrels per day. This is below both prewar production levels and the Iraqi government’starget of 2.5 million barrels per day, and far short of the vast potential of the Iraqi oil sector.Fortunately for the government, global energy prices have been higher than projected, making itpossible for Iraq to meet its budget revenue targets.Problems with oil production are caused by lack of security, lack of investment, and lackof technical capacity. Insurgents with a detailed knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure targetpipelines and oil facilities. There is no metering system for the oil. There is poor maintenance atpumping stations, pipelines, and port facilities, as well as inadequate investment in moderntechnology. Iraq had a cadre of experts in the oil sector, but intimidation and an extendedmigration of experts to other countries have eroded technical capacity. Foreign companies havebeen reluctant to invest, and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil has been unable to spend more than 15percent of its capital budget.Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that 150,000 to 200,000—and perhaps asmany as 500,000—barrels of oil per day are being stolen. Controlled prices for refined productsresult in shortages within Iraq, which drive consumers to the thriving black market. One seniorU.S. official told us that corruption is more responsible than insurgents for breakdowns in theoil sector.The Politics of OilThe politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country’s already fragile efforts tocreate a unified central government. The Iraqi Constitution leaves the door open for regions totake the lead in developing new oil resources. Article 108 states that “oil and gas are theownership of all the peoples of Iraq in all the regions and governorates,” while Article 109 tasksthe federal government with “the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields.” Thislanguage has led to contention over what constitutes a “new” or an “existing” resource, aquestion that has profound ramifications for the ultimate control of future oil revenue.Senior members of Iraq’s oil industry argue that a national oil company could reducepolitical tensions by centralizing revenues and reducing regional or local claims to a percentageof the revenue derived from production. However, regional leaders are suspicious and resist thisproposal, affirming the rights of local communities to have direct access to the inflow of oilrevenue. Kurdish leaders have been particularly aggressive in asserting independent control oftheir oil assets, signing and implementing investment deals with foreign oil companies innorthern Iraq. Shia politicians are also reported to be negotiating oil investment contracts withforeign companies.There are proposals to redistribute a portion of oil revenues directly to the population on aper capita basis. These proposals have the potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in thenation’s chief natural resource, but it would take time to develop a fair distribution system. Oilrevenues have been incorporated into state budget projections for the next several years. There isno institution in Iraq at present that could properly implement such a distribution system. Itwould take substantial time to establish, and would have to be based on a well-developed state census and income tax system, which Iraq currently lacks.
U.S.-Led Reconstruction EffortsThe United States has appropriated a total of about $34 billion to support the reconstruction ofIraq, of which about $21 billion has been appropriated for the “Iraq Relief and ReconstructionFund.” Nearly $16 billion has been spent, and almost all the funds have been committed. Theadministration requested $1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1.485billion. The administration requested $750 million for FY 2007. The trend line for economicassistance in FY 2008 also appears downward.Congress has little appetite for appropriating more funds for reconstruction. There is asubstantial need for continued reconstruction in Iraq, but serious questions remain about thecapacity of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense Department, State Department,United States Agency for International Development, and other agencies has been ineffective.There are no clear lines establishing who is in charge of reconstruction.As resources decline, the U.S. reconstruction effort is changing its focus, shifting frominfrastructure, education, and health to smaller-scale ventures that are chosen and to some degreemanaged by local communities. A major attempt is also being made to improve the capacity ofgovernment bureaucracies at the national, regional, and provincial levels to provide services tothe population as well as to select and manage infrastructure projects.The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi ministries, but it confrontsproblems with access and sustainability. Moqtada al-Sadr objects to the U.S. presence in Iraq,and therefore the ministries he controls—Health, Agriculture, and Transportation—will notwork with Americans. It is not clear that Iraqis can or will maintain and operate reconstructionprojects launched by the United States.Several senior military officers commented to us that the Commander’s EmergencyResponse Program, which funds quick-impact projects such as the clearing of sewage and therestoration of basic services, is vital. The U.S. Agency for International Development, incontrast, is focused on long-term economic development and capacity building, but funds havenot been committed to support these efforts into the future. The State Department leads sevenProvincial Reconstruction Teams operating around the country. These teams can have a positiveeffect in secure areas, but not in areas where their work is hampered by significant securityconstraints.Substantial reconstruction funds have also been provided to contractors, and the SpecialInspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has documented numerous instances of waste andabuse. They have not all been put right. Contracting has gradually improved, as more oversighthas been exercised and fewer cost-plus contracts have been granted; in addition, the use of Iraqicontractors has enabled the employment of more Iraqis in reconstruction projects.4. International SupportInternational support for Iraqi reconstruction has been tepid. International donors pledged $13.5billion to support reconstruction, but less than $4 billion has been delivered.An important agreement with the Paris Club relieved a significant amount of Iraq’sgovernment debt and put the country on firmer financial footing. But the Gulf States, includingSaudi Arabia and Kuwait, hold large amounts of Iraqi debt that they have not forgiven.The United States is currently working with the United Nations and other partners tofashion the “International Compact” on Iraq. The goal is to provide Iraqis with greater debtrelief and credits from the Gulf States, as well as to deliver on pledged aid from internationaldonors. In return, the Iraqi government will agree to achieve certain economic reform milestones,such as building anticorruption measures into Iraqi institutions, adopting a fair legal frameworkfor foreign investors, and reaching economic self-sufficiency by 2012. Several U.S. andinternational officials told us that the compact could be an opportunity to seek greaterinternational engagement in the country.The RegionThe policies and actions of Iraq’s neighbors greatly influence its stability and prosperity. Nocountry in the region wants a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are doing little to help it, andsome are undercutting its stability. Iraqis complain that neighbors are meddling in their affairs.When asked which of Iraq’s neighbors are intervening in Iraq, one senior Iraqi official replied,“All of them.”The situation in Iraq is linked with events in the region. U.S. efforts in Afghanistan havebeen complicated by the overriding focus of U.S. attention and resources on Iraq. Several Iraqi,U.S., and international officials commented to us that Iraqi opposition to the United States—and support for Sadr—spiked in the aftermath of Israel’s bombing campaign in Lebanon. Theactions of Syria and Iran in Iraq are often tied to their broader concerns with the United States.Many Sunni Arab states are concerned about rising Iranian influence in Iraq and the region. Mostof the region’s countries are wary of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and the MiddleEast.Neighboring StatesIRAN. Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq. Iran has long-standing ties tomany Iraqi Shia politicians, many of whom were exiled to Iran during the Saddam Husseinregime. Iran has provided arms, financial support, and training for Shiite militias within Iraq, aswell as political support for Shia parties. There are also reports that Iran has suppliedimprovised explosive devices to groups—including Sunni Arab insurgents—that attack U.S.forces. The Iranian border with Iraq is porous, and millions of Iranians travel to Iraq each year tovisit Shia holy sites. Many Iraqis spoke of Iranian meddling, and Sunnis took a particularlyalarmist view. One leading Sunni politician told us, “If you turn over any stone in Iraq today,you will find Iran underneath.”U.S., Iraqi, and international officials also commented on the range of tensions between theUnited States and Iran, including Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism, Iran’sinfluence in Lebanon and the region, and Iran’s influence in Iraq. Iran appears content for theU.S. military to be tied down in Iraq, a position that limits U.S. options in addressing Iran’snuclear program and allows Iran leverage over stability in Iraq. Proposed talks between Iran andthe United States about the situation in Iraq have not taken place. One Iraqi official told us:“Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets of Baghdad.”SYRIA. Syria is also playing a counterproductive role. Iraqis are upset about what theyperceive as Syrian support for efforts to undermine the Iraqi government. The Syrian role is notso much to take active measures as to countenance malign neglect: the Syrians look the otherway as arms and foreign fighters flow across their border into Iraq, and former Baathist leadersfind a safe haven within Syria. Like Iran, Syria is content to see the United States tied down inIraq. That said, the Syrians have indicated that they want a dialogue with the United States, andin November 2006 agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Iraq after a 24-year break.SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES. These countries for the most part have beenpassive and disengaged. They have declined to provide debt relief or substantial economicassistance to the Iraqi government. Several Iraqi Sunni Arab politicians complained that SaudiArabia has not provided political support for their fellow Sunnis within Iraq. One observed thatSaudi Arabia did not even send a letter when the Iraqi government was formed, whereas Iran hasan ambassador in Iraq. Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals withinSaudi Arabia and the Gulf States, even as those governments help facilitate U.S. militaryoperations in Iraq by providing basing and overflight rights and by cooperating on intelligenceissues.As worries about Iraq increase, the Gulf States are becoming more active. The United ArabEmirates and Kuwait have hosted meetings in support of the International Compact. SaudiArabia recently took the positive step of hosting a conference of Iraqi religious leaders in Mecca.Several Gulf States have helped foster dialogue with Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. While theGulf States are not proponents of democracy in Iraq, they worry about the direction of events: -battle-hardened insurgents from Iraq could pose a threat to their own internal stability, and thegrowth of Iranian influence in the region is deeply troubling to them.TURKEY. Turkish policy toward Iraq is focused on discouraging Kurdish nationalism, whichis seen as an existential threat to Turkey’s own internal stability. The Turks have supported theTurkmen minority within Iraq and have used their influence to try to block the incorporation ofKirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, Turkish companies have invested in Kurdishareas in northern Iraq, and Turkish and Kurdish leaders have sought constructive engagement onpolitical, security, and economic issues.The Turks are deeply concerned about the operations of the Kurdish Workers Party(PKK)—a terrorist group based in northern Iraq that has killed thousands of Turks. They areupset that the United States and Iraq have not targeted the PKK more aggressively. The Turkshave threatened to go after the PKK themselves, and have made several forays across the borderinto Iraq.JORDAN AND EGYPT. Both Jordan and Egypt have provided some assistance for the Iraqigovernment. Jordan has trained thousands of Iraqi police, has an ambassador in Baghdad, andKing Abdullah recently hosted a meeting in Amman between President Bush and PrimeMinister Maliki. Egypt has provided some limited Iraqi army training. Both Jordan and Egypthave facilitated U.S. military operations—Jordan by allowing overflight and search-and-rescueoperations, Egypt by allowing overflight and Suez Canal transits; both provide importantcooperation on intelligence. Jordan is currently home to 700,000 Iraqi refugees (equal to 10percent of its population) and fears a flood of many more. Both Jordan and Egypt are concernedabout the position of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and want constitutional reforms in Iraq to bolster theSunni community. They also fear the return of insurgents to their countries.The International CommunityThe international community beyond the United Kingdom and our other coalition partners hasplayed a limited role in Iraq. The United Nations—acting under Security Council Resolution1546—has a small presence in Iraq; it has assisted in holding elections, drafting theconstitution, organizing the government, and building institutions. The World Bank, which hascommitted a limited number of resources, has one and sometimes two staff in Iraq. TheEuropean Union has a representative there.Several U.S.-based and international nongovernmental organizations have done excellentwork within Iraq, operating under great hardship. Both Iraqi and international nongovernmentalorganizations play an important role in reaching across sectarian lines to enhance dialogue andunderstanding, and several U.S.-based organizations have employed substantial resources to helpIraqis develop their democracy. However, the participation of international nongovernmentalorganizations is constrained by the lack of security, and their Iraqi counterparts face acumbersome and often politicized process of registration with the government.The United Kingdom has dedicated an extraordinary amount of resources to Iraq and hasmade great sacrifices. In addition to 7,200 troops, the United Kingdom has a substantialdiplomatic presence, particularly in Basra and the Iraqi southeast. The United Kingdom hasbeen an active and key player at every stage of Iraq’s political development. U.K. officials toldus that they remain committed to working for stability in Iraq, and will reduce theircommitment of troops and resources in response to the situation on the ground.5. ConclusionsThe United States has made a massive commitment to the future of Iraq in both blood andtreasure. As of December 2006, nearly 2,900 Americans have lost their lives serving in Iraq.Another 21,000 Americans have been wounded, many severely.To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion on the Iraq War, and costs arerunning about $8 billion per month. In addition, the United States must expect significant “tailcosts” to come. Caring for veterans and replacing lost equipment will run into the hundreds ofbillions of dollars. Estimates run as high as $2 trillion for the final cost of the U.S. involvementin Iraq.Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive and the situation is deteriorating.The Iraqi government cannot now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of theUnited States. Iraqis have not been convinced that they must take responsibility for their ownfuture. Iraq’s neighbors and much of the international community have not been persuaded toplay an active and constructive role in supporting Iraq. The ability of the United States to shapeoutcomes is diminishing. Time is running out.B. Consequences of Continued Decline in IraqIf the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, theUnited States, the region, and the world.Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and inflict greater suffering upon theIraqi people. A collapse of Iraq’s government and economy would further cripple a countryalready unable to meet its people’s needs. Iraq’s security forces could split along sectarian lines.A humanitarian catastrophe could follow as more refugees are forced to relocate across thecountry and the region. Ethnic cleansing could escalate. The Iraqi people could be subjected toanother strongman who flexes the political and military muscle required to impose order amidanarchy. Freedoms could be lost.Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their borders. Chaos in Iraqcould lead those countries to intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking abroader regional war. Turkey could send troops into northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan fromdeclaring independence. Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern Iraq andperhaps gain control of oil fields. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time when thatcountry is on a path to producing nuclear weapons.Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that they fear the distinct possibility ofSunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world. Many expressed a fear of Shia insurrections—perhaps fomented by Iran—in Sunni-ruled states. Such a broader sectarian conflict could open aPandora’s box of problems—including the radicalization of populations, mass movements ofpopulations, and regime changes—that might take decades to play out. If the instability in Iraqspreads to the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead to a sharpincrease in the price of oil and thus could harm the global economy.Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, “Al Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq,like McDonald’s.” Left unchecked, al Qaeda in Iraq could continue to incite violence betweenSunnis and Shia. A chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of operations for terroristswho seek to act regionally or even globally. Al Qaeda will portray any failure by the UnitedStates in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for theircause in the region and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to Osama bin Laden, hasdeclared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they will seek to expel the Americans and then spread “thejihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.” A senior European official told us thatfailure in Iraq could incite terrorist attacks within his country.The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends further into chaos.Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities.Perceived failure there could diminish America’s credibility and influence in a region that is thecenter of the Islamic world and vital to the world’s energy supply. This loss would reduceAmerica’s global influence at a time when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran, and elsewheredemand our full attention and strong U.S. leadership of international alliances. And the longerthat U.S. political and military resources are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances forAmerican failure in Afghanistan increase.Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization within the United States.Sixty-six percent of Americans disapprove of the government’s handling of the war, and morethan 60 percent feel that there is no clear plan for moving forward. The November elections werelargely viewed as a referendum on the progress in Iraq. Arguments about continuing to providesecurity and assistance to Iraq will fall on deaf ears if Americans become disillusioned with thegovernment that the United States invested so much to create. U.S. foreign policy cannot besuccessfully sustained without the broad support of the American people.Continued problems in Iraq could also lead to greater Iraqi opposition to the UnitedStates. Recent polling indicates that only 36 percent of Iraqis feel their country is heading in theright direction, and 79 percent of Iraqis have a “mostly negative” view of the influence that theUnited States has in their country. Sixty-one percent of Iraqis approve of attacks on U.S.-ledforces. If Iraqis continue to perceive Americans as representing an occupying force, the UnitedStates could become its own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny.These and other predictions of dire consequences in Iraq and the region are by no means acertainty. Iraq has taken several positive steps since Saddam Hussein was overthrown: Iraqisrestored full sovereignty, conducted open national elections, drafted a permanent constitution,ratified that constitution, and elected a new government pursuant to that constitution. Iraqis maybecome so sobered by the prospect of an unfolding civil war and intervention by their regionalneighbors that they take the steps necessary to avert catastrophe. But at the moment, such ascenario seems implausible because the Iraqi people and their leaders have been slow todemonstrate the capacity or will to act.C. Some Alternative Courses in IraqBecause of the gravity of the situation in Iraq and of its consequences for Iraq, the United States,the region, and the world, the Iraq Study Group has carefully considered the full range ofalternative approaches for moving forward. We recognize that there is no perfect solution and thatall that have been suggested have flaws. The following are some of the more notablepossibilities that we have considered.1. Precipitate WithdrawalBecause of the importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, and the role and commitments ofthe United States in initiating events that have led to the current situation, we believe it wouldbe wrong for the United States to abandon the country through a precipitate withdrawal of troopsand support. A premature American departure from Iraq would almost certainly produce greatersectarian violence and further deterioration of conditions, leading to a number of the adverseconsequences outlined above. The near-term results would be a significant power vacuum,greater human suffering, regional destabilization, and a threat to the global economy. Al Qaedawould depict our withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave and Iraq descends into chaos, thelong-range consequences could eventually require the United States to return.2. Staying the CourseCurrent U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq is rising and the governmentis not advancing national reconciliation. Making no changes in policy would simply delay theday of reckoning at a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The UnitedStates is spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to other international crises isconstrained. A majority of the American people are soured on the war. This level of expense isnot sustainable over an extended period, especially when progress is not being made. The longerthe United States remains in Iraq without progress, the more resentment will grow among Iraqiswho believe they are subjects of a repressive American occupation. As one U.S. official said tous, “Our leaving would make it worse. . . . The current approach without modification will notmake it better.”
3. More Troops for IraqSustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence inIraq, which is the absence of national reconciliation. A senior American general told us thatadding U.S. troops might temporarily help limit violence in a highly localized area. However,past experience indicates that the violence would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces aremoved to another area. As another American general told us, if the Iraqi government does notmake political progress, “all the troops in the world will not provide security.” Meanwhile,America’s military capacity is stretched thin: we do not have the troops or equipment to make a substantial, sustained increase in our troop presence. Increased deployments to Iraq would also necessarily hamper our ability to provide adequate resources for our efforts in Afghanistan or respond to crises around the world.
4. Devolution to Three RegionsThe costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with loose centralcontrol would be too high. Because Iraq’s population is not neatly separated, regionalboundaries cannot be easily drawn. All eighteen Iraqi provinces have mixed populations, as doBaghdad and most other major cities in Iraq. A rapid devolution could result in masspopulation movements, collapse of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening of militias, ethniccleansing, destabilization of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominateIraqi regions. Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division would confirm widerfears across the Arab world that the United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state.While such devolution is a possible consequence of continued instability in Iraq, we donot believe the United States should support this course as a policy goal or impose thisoutcome on the Iraqi state. If events were to move irreversibly in this direction, the UnitedStates should manage the situation to ameliorate humanitarian consequences, contain the spreadof violence, and minimize regional instability. The United States should support as much as -possible central control by governmental authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question ofoil revenues.D. Achieving Our GoalsWe agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the President: an Iraq that can“govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself.” In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with abroadly representative government that maintains its territorial integrity, is at peace with itsneighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn’t brutalize its own people. Given the currentsituation in Iraq, achieving this goal will require much time and will depend primarily on theactions of the Iraqi people.In our judgment, there is a new way forward for the United States to support thisobjective, and it will offer people of Iraq a reasonable opportunity to lead a better life than theydid under Saddam Hussein. Our recommended course has shortcomings, as does each of thepolicy alternatives we have reviewed. We firmly believe, however, that it includes the beststrategies and tactics available to us to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region.We believe that it could enable a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a chanceto pursue a better future, as well as serving America’s interests and values in the years ahead.
IIThe Way Forward—
A New ApproachProgress in Iraq is still possible if new approaches are taken promptly by Iraq, the United States,and other countries that have a stake in the Middle East.To attain the goals we have outlined, changes in course must be made both outside andinside Iraq. Our report offers a comprehensive strategy to build regional and international supportfor stability in Iraq, as it encourages the Iraqi people to assume control of their own destiny. Itoffers a responsible transition.Externally, the United States should immediately begin to employ all elements ofAmerican power to construct a regional mechanism that can support, rather than retard, progressin Iraq. Internally, the Iraqi government must take the steps required to achieve nationalreconciliation, reduce violence, and improve the daily lives of Iraqis. Efforts to implement theseexternal and internal strategies must begin now and must be undertaken in concert with oneanother.This responsible transition can allow for a reduction in the U.S. presence in Iraq overtime.A. The External Approach: Buildingan International ConsensusThe United States must build a new international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region.In order to foster such consensus, the United States should embark on a robust diplomaticeffort to establish an international support structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions inother countries in the region. This support structure should include every country that has aninterest in averting a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors—Iran and Syria among them.Despite the well-known differences between many of these countries, they all share an interest inavoiding the horrific consequences that would flow from a chaotic Iraq, particularly ahumanitarian catastrophe and regional destabilization.A reinvigorated diplomatic effort is required because it is clear that the Iraqi governmentcannot succeed in governing, defending, and sustaining itself by relying on U.S. military andeconomic support alone. Nor can the Iraqi government succeed by relying only on U.S. militarysupport in conjunction with Iraqi military and police capabilities. Some states have beenwithholding commitments they could make to support Iraq’s stabilization and reconstruction.Some states have been actively undermining stability in Iraq. To achieve a political solutionwithin Iraq, a broader international support structure is needed.1. The New Diplomatic OffensiveIraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional issues, interests, andunresolved conflicts. To put it simply, all key issues in the Middle East—the Arab-Israeliconflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism and terrorism—are inextricably linked. In addition to supporting stability in Iraq, a comprehensive diplomaticoffensive—the New Diplomatic Offensive—should address these key regional issues. By doingso, it would help marginalize extremists and terrorists, promote U.S. values and interests, andimprove America’s global image.Under the diplomatic offensive, we propose regional and international initiatives and stepsto assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones.Achieving these milestones will require at least the acquiescence of Iraq’s neighbors, and theiractive and timely cooperation would be highly desirable.
The diplomatic offensive would extend beyond the primarily economic “Compact for Iraq”by also emphasizing political, diplomatic, and security issues. At the same time, it would becoordinated with the goals of the Compact for Iraq. The diplomatic offensive would also bebroader and more far-reaching than the “Gulf Plus Two” efforts currently being conducted, andthose efforts should be folded into and become part of the diplomatic offensive.States included within the diplomatic offensive can play a major role in reinforcingnational reconciliation efforts between Iraqi Sunnis and Shia. Such reinforcement wouldcontribute substantially to legitimizing of the political process in Iraq. Iraq’s leaders may not beable to come together unless they receive the necessary signals and support from abroad. This backing will not materialize of its own accord, and must be encouraged urgently by the United States.
In order to advance a comprehensive diplomatic solution, the Study Group recommends asfollows:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with the Iraqi government, shouldlaunch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. This new diplomatic offensive should be launched before December 31, 2006.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional playersshould be to:
i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s neighbors.iii. Secure Iraq’s borders, including the use of joint patrols with neighboring countries.iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond Iraq’s borders.v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and, if possible, militaryassistance for the Iraqi government from non-neighboring Muslim nations.vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in Iraq.vii. Validate Iraq’s legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, andreestablishing embassies in Baghdad.viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key capitals in the region (for -example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk.x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones,including better performance on issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distributionof oil revenues, and the dismantling of militias.RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and in addition to theSupport Group discussed below, the United States and the Iraqi government should support the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic presence in Iraq.
2. The Iraq International Support GroupThis new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includes the active participation of those countries that have a critical stake in preventing Iraq from falling into chaos. To encourage their participation, the United States should immediately seek the creation of the Iraq International Support Group. The Support Group should also include all countries that border Iraq as well as other key countries in the region and the world.The Support Group would not seek to impose obligations or undertakings on thegovernment of Iraq. Instead, the Support Group would assist Iraq in ways the government of Iraq would desire, attempting to strengthen Iraq’s sovereignty—not diminish it.It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq’s neighbors are anxious about thesituation in Iraq. They favor a unified Iraq that is strong enough to maintain its territorialintegrity, but not so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None favors the breakup of the Iraqistate. Each country in the region views the situation in Iraq through the filter of its particular setof interests. For example:• Turkey opposes an independent or even highly autonomous Kurdistan because of its ownnational security considerations.• Iran backs Shia claims and supports various Shia militias in Iraq, but it also supports othergroups in order to enhance its influence and hedge its bets on possible outcomes.• Syria, despite facilitating support for Iraqi insurgent groups, would be threatened by theimpact that the breakup of Iraq would have on its own multiethnic and multiconfessional -society.• Kuwait wants to ensure that it will not once again be the victim of Iraqi irredentism andaggression.• Saudi Arabia and Jordan share Sunni concerns over Shia ascendancy in Iraq and the region as a whole.• The other Arab Gulf states also recognize the benefits of an outcome in Iraq that does notdestabilize the region and exacerbate Shia-Sunni tensions.• None of Iraq’s neighbors especially major countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, andIsrael see it in their interest for the situation in Iraq to lead to aggrandized regional influenceby Iran. Indeed, they may take active steps to limit Iran’s influence, steps that could lead toan intraregional conflict.Left to their own devices, these governments will tend to reinforce ethnic, sectarian, andpolitical divisions within Iraqi society. But if the Support Group takes a systematic and activeapproach toward considering the concerns of each country, we believe that each can beencouraged to play a positive role in Iraq and the region.
SAUDI ARABIA. Saudi Arabia’s agreement not to intervene with assistance to Sunni ArabIraqis could be an essential quid pro quo for similar forbearance on the part of other neighbors, especially Iran. The Saudis could use their Islamic credentials to help reconcile differences between Iraqi factions and build broader support in the Islamic world for a stabilization agreement, as their recent hosting of a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Mecca suggests. If the government in Baghdad pursues a path of national reconciliation with the Sunnis, the Saudis could help Iraq confront and eliminate al Qaeda in Iraq. They could also cancel the Iraqi debt owed them. In addition, the Saudis might be helpful in persuading the Syrians to cooperate.
TURKEY. As a major Sunni Muslim country on Iraq’s borders, Turkey can be a partner insupporting the national reconciliation process in Iraq. Such efforts can be particularly helpfulgiven Turkey’s interest in Kurdistan remaining an integral part of a unified Iraq and its interestin preventing a safe haven for Kurdish terrorists (the PKK).EGYPT. Because of its important role in the Arab world, Egypt should be encouraged to fosterthe national reconciliation process in Iraq with a focus on getting the Sunnis to participate. Atthe same time, Egypt has the means, and indeed has offered, to train groups of Iraqi military and security forces in Egypt on a rotational basis.
JORDAN. Jordan, like Egypt, can help in the national reconciliation process in Iraq with theSunnis. It too has the professional capability to train and equip Iraqi military and security forces.
RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, an IraqInternational Support Group should be organized immediately following the launch of the NewDiplomatic Offensive.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the statesbordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the GulfStates; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; the EuropeanUnion; and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries for instance, Germany, Japan and SouthKorea—that might be willing to contribute to resolving political, diplomatic, and securityproblems affecting Iraq could also become members.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of the Support Groupshould be carried out with urgency, and should be conducted by and organized at the level offoreign minister or above. The Secretary of State, if not the President, should lead the U.S.effort. That effort should be both bilateral and multilateral, as circumstances require.RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on the participation of the office ofthe United Nations Secretary-General in its work. The United Nations Secretary-General shoulddesignate a Special Envoy as his representative.RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the New Diplomatic Offensive, shoulddevelop specific approaches to neighboring countries that take into account the interests,perspectives, and potential contributions as suggested above.3. Dealing with Iran and SyriaDealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our view that in diplomacy, anation can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflicts anddifferences consistent with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should activelyengage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions.The Study Group recognizes that U.S. relationships with Iran and Syria involve difficultissues that must be resolved. Diplomatic talks should be extensive and substantive, and theywill require a balancing of interests. The United States has diplomatic, economic, and militarydisincentives available in approaches to both Iran and Syria. However, the United States shouldalso consider incentives to try to engage them constructively, much as it did successfully withLibya.Some of the possible incentives to Iran, Syria, or both include:i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors and the region.ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the Taliban from destabilizingAfghanistan.iii. Accession to international organizations, including the World Trade Organization.iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United States.v. The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and economic reforms instead of (asIran now perceives it) advocating regime change.vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated between Israel and Syria,with U.S. involvement as part of a broader initiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlinedbelow.RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and the SupportGroup, the United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtaintheir commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. In engagingSyria and Iran, the United States should consider incentives, as well as disincentives, in seekingconstructive results.IRAN. Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state of the U.S.-Iranian relationship.Yet the United States and Iran cooperated in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore whetherthis model can be replicated in the case of Iraq.Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United States bogged down in Iraq, Iran’sinterests would not be served by a failure of U.S. policy in Iraq that led to chaos and theterritorial disintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran’s population is slightly more than 50 percentPersian, but it has a large Azeri minority (24 percent of the population) as well as Kurdish andArab minorities. Worst-case scenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, withserious consequences for Iranian national security interests.Our limited contacts with Iran’s government lead us to believe that its leaders are likely tosay they will not participate in diplomatic efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute thisreluctance to their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran.Nevertheless, as one of Iraq’s neighbors Iran should be asked to assume its responsibilityto participate in the Support Group. An Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq andthe rest of the world Iran’s rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead to its isolation.Further, Iran’s refusal to cooperate on this matter would diminish its prospects of engaging withthe United States in the broader dialogue it seeks.RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealtwith by the United Nations Security Council and its five permanent members (i.e., the UnitedStates, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) plus Germany.RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts within the Support Group should seek topersuade Iran that it should take specific steps to improve the situation in Iraq.Among steps Iran could usefully take are the following:• Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and training to any group resorting toviolence in Iraq.• Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity of Iraq as a unified state, as wellas its respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its government.• Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, to encourage nationalreconciliation.• Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic reconstruction of Iraq.SYRIA. Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point, both countries have importantinterests in the region that could be enhanced if they were able to establish some commonground on how to move forward. This approach worked effectively in the early 1990s. In thiscontext, Syria’s national interests in the Arab-Israeli dispute are important and can be broughtinto play.Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq’s stability in several ways. Accordingly, theStudy Group recommends the following:RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support Group should encourage andpersuade Syria of the merit of such contributions as the following:• Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent possible and work together withIraqis on joint patrols on the border. Doing so will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents,and terrorists in and out of Iraq.• Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with the Iraqis.• Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq.4. The Wider Regional ContextThe United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the UnitedStates deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict.There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to acomprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must includedirect talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s rightto exist), and particularly Syria—which is the principal transit point for shipments of weaponsto Hezbollah, and which supports radical Palestinian groups.The United States does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding direct involvement to solve theArab-Israeli conflict. For several reasons, we should act boldly:• There is no military solution to this conflict.• The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being a nation perpetually at war.• No American administration—Democratic or Republican—will ever abandon Israel.• Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the Arab-Israeli dispute because it is anaxiom that when the political process breaks down there will be violence on the ground.• The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set forth in UN Security CouncilResolutions 242 and 338 and in the principle of “land for peace.”• The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace such as Israel has achieved withEgypt and Jordan.This effort would strongly support moderate Arab governments in the region, especiallythe democratically elected government of Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority underPresident Mahmoud Abbas.RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the UnitedStates to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon and Syria, and PresidentBush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include—as soon as possible—the unconditionalcalling and holding of meetings, under the auspices of the United States or the Quartet (i.e., theUnited States, Russia, European Union, and the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanonand Syria on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who acknowledge Israel’s right to exist)on the other. The purpose of these meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at theMadrid Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks—one Syrian/Lebanese, and the otherPalestinian.RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements of that negotiated peace shouldbe:• Syria’s full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 2006, whichprovides the framework for Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory.• Syria’s full cooperation with all investigations into political assassinations in Lebanon,especially those of Rafik Hariri and Pierre Gemayel.• A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use of Syrian territory fortransshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solveIsrael’s problem with Hezbollah.)• Syria’s use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for the release of the captured IsraeliDefense Force soldiers.• A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the democratically elected government ofLebanon.• A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting through Syria for Hamas and otherradical Palestinian groups.• A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment of Israel’s right toexist.• Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq.RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and in the context of a full and securepeace agreement, the Israelis should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee forIsrael that could include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if requestedby both parties.RECOMMENDATION 17: Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of that negotiated peaceshould include:• Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the principle of land forpeace, which are the only bases for achieving peace.• Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority totake the lead in preparing the way for negotiations with Israel.• A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating the cease-fire reachedbetween the Palestinians and the Israelis in November 2006.• Support for a Palestinian national unity government.• Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along the lines of PresidentBush’s two-state solution, which would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements,Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict.AfghanistanAt the same time, we must not lose sight of the importance of the situation inside Afghanistanand the renewed threat posed by the Taliban. Afghanistan’s borders are porous. If the Talibanwere to control more of Afghanistan, it could provide al Qaeda the political space to conductterrorist operations. This development would destabilize the region and have national securityimplications for the United States and other countries around the world. Also, the significantincrease in poppy production in Afghanistan fuels the illegal drug trade and narco-terrorism.The huge focus of U.S. political, military, and economic support on Iraq has necessarilydiverted attention from Afghanistan. As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq andthe Middle East, it must also give priority to the situation in Afghanistan. Doing so mayrequire increased political, security, and military measures.RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States to provide additional political,economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become availableas combat forces are moved from Iraq.B.The Internal Approach:Helping Iraqis Help ThemselvesThe New Diplomatic Offensive will provide the proper external environment and support for thedifficult internal steps that the Iraqi government must take to promote national reconciliation,establish security, and make progress on governance.The most important issues facing Iraq’s future are now the responsibility of Iraq’s electedleaders. Because of the security and assistance it provides, the United States has a significantrole to play. Yet only the government and people of Iraq can make and sustain certain decisionscritical to Iraq’s future.1. Performance on MilestonesThe United States should work closely with Iraq’s leaders to support the achievement of specificobjectives—or milestones—on national reconciliation, security, and governance. Miraclescannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. The Iraqigovernment needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens of the United States and othercountries—that it deserves continued support.The U.S. government must make clear that it expects action by the Iraqi government tomake substantial progress toward these milestones. Such a message can be sent only at the levelof our national leaders, and only in person, during direct consultation.As President Bush’s meeting with Prime Minister Maliki in Amman, Jordandemonstrates, it is important for the President to remain in close and frequent contact with theIraqi leadership. There is no substitute for sustained dialogue at the highest levels ofgovernment.During these high-level exchanges, the United States should lay out an agenda forcontinued support to help Iraq achieve milestones, as well as underscoring the consequences ifIraq does not act. It should be unambiguous that continued U.S. political, military, andeconomic support for Iraq depends on the Iraqi government’s demonstrating political will andmaking substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation,security, and governance. The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces unitsfrom the United States to Iraq should be influenced by Iraq’s performance on milestones.The United States should also signal that it is seeking broad international support for Iraqon behalf of achieving these milestones. The United States can begin to shape a positive climatefor its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq, through public statements by PresidentBush that reject the notion that the United States seeks to control Iraq’s oil, or seeks permanentmilitary bases within Iraq. However, the United States could consider a request from Iraq fortemporary bases.RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership of his national security teamshould remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts mustconvey a clear message: there must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantialprogress toward the achievement of milestones. In public diplomacy, the President shouldconvey as much detail as possible about the substance of these exchanges in order to keep theAmerican people, the Iraqi people, and the countries in the region well informed.RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makessubstantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security,and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training,assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces, and to continue political, military, andeconomic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq becomes more capable of governing,defending, and sustaining itself, the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced.RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress towardthe achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the UnitedStates should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that the United States does not seekpermanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary base orbases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any othergovernment.RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that the United States does not seek tocontrol Iraq’s oil.Milestones for IraqThe government of Iraq understands that dramatic steps are necessary to avert a downward spiraland make progress. Prime Minister Maliki has worked closely in consultation with the UnitedStates and has put forward the following milestones in the key areas of national reconciliation,security and governance:NATIONAL RECONCILIATIONBy the end of 2006–early 2007:Approval of the Provincial Election Law and setting an election dateApproval of the Petroleum LawApproval of the De-Baathification LawApproval of the Militia LawBy March 2007:A referendum on constitutional amendments (if it is necessary)By May 2007:Completion of Militia Law implementationApproval of amnesty agreementCompletion of reconciliation effortsBy June 2007:Provincial electionsSECURITY (pending joint U.S.-Iraqi review)By the end of 2006:Iraqi increase of 2007 security spending over 2006 levelsBy April 2007:Iraqi control of the ArmyBy September 2007:Iraqi control of provincesBy December 2007:Iraqi security self-reliance (with U.S. support)GOVERNANCEBy the end of 2006:The Central Bank of Iraq will raise interest rates to 20 percent and appreciate the Iraqidinar by 10 percent to combat accelerating inflation.Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleum products and sellimported fuel at market prices.RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated completion dates of the end of 2006 or early2007 for some milestones may not be realistic. These should be completed by the first quarter of2007.RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good start. The United States shouldconsult closely with the Iraqi government and develop additional milestones in three areas:national reconciliation, security, and improving government services affecting the daily lives ofIraqis. As with the current milestones, these additional milestones should be tied to calendardates to the fullest extent possible.2. National ReconciliationNational reconciliation is essential to reduce further violence and maintain the unity of Iraq.U.S. forces can help provide stability for a time to enable Iraqi leaders to negotiatepolitical solutions, but they cannot stop the violence—or even contain it—if there is nounderlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their country.The Iraqi government must send a clear signal to Sunnis that there is a place for them innational life. The government needs to act now, to give a signal of hope. Unless Sunnis believethey can get a fair deal in Iraq through the political process, there is no prospect that theinsurgency will end. To strike this fair deal, the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people mustaddress several issues that are critical to the success of national reconciliation and thus to thefuture of Iraq.Steps for Iraq to Take on Behalf ofNational ReconciliationRECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of the constitution is essential tonational reconciliation and should be pursued on an urgent basis. The United Nations hasexpertise in this field, and should play a role in this process.RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliation requires the reintegrationof Baathists and Arab nationalists into national life, with the leading figures of SaddamHussein’s regime excluded. The United States should encourage the return of qualified Iraqiprofessionals—Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd or Turkmen or Christian orArab—into the government.RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to the centralgovernment and be shared on the basis of population. No formula that gives control overrevenues from future fields to the regions or gives control of oil fields to the regions iscompatible with national reconciliation.RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial elections should be held at theearliest possible date. Under the constitution, new provincial elections should have been heldalready. They are necessary to restore representative government.RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in Kirkuk, internationalarbitration is necessary to avert communal violence. Kirkuk’s mix of Kurdish, Arab, andTurkmen populations could make it a powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (asrequired by the Iraqi Constitution before the end of 2007) would be explosive and should bedelayed. This issue should be placed on the agenda of the International Iraq Support Group aspart of the New Diplomatic Offensive.RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching. Any successfuleffort at national reconciliation must involve those in the government finding ways and means toreconcile with former bitter enemies.RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women and the rights of all minoritycommunities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, andArmenians, must be protected.RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government should stop using the processof registering nongovernmental organizations as a tool for politicizing or stopping theiractivities. Registration should be solely an administrative act, not an occasion for governmentcensorship and interference.Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf ofNational ReconciliationThe United States can take several steps to assist in Iraq’s reconciliation process.The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest in a national reconciliationdialogue. The point is not for the United States to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, anapproach that we oppose. The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear their sharedinterest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi forces take on the security mission. Asuccessful national reconciliation dialogue will advance that departure date.RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. force presence must be on the tablefor discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion will increase thelikelihood of participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase thepossibilities for success.Violence cannot end unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue must involve those who wieldpower, not simply those who hold political office. The United States must try to talk directly toGrand Ayatollah Sistani and must consider appointing a high-level American Shia Muslim toserve as an emissary to him. The United States must also try to talk directly to Moqtada al-Sadr, to militia leaders, and to insurgent leaders. The United Nations can help facilitatecontacts.RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts to engage all parties inIraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United States must find a way to talk to GrandAyatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders.The very focus on sectarian identity that endangers Iraq also presents opportunities to seekbroader support for a national reconciliation dialogue. Working with Iraqi leaders, theinternational community and religious leaders can play an important role in fostering dialogueand reconciliation across the sectarian divide. The United States should actively encourage theconstructive participation of all who can take part in advancing national reconciliation withinIraq.RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage dialogue between sectariancommunities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensive above. It should press religiousleaders inside and outside Iraq to speak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation.Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi government are an important incentive inreconciliation talks and they need to be generous. Amnesty proposals to once-bitter enemies willbe difficult for the United States to accept, just as they will be difficult for the Iraqis to make.Yet amnesty is an issue to be grappled with by the Iraqis, not by Americans. Despite beingpolitically unpopular—in the United States as well as in Iraq—amnesty is essential if progressis to take place. Iraqi leaders need to be certain that they have U.S. support as they moveforward with this critical element of national reconciliation.RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington byeither the executive or the legislative branch.Militias and National ReconciliationThe use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and necessary to stop militias that actas death squads or use violence against institutions of the state. However, solving the problemof militias requires national reconciliation.Dealing with Iraq’s militias will require long-term attention, and substantial funding willbe needed to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members into civilian society. Aroundthe world, this process of transitioning members of irregular military forces from civil conflict tonew lives once a peace settlement takes hold is familiar. The disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration of militias depends on national reconciliation and on confidence-building measuresamong the parties to that reconciliation.Both the United Nations and expert and experienced nongovernmental organizations,especially the International Organization for Migration, must be on the ground with appropriatepersonnel months before any program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia membersbegins. Because the United States is a party to the conflict, the U.S. military should not beinvolved in implementing such a program. Yet U.S. financial and technical support is crucial.RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support the presence of neutralinternational experts as advisors to the Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration.RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide financial and technical supportand establish a single office in Iraq to coordinate assistance to the Iraqi government and itsexpert advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members.3. Security and Military ForcesA Military Strategy for IraqThere is no action the American military can take that, by itself, can bring about success in Iraq.But there are actions that the U.S. and Iraqi governments, working together, can and should taketo increase the probability of avoiding disaster there, and increase the chance of success.The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently needed national reconciliationprogram to which it has already committed. And it should accelerate assuming responsibility forIraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. As the Iraqi Armyincreases in size and capability, the Iraqi government should be able to take real responsibilityfor governance.While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should significantlyincrease the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in andsupporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, we could begin to move combat forcesout of Iraq. The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting theIraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. We shouldcontinue to maintain support forces, rapid-reaction forces, special operations forces, intelligenceunits, search-and-rescue units, and force protection units.While the size and composition of the Iraqi Army is ultimately a matter for the Iraqigovernment to determine, we should be firm on the urgent near-term need for significantadditional trained Army brigades, since this is the key to Iraqis taking over full responsibilityfor their own security, which they want to do and which we need them to do. It is clear that theywill still need security assistance from the United States for some time to come as they work toachieve political and security changes.One of the most important elements of our support would be the imbedding ofsubstantially more U.S. military personnel in all Iraqi Army battalions and brigades, as well aswithin Iraqi companies. U.S. personnel would provide advice, combat assistance, and staffassistance. The training of Iraqi units by the United States has improved and should continue forthe coming year. In addition to this training, Iraqi combat units need supervised on-the-jobtraining as they move to field operations. This on-the-job training could be best done byimbedding more U.S. military personnel in Iraqi deployed units. The number of imbeddedpersonnel would be based on the recommendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but itshould be large enough to accelerate the development of a real combat capability in Iraqi Armyunits. Such a mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000 American troops instead of the 3,000 to4,000 now in this role. This increase in imbedded troops could be carried out without anaggregate increase over time in the total number of troops in Iraq by making a correspondingdecrease in troops assigned to U.S. combat brigades.Another mission of the U.S. military would be to assist Iraqi deployed brigades withintelligence, transportation, air support, and logistics support, as well as providing some keyequipment.A vital mission of the U.S. military would be to maintain rapid-reaction teams and specialoperations teams. These teams would be available to undertake strike missions against al Qaedain Iraq when the opportunity arises, as well as for other missions considered vital by the U.S.commander in Iraq.The performance of the Iraqi Army could also be significantly improved if it had improvedequipment. One source could be equipment left behind by departing U.S. units. The quickestand most effective way for the Iraqi Army to get the bulk of their equipment would be throughour Foreign Military Sales program, which they have already begun to use.While these efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being deployed,U.S. combat brigades could begin to move out of Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject tounexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades notnecessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq couldbe deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operationsteams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligenceand support efforts would continue. Even after the United States has moved all combat brigadesout of Iraq, we would maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our stillsignificant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait,Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces would besufficiently robust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi government, toaccomplish four missions:• Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order to avoid its collapse and thedisintegration of the country.• Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq using special operations teams.• Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces.• Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran.Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and to our ongoing fightagainst al Qaeda, we considered proposals to make a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000)in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not believe that theneeded levels are available for a sustained deployment. Further, adding more American troopscould conceivably worsen those aspects of the security problem that are fed by the view that theU.S. presence is intended to be a long-term “occupation.” We could, however, support a shorttermredeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up thetraining and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps wouldbe effective.We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because we believe that so muchis at stake.We believe that our recommended actions will give the Iraqi Army the support it needs tohave a reasonable chance to take responsibility for Iraq’s security. Given the ongoingdeterioration in the security situation, it is urgent to move as quickly as possible to have thatsecurity role taken over by Iraqi security forces.The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers ofAmerican troops deployed in Iraq for three compelling reasons.First, and most importantly, the United States faces other security dangers in the world,and a continuing Iraqi commitment of American ground forces at present levels will leave noreserve available to meet other contingencies. On September 7, 2006, General James Jones, ourNATO commander, called for more troops in Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces arefighting a resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban forces. The United States should respondpositively to that request, and be prepared for other security contingencies, including those inIran and North Korea.Second, the long-term commitment of American ground forces to Iraq at current levels isadversely affecting Army readiness, with less than a third of the Army units currently at highreadiness levels. The Army is unlikely to be able to meet the next rotation of troops in Iraqwithout undesirable changes in its deployment practices. The Army is now considering breakingits compact with the National Guard and Reserves that limits the number of years that thesecitizen-soldiers can be deployed. Behind this short-term strain is the longer-term risk that theground forces will be impaired in ways that will take years to reverse.And finally, an open-ended commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqigovernment the incentive it needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance ofquelling sectarian violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi government mightcontinue to delay taking those difficult actions.While it is clear that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is moderating the violence, thereis little evidence that the long-term deployment of U.S. troops by itself has led or will lead tofundamental improvements in the security situation. It is important to recognize that there are norisk-free alternatives available to the United States at this time. Reducing our combat troopcommitments in Iraq, whenever that occurs, undeniably creates risks, but leaving those forcestied down in Iraq indefinitely creates its own set of security risks.RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-ended commitment tokeep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government thatthe United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq doesnot implement its planned changes. America’s other security needs and the future of our militarycannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the training and equipping mission bythe first quarter of 2008, as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006.RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the highest prioritygiven to the training, equipping, advising, and support mission and to counterterrorismoperations.RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers and military personnelshould be assigned to the imbedded teams, and American teams should be present with Iraqiunits down to the company level. The U.S. military should establish suitable career-enhancingincentives for these officers and personnel.RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support more and better equipment forthe Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign Military Salesrequests and, as American combat brigades move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some Americanequipment for Iraqi forces.Restoring the U.S. MilitaryWe recognize that there are other results of the war in Iraq that have great consequence for ournation. One consequence has been the stress and uncertainty imposed on our military—the mostprofessional and proficient military in history. The United States will need its military toprotect U.S. security regardless of what happens in Iraq. We therefore considered how to limitthe adverse consequences of the strain imposed on our military by the Iraq war.U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have been stretched nearly to thebreaking point by the repeated deployments in Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 deadand more than 21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting, and accelerated wear onequipment.Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of disarray, as supplementalfunding winds down and reset costs become clear. It will be a major challenge to meet ongoingrequirements for other current and future security threats that need to be accommodated togetherwith spending for operations and maintenance, reset, personnel, and benefits for active duty andretired personnel. Restoring the capability of our military forces should be a high priority for theUnited States at this time.The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership between the civilian leadershipof the Department of Defense and the uniformed services. Both have long benefited from arelationship in which the civilian leadership exercises control with the advantage of fully candidprofessional advice, and the military serves loyally with the understanding that its advice hasbeen heard and valued. That tradition has frayed, and civil-military relations need to be repaired.RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to buildhealthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel freeto offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to thePresident and the National Security Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nicholslegislation.RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership shouldemphasize training and education programs for the forces that have returned to the continentalUnited States in order to “reset” the force and restore the U.S. military to a high level ofreadiness for global contingencies.RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the United States, Congress shouldappropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next five years.RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation with the relevantcommittees of Congress, should assess the full future budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and itspotential impact on the future readiness of the force, the ability to recruit and retain high-qualitypersonnel, needed investments in procurement and in research and development, and the budgetsof other U.S. government agencies involved in the stability and reconstruction effort.4. Police and Criminal JusticeThe problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system are profound.The ethos and training of Iraqi police forces must support the mission to “protect andserve” all Iraqis. Today, far too many Iraqi police do not embrace that mission, in part becauseof problems in how reforms were organized and implemented by the Iraqi and U.S.governments.Recommended Iraqi ActionsWithin Iraq, the failure of the police to restore order and prevent militia infiltration is due, inpart, to the poor organization of Iraq’s component police forces: the Iraqi National Police, theIraqi Border Police, and the Iraqi Police Service.The Iraqi National Police pursue a mission that is more military than domestic innature—involving commando-style operations—and is thus ill-suited to the Ministry of theInterior. The more natural home for the National Police is within the Ministry of Defense, whichshould be the authority for counterinsurgency operations and heavily armed forces. Thoughdepriving the Ministry of the Interior of operational forces, this move will place the IraqiNational Police under better and more rigorous Iraqi and U.S. supervision and will enable theseunits to better perform their counterinsurgency mission.RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to theMinistry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged with a role that bears little resemblance toordinary policing, especially in light of the current flow of foreign fighters, insurgents, andweaponry across Iraq’s borders and the need for joint patrols of the border with foreignmilitaries. Thus the natural home for the Border Police is within the Ministry of Defense, whichshould be the authority for controlling Iraq’s borders.RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police should be transferred to the Ministryof Defense, which would have total responsibility for border control and external security.The Iraqi Police Service, which operates in the provinces and provides local policing, needs tobecome a true police force. It needs legal authority, training, and equipment to control crime andprotect Iraqi citizens. Accomplishing those goals will not be easy, and the presence of Americanadvisors will be required to help the Iraqis determine a new role for the police.RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should be given greater responsibility toconduct criminal investigations and should expand its cooperation with other elements in theIraqi judicial system in order to better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians.In order to more effectively administer the Iraqi Police Service, the Ministry of the Interior needsto undertake substantial reforms to purge bad elements and highlight best practices. Once theministry begins to function effectively, it can exert a positive influence over the provinces andtake back some of the authority that was lost to local governments through decentralization. Toreduce corruption and militia infiltration, the Ministry of the Interior should take authority fromthe local governments for the handling of policing funds. Doing so will improve accountabilityand organizational discipline, limit the authority of provincial police officials, and identify policeofficers with the central government.RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo a process oforganizational transformation, including efforts to expand the capability and reach of the currentmajor crime unit (or Criminal Investigation Division) and to exert more authority over localpolice forces. The sole authority to pay police salaries and disburse financial support to localpolice should be transferred to the Ministry of the Interior.Finally, there is no alternative to bringing the Facilities Protection Service under the control ofthe Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. Simply disbanding these units is not an option, as themembers will take their weapons and become full-time militiamen or insurgents. All should bebrought under the authority of a reformed Ministry of the Interior. They will need to be vetted,retrained, and closely supervised. Those who are no longer part of the Facilities ProtectionService need to participate in a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program(outlined above).RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should proceed with current effortsto identify, register, and control the Facilities Protection Service.U.S. ActionsThe Iraqi criminal justice system is weak, and the U.S. training mission has been hindered by alack of clarity and capacity. It has not always been clear who is in charge of the police trainingmission, and the U.S. military lacks expertise in certain areas pertaining to police and the rule oflaw. The United States has been more successful in training the Iraqi Army than it has thepolice. The U.S. Department of Justice has the expertise and capacity to carry out the policetraining mission. The U.S. Department of Defense is already bearing too much of the burden inIraq. Meanwhile, the pool of expertise in the United States on policing and the rule of law hasbeen underutilized.The United States should adjust its training mission in Iraq to match the recommendedchanges in the Iraqi government—the movement of the National and Border Police to theMinistry of Defense and the new emphasis on the Iraqi Police Service within the Ministry of theInterior. To reflect the reorganization, the Department of Defense would continue to train theIraqi National and Border Police, and the Department of Justice would become responsible fortraining the Iraqi Police Service.RECOMMENDATION 55: The U.S. Department of Defense should continue its mission totrain the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border Police, which should be placed within theIraqi Ministry of Defense.RECOMMENDATION 56: The U.S. Department of Justice should direct the training missionof the police forces remaining under the Ministry of the Interior.RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training teams are imbedded within IraqiArmy units, the current practice of imbedding U.S. police trainers should be expanded and thenumbers of civilian training officers increased so that teams can cover all levels of the IraqiPolice Service, including local police stations. These trainers should be obtained from amongexperienced civilian police executives and supervisors from around the world. These officerswould replace the military police personnel currently assigned to training teams.The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided personnel to train the Criminal InvestigationDivision in the Ministry of the Interior, which handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded alarge team within Iraq for counterterrorism activities.Building on this experience, the training programs should be expanded and should includethe development of forensic investigation training and facilities that could apply scientific andtechnical investigative methods to counterterrorism as well as to ordinary criminal activity.RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative and forensic training andfacilities within Iraq, to include coverage of terrorism as well as criminal activity.One of the major deficiencies of the Iraqi Police Service is its lack of equipment, particularly inthe area of communications and motor transport.RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should provide funds to expand and upgradecommunications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service.The Department of Justice is also better suited than the Department of Defense to carry out themission of reforming Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior and Iraq’s judicial system. Iraq needs morethan training for cops on the beat: it needs courts, trained prosecutors and investigators, and theability to protect Iraqi judicial officials.RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice should lead the work oforganizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior. This approach must involve Iraqiofficials, starting at senior levels and moving down, to create a strategic plan and work outstandard administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures that Iraqis willaccept and use. These plans must be drawn up in partnership.RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to establish courts;to train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and to create institutions and practices to fightcorruption must be strongly supported and funded. New and refurbished courthouses withimproved physical security, secure housing for judges and judicial staff, witness protectionfacilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts of a secure and functioning systemof justice.5. The Oil SectorSince the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the Iraqi economy, the UnitedStates must do what it can to help Iraq maximize its capability.Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore oil production from existingfields to 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels a day over a three- to five-year period, depending on evolvingconditions in key reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow, oil production would declineunless current problems in the oil sector were addressed.Short TermRECOMMENDATION 62:• As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical assistance to the Iraqigovernment to prepare a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and local governmentsand creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract -investment.• The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to accelerate contracting for thecomprehensive well work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase production, but theUnited States should no longer fund such infrastructure projects.• The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and with private security forces toprotect oil infrastructure and contractors. Protective measures could include a program toimprove pipeline security by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput (rather thanfixed amounts).• Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This step wouldimmediately improve accountability in the oil sector.• In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. government should press Iraqto continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector, instead of providing grant assistance.Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain.Long TermExpanding oil production in Iraq over the long term will require creating corporate structures,establishing management systems, and installing competent managers to plan and oversee anambitious list of major oil-field investment projects.To improve oil-sector performance, the Study Group puts forward the followingrecommendations.RECOMMENDATION 63:• The United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the internationalcommunity and by international energy companies.• The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as acommercial enterprise, in order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.• To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government to post all oilcontracts, volumes, and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers can trackexports and export revenues.• The United States should support the World Bank’s efforts to ensure that best practices areused in contracting. This support involves providing Iraqi officials with contracting templatesand training them in contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits.• The United States should provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Oil for enhancingmaintenance, improving the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting andauditing, and updating professional training programs for management and technicalpersonnel.6. U.S. Economic and ReconstructionAssistanceBuilding the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the heart of U.S. reconstructionefforts, and capacity building demands additional U.S. resources.Progress in providing essential government services is necessary to sustain any progresson the political or security front. The period of large U.S.-funded reconstruction projects is over,yet the Iraqi government is still in great need of technical assistance and advice to build thecapacity of its institutions. The Iraqi government needs help with all aspects of its operations,including improved procedures, greater delegation of authority, and better internal controls. Thestrong emphasis on building capable central ministries must be accompanied by efforts todevelop functioning, effective provincial government institutions with local citizen participation.Job creation is also essential. There is no substitute for private-sector job generation, butthe Commander’s Emergency Response Program is a necessary transitional mechanism untilsecurity and the economic climate improve. It provides immediate economic assistance for trashpickup, water, sewers, and electricity in conjunction with clear, hold, and build operations, andit should be funded generously. A total of $753 million was appropriated for this program in FY2006.RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic assistance should be increased to a level of $5billion per year rather than being permitted to decline. The President needs to ask for thenecessary resources and must work hard to win the support of Congress. Capacity building andjob creation, including reliance on the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, should beU.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be provided on a nonsectarian basis.The New Diplomatic Offensive can help draw in more international partners to assist with thereconstruction mission. The United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, theOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and some Arab League membersneed to become hands-on participants in Iraq’s reconstruction.RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq should be greaterinvolvement by and with international partners, who should do more than just contributemoney. They should also actively participate in the design and construction of projects.The number of refugees and internally displaced persons within Iraq is increasing dramatically. Ifthis situation is not addressed, Iraq and the region could be further destabilized, and thehumanitarian suffering could be severe. Funding for international relief efforts is insufficient, andshould be increased.RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take the lead in funding assistancerequests from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarianagencies.Coordination of Economic andReconstruction AssistanceA lack of coordination by senior management in Washington still hampers U.S. contributionsto Iraq’s reconstruction.Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in short supply. No single officialis assigned responsibility or held accountable for the overall reconstruction effort.Representatives of key foreign partners involved in reconstruction have also spoken to us directlyand specifically about the need for a point of contact that can coordinate their efforts with theU.S. government.A failure to improve coordination will result in agencies continuing to follow conflictingstrategies, wasting taxpayer dollars on duplicative and uncoordinated efforts. This waste willfurther undermine public confidence in U.S. policy in Iraq.A Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq is required. He or she should reportto the President, be given a staff and funding, and chair a National Security Council interagencygroup consisting of senior principals at the undersecretary level from all relevant U.S.government departments and agencies. The Senior Advisor’s responsibility must be to bringunity of effort to the policy, budget, and implementation of economic reconstruction programs inIraq. The Senior Advisor must act as the principal point of contact with U.S. partners in theoverall reconstruction effort.He or she must have close and constant interaction with senior U.S. officials and militarycommanders in Iraq, especially the Director of the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office,so that the realities on the ground are brought directly and fully into the policy-making process.In order to maximize the effectiveness of assistance, all involved must be on the same page at alltimes.RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a Senior Advisor for EconomicReconstruction in Iraq.Improving the Effectiveness ofAssistance ProgramsCongress should work with the administration to improve its ability to implement assistanceprograms in Iraq quickly, flexibly, and effectively.As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the authority to fundquick-disbursing projects to promote national reconciliation, as well as to rescind funding fromprograms and projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating effectivepartnership. These are important tools to improve performance and accountability—as is thework of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the authority to spendsignificant funds through a program structured along the lines of the Commander’s EmergencyResponse Program, and should have the authority to rescind funding from programs and projectsin which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership.RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector General for IraqReconstruction should be renewed for the duration of assistance programs in Iraq.U.S. security assistance programs in Iraq are slowed considerably by the differing requirementsof State and Defense Department programs and of their respective congressional oversightcommittees. Since Iraqi forces must be trained and equipped, streamlining the provision oftraining and equipment to Iraq is critical. Security assistance should be delivered promptly,within weeks of a decision to provide it.RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance program for Iraq, breaking downthe barriers to effective interagency cooperation, should be authorized and implemented.The United States also needs to break down barriers that discourage U.S. partnerships withinternational donors and Iraqi participants to promote reconstruction. The ability of the UnitedStates to form such partnerships will encourage greater international participation in Iraq.RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds with those from international donorsand Iraqi participants on behalf of assistance projects should be provided.7. Budget Preparation, Presentation,and ReviewThe public interest is not well served by the government’s preparation, presentation, and reviewof the budget for the war in Iraq.First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal budget request but inrequests for emergency supplemental appropriations. This means that funding requests are drawnup outside the normal budget process, are not offset by budgetary reductions elsewhere, andmove quickly to the White House with minimal scrutiny. Bypassing the normal review erodesbudget discipline and accountability.Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in a confusing manner, making itdifficult for both the general public and members of Congress to understand the request or todifferentiate it from counterterrorism operations around the world or operations in Afghanistan.Detailed analyses by budget experts are needed to answer what should be a simple question:“How much money is the President requesting for the war in Iraq?”Finally, circumvention of the budget process by the executive branch erodes oversight andreview by Congress. The authorizing committees (including the House and Senate ArmedServices committees) spend the better part of a year reviewing the President’s annual budgetrequest. When the President submits an emergency supplemental request, the authorizingcommittees are bypassed. The request goes directly to the appropriations committees, and theyare pressured by the need to act quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds. Theresult is a spending bill that passes Congress with perfunctory review. Even worse, the mustpassappropriations bill becomes loaded with special spending projects that would not survivethe normal review process.RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the President’sannual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal budgetprocess should not be circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presentedclearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out its constitutionalresponsibility to review budget requests for the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.8. U.S. PersonnelThe United States can take several steps to ensure that it has personnel with the right skillsserving in Iraq.All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by Americans’ lack oflanguage and cultural understanding. Our embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six ofwhom are at the level of fluency. In a conflict that demands effective and efficient communicationwith Iraqis, we are often at a disadvantage. There are still far too few Arab language– proficientmilitary and civilian officers in Iraq, to the detriment of the U.S. mission.Civilian agencies also have little experience with complex overseas interventions to restoreand maintain order—stability operations—outside of the normal embassy setting. The nature ofthe mission in Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous, and the United States has had great difficultyfilling civilian assignments in Iraq with sufficient numbers of properly trained personnel at theappropriate rank.RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director ofNational Intelligence should accord the highest possible priority to professional languageproficiency and cultural training, in general and specifically for U.S. officers and personnel aboutto be assigned to Iraq.RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough civilians volunteer to fill keypositions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed assignments. Stepsshould be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed assignments,including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq.RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United States government needs toimprove how its constituent agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development,Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others—respond to a complex stabilityoperation like that represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previousdecade’s operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations acrossagency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in theU.S. armed services.RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should train personnel to carry out civiliantasks associated with a complex stability operation outside of the traditional embassy setting. Itshould establish a Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surgecapacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including Treasury, Justice, andAgriculture, need to create similar technical assistance capabilities.9. IntelligenceWhile the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimes superb tacticalintelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government still does not understand very well either theinsurgency in Iraq or the role of the militias.A senior commander told us that human intelligence in Iraq has improved from 10 percentto 30 percent. Clearly, U.S. intelligence agencies can and must do better. As mentioned above, an essential part of better intelligence must be improved language and cultural skills. As an intelligence analyst told us, “We rely too much on others to bring information to us, and too often don’t understand what is reported back because we do not understand the context of what we are told.”
The Defense Department and the intelligence community have not invested sufficient -people and resources to understand the political and military threat to American men and women in the armed forces. Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year for countermeasures to protect our troops in Iraq against improvised explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the people who fabricate, plant, and explode those devices.
We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the job at the Defense IntelligenceAgency who have more than two years’ experience in analyzing the insurgency. Capableanalysts are rotated to new assignments, and on-the-job training begins anew. Agencies musthave a better personnel system to keep analytic expertise focused on the insurgency. They arenot doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a national andprovincial level. The analytic community’s knowledge of the organization, leadership,financing, and operations of militias, as well as their relationship to government security forces,also falls far short of what policy makers need to know.
In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq. The standard forrecording attacks acts as a filter to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn’t hurt U.S. personnel doesn’t count. For example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.
RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defenseshould devote significantly greater analytic resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defenseshould also institute immediate changes in the collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground.Recommended Iraqi Actions The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability, initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take full responsibility for this intelligence function.
To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the CIA should increase its personnelin Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence personnel. The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials, acounterterrorism intelligence center for the all-source fusion of information on the various sources of terrorism within Iraq. This center would analyze data concerning the individuals,organizations, networks, and support groups involved in terrorism within Iraq. It would alsofacilitate intelligence-led police and military actions against them.
RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to developand train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts.
Appendices
Letter from the Sponsoring OrganizationsThe initiative for a bipartisan, independent, forward-looking “fresh-eyes” assessment of Iraqemerged from conversations U.S. House Appropriations Committee Member Frank Wolf hadwith us. In late 2005, Congressman Wolf asked the United States Institute of Peace, a bipartisan federal entity, to facilitate the assessment, in collaboration with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Interested members of Congress, in consultation with the sponsoring organizations and theadministration, agreed that former Republican U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III andformer Democratic Congressman Lee H. Hamilton had the breadth of knowledge of foreign affairs required to co-chair this bipartisan effort. The co-chairs subsequently selected the other members of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, all senior individuals with distinguished records of public service. Democrats included former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, former Governor and U.S. Senator Charles S. Robb, former Congressman and White House chief of staff Leon E. Panetta, and Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., advisor to President Bill Clinton. Republicans included former Associate Justice to the U.S. Supreme Court Sandra Day O’Connor, former U.S. Senator Alan K. Simpson, former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, and former Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger. Former CIA Director Robert Gates was an active member for a period of months until his nomination as Secretary of Defense.The Iraq Study Group was launched on March 15, 2006, in a Capitol Hill meeting hostedby U.S. Senator John Warner and attended by congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle.
To support the Study Group, the sponsoring organizations created four expert workinggroups consisting of 44 leading foreign policy analysts and specialists on Iraq. The workinggroups, led by staff of the United States Institute of Peace, focused on the Strategic Environment, Military and Security Issues, Political Development, and the Economy and Reconstruction.
Every effort was made to ensure the participation of experts across a wide span of the politicalspectrum. Additionally, a panel of retired military officers was consulted.We are grateful to all those who have assisted the Study Group, especially the supportingexperts and staff. Our thanks go to Daniel P. Serwer of the Institute of Peace, who served asexecutive director; Christopher Kojm, advisor to the Study Group; John Williams, PolicyAssistant to Mr. Baker; and Ben Rhodes, Special Assistant to Mr. Hamilton.Richard H. Solomon, PresidentUnited States Institute of PeaceEdward P. Djerejian, Founding DirectorJames A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy,Rice UniversityDavid M. Abshire, PresidentCenter for the Study of the PresidencyJohn J. Hamre, PresidentCenter for Strategic and International StudiesIraq Study Group Plenary SessionsMarch 15, 2006April 11–12, 2006May 18–19, 2005June 13–14, 2006August 2–3, 2006August 30–September 4, 2006 (Trip to Baghdad)September 18–19, 2006November 13–14, 2006November 27–29, 2006Iraq Study Group Consultations(* denotes a meeting that took place in Iraq)Iraqi Officials and Representatives* Jalal Talabani—President* Tariq al-Hashimi—Vice President* Adil Abd al-Mahdi—Vice President* Nouri Kamal al-Maliki—Prime Minister* Salaam al-Zawbai—Deputy Prime Minister* Barham Salih—Deputy Prime Minister* Mahmoud al-Mashhadani—Speaker of the Parliament* Mowaffak al-Rubaie—National Security Advisor* Jawad Kadem al-Bolani—Minister of Interior* Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi—Minister of Defense* Hoshyar Zebari—Minister of Foreign Affairs* Bayan Jabr—Minister of Finance* Hussein al-Shahristani—Minster of Oil* Karim Waheed—Minister of Electricity* Akram al-Hakim—Minister of State for National Reconciliation Affairs* Mithal al-Alusi—Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation* Ayad Jamal al-Din—Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation* Ali Khalifa al-Duleimi—Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation* Sami al-Ma’ajoon—Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation* Muhammad Ahmed Mahmoud—Member, Commission on National Reconciliation* Wijdan Mikhael—Member, High Commission on National ReconciliationLt. General Nasir Abadi—Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Joint Forces* Adnan al-Dulaimi—Head of the Tawafuq listAli Allawi—Former Minister of Finance* Sheik Najeh al-Fetlawi—representative of Moqtada al-Sadr* Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim—Shia Coalition Leader* Sheik Maher al-Hamraa—Ayat Allah Said Sussein AlSadar* Hajim al-Hassani—Member of the Parliament on the Iraqiya list* Hunain Mahmood Ahmed Al-Kaddo—President of the Iraqi Minorities Council* Abid al-Gufhoor Abid al-Razaq al-Kaisi—Dean of the Islamic University of the Imam Al-Atham* Ali Neema Mohammed Aifan al-Mahawili—Rafiday Al-Iraq Al-Jaded Foundation* Saleh al-Mutlaq—Leader of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue* Ayyad al-Sammara’l—Member of the Parliament* Yonadim Kenna—Member of the Parliament and Secretary General of Assyrian Movement* Shahla Wali Mohammed—Iraqi Counterpart International* Hamid Majid Musa—Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party* Raid Khyutab Muhemeed—Humanitarian, Cultural, and Social FoundationSinan Shabibi—Governor of the Central Bank of IraqSamir Shakir M. Sumaidaie—Ambassador of Iraq to the United StatesCurrent U.S. Administration OfficialsSenior Administration OfficialsGeorge W. Bush—PresidentRichard B. Cheney—Vice PresidentCondoleezza Rice—Secretary of StateDonald H. Rumsfeld—Secretary of DefenseStephen J. Hadley—National Security AdvisorJoshua B. Bolten—White House Chief of StaffDepartment of Defense/MilitaryCIVILIAN:Gordon England—Deputy Secretary of DefenseStephen Cambone—Under Secretary of Defense for IntelligenceEric Edelman—Under Secretary of Defense for PolicyMILITARY:General Peter Pace—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffAdmiral Edmund Giambastiani—Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffGeneral John Abizaid—Commander, United States Central Command* General George W. Casey, Jr.—Commanding General,Multi-National Forces–IraqLt. General James T. Conway—Director of Operations, J-3, on the Joint Staff* Lt. General Peter Chiarelli—Commander, Multi-National Forces–IraqLt. General David H. Petraeus—Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center andFort Leavenworth* Lt. General Martin Dempsey—Commander Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq* Maj. General Joseph Peterson—Coalition Police Assistance Training Team* Maj. General Richard Zilmer—Commander, 1st Marine Expeditionary ForceColonel Derek Harvey—Senior Intelligence Officer for Iraq, Defense Intelligence AgencyLt. Colonel Richard Bowyer—National War College (recently served in Iraq)Lt. Colonel Justin Gubler—National War College (recently served in Iraq)Lt. Colonel David Haight—National War College (recently served in Iraq)Lt. Colonel Russell Smith—National War College (recently served in Iraq)Department of State/Civilian Embassy PersonnelR. Nicholas Burns—Under Secretary of State for Political AffairsPhilip Zelikow—Counselor to the Department of StateC. David Welch—Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern AffairsJames Jeffrey—Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and Coordinator for Iraq PolicyDavid Satterfield—Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and Coordinator for Iraq PolicyZalmay Khalilzad—U.S. Ambassador to Iraq* Dan Speckhard—Charge D’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Iraq* Joseph Saloom—Director, Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office* Hilda Arellano—U.S. Agency for International Development Director in Iraq* Terrance Kelly—Director, Office of Strategic Plans and Assessments* Randall Bennett—Regional Security Officer of the U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, IraqIntelligence CommunityJohn D. Negroponte—Director of National IntelligenceGeneral Michael V. Hayden—Director, Central Intelligence AgencyThomas Fingar—Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of theNational Intelligence CouncilJohn Sherman—Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Military IssuesSteve Ward—Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Middle EastJeff Wickham—Iraq Analyst, Central Intelligence AgencyOther Senior OfficialsDavid Walker—Comptroller General of the United States* Stuart Bowen—Special Inspector General for Iraqi ReconstructionMembers of CongressUnited States SenateSenator William Frist (R-TN)—Majority LeaderSenators Harry Reid (D-NV)—Minority LeaderSenator Mitch McConnell (R-KY)—Majority WhipSenator Richard Durbin (D-IL)—Minority WhipSenator Richard Lugar (R-IN)—Chair, Foreign Relations CommitteeSenators John Warner (R-VA)—Chair, Armed Services CommitteeSenator Joseph Biden (D-DE)—Ranking Member, Foreign Relations CommitteeSenator Carl Levin (D-MI)—Ranking Member, Armed Services CommitteeSenator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)—Ranking Member, Energy and Resources CommitteeSenator Kit Bond (R-MO)—Member, IntelligenceCommitteeSenator James Inhofe (R-OK)—Member, Armed Services CommitteeSenator John Kerry (D-MA)—Member, Foreign Relations CommitteeSenator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)—Member, ArmedServices CommitteeSenator John McCain (R-AZ)—Member, Armed Services CommitteeSenator Jack Reed (D-RI)—Member, Armed Services CommitteeUnited States House of RepresentativesRepresentative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)—Minority LeaderRepresentative Tom Davis (R-VA)—Chair, Government Reform CommitteeRepresentative Jane Harman (D-CA)—Ranking Member, Intelligence CommitteeRepresentative Ike Skelton (D-MO)—Ranking Member, Armed Services CommitteeRepresentative John Murtha (D-PA)—Ranking Member, Appropriations Subcommittee onDefenseRepresentative Jim Cooper (D-TN)—Member, Armed Services CommitteeRepresentative Michael McCaul (R-TX)—Member, International Relations CommitteeRepresentative Alan Mollohan (D-WV)—Member, Appropriations CommitteeRepresentative Christopher Shays (R-CT)—Member, Government Reform CommitteeRepresentative Frank Wolf (R-VA)—Member, Appropriations CommitteeForeign OfficialsSheikh Salem al-Abdullah al-Sabah—Ambassador of Kuwait to the United StatesMichael Ambuhl—Secretary of State of SwitzerlandKofi Annan—Secretary-General of the United Nations* Dominic Asquith—British Ambassador to IraqTony Blair—Prime Minister of the United KingdomPrince Turki al-Faisal—Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United StatesNabil Fahmy—Ambassador of Egypt to the United StatesKarim Kawar—Ambassador of Jordan to the United StatesNasser bin Hamad al-Khalifa—Ambassador of Qatar to the United States* Mukhtar Lamani—Arab League envoy to IraqSir David Manning—British Ambassador to the UnitedStatesImad Moustapha—Ambassador of Syria to the United StatesWalid Muallem—Foreign Minister of SyriaRomano Prodi—Prime Minister of Italy* Ashraf Qazi—Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for IraqAnders Fogh Rasmussen—Prime Minister of DenmarkNabi Sensoy—Ambassador of Turkey to the United StatesEphraim Sneh—Deputy Minister of Defense of the State of IsraelJavad Zarif—Iranian Ambassador to the United NationsSheikh Abdullah bin Zayad—Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab EmiratesFormer Officials and ExpertsWilliam J. Clinton—former President of the United StatesWalter Mondale—former Vice President of the United StatesMadeleine K. Albright—former United States Secretary of StateWarren Christopher—former United States Secretary of StateHenry Kissinger—former United States Secretary of StateColin Powell—former United States Secretary of StateGeorge P. Schultz—former United States Secretary of StateSamuel R. Berger—former United States National Security AdvisorZbigniew Brzezinski—former United States National Security AdvisorAnthony Lake—former United States National Security AdvisorGeneral Brent Scowcroft—former United States National Security AdvisorGeneral Eric Shinseki—former Chief of Staff of the United States ArmyGeneral Anthony Zinni—former Commander, United States Central CommandGeneral John Keane—former Vice Chief of Staff of the United States ArmyAdmiral Jim Ellis—former Commander of United States Strategic CommandGeneral Joe Ralston—former Supreme Allied Commander of NATOLt. General Roger C. Schultz—former Director of the United States Army National GuardDouglas Feith—former United States Under Secretary of Defense for PolicyMark Danner—The New York Review of BooksLarry Diamond—Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford UniversityThomas Friedman—New York TimesLeslie Gelb—President Emeritus, Council on Foreign RelationsRichard Hill—Director, Office of Strategic Initiatives and Analysis, CHF InternationalRichard C. Holbrooke—former Ambassador of the United States to the United NationsMartin S. Indyk—Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings InstitutionRonald Johnson—Executive Vice President for International Development, RTI InternationalFrederick Kagan—The American Enterprise InstituteArthur Keys, Jr.—President and CEO, International Relief and DevelopmentWilliam Kristol—The Weekly Standard* Guy Laboa—Kellogg, Brown & RootNancy Lindborg—President, Mercy CorpsMichael O’Hanlon—Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings InstitutionGeorge Packer—The New YorkerCarlos Pascual—Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Studies, The BrookingsInstitutionRobert Perito—Senior Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace* Col. Jack Petri, USA (Ret.)—advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of InteriorKenneth Pollack—Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The BrookingsInstitutionThomas Ricks—The Washington PostZainab Salbi—Founder and CEO, Women for Women InternationalMatt Sherman—former Deputy Senior Advisor and Director of Policy, Iraqi Ministry of InteriorStrobe Talbott—President, The Brookings InstitutionRabih Torbay—Vice President for International Operations, International Medical CorpsGeorge Will—The Washington PostExpert Working Groups andMilitary Senior Advisor PanelEconomy and ReconstructionGary Matthews, USIP SecretariatDirector, Task Force on the United Nations and Special Projects, United States Institute ofPeaceRaad AlkadiriDirector, Country Strategies Group, PFC EnergyFrederick D. BartonSenior Adviser and Co-Director, International Security Program, Center for Strategic &International StudiesJay CollinsChief Executive Officer, Public Sector Group, Citigroup, Inc.Jock P. CoveySenior Vice President, External Affairs, Corporate Security and Sustainability Services, BechtelCorporationKeith CraneSenior Economist, RAND CorporationAmy Myers JaffeAssociate Director for Energy Studies, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, RiceUniversityK. Riva LevinsonManaging Director, BKSH & AssociatesDavid A. LiptonManaging Director and Head of Global Country Risk Management, Citigroup, IncMichael E. O’HanlonSenior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings InstitutionJames A. PlackeSenior Associate, Cambridge Energy Research AssociatesJames A. SchearDirector of Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense UniversityMilitary and SecurityPaul Hughes, USIP SecretariatSenior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United StatesInstitute of PeaceHans A. BinnendijkDirector & Theodore Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology & National Security Policy,National Defense UniversityJames CarafanoSenior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center forForeign Policy Studies, The Heritage FoundationMichael EisenstadtDirector, Military & Security Program, The Washington Institute for Near East PolicyMichèle A. FlournoySenior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for Strategic & International StudiesBruce HoffmanProfessor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, GeorgetownUniversityClifford MayPresident, Foundation for the Defense of DemocraciesRobert M. PeritoSenior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United StatesInstitute of PeaceKalev I. SeppAssistant Professor, Department of Defense Analysis, Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare,Naval Postgraduate SchoolJohn F. SiglerAdjunct Distinguished Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, NationalDefense UniversityW. Andrew TerrillResearch Professor, National Security Affairs, Strategic Studies InstituteJeffrey A. WhiteBerrie Defense Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East PolicyPolitical DevelopmentDaniel P. Serwer, USIP SecretariatVice President, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United States Instituteof PeaceRaymond H. CloseFreelance Analyst and Commentator on Middle East PoliticsLarry DiamondSenior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and Co-Editor, Journal ofDemocracyAndrew P. N. ErdmannFormer Director for Iran, Iraq and Strategic Planning, National Security CouncilReuel Marc GerechtResident Fellow, American Enterprise InstituteDavid L. MackVice President, The Middle East InstitutePhebe A. MarrSenior Fellow, United States Institute of PeaceHassan MneimnehDirector, Documentation Program, The Iraq Memory FoundationAugustus Richard NortonProfessor of International Relations and Anthropology, Department of International Relations,Boston UniversityMarina S. OttawaySenior Associate, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeaceJudy Van RestExecutive Vice President, International Republican InstituteJudith S. YapheDistinguished Research Fellow for the Middle East,Institute for National Strategic Studies, National DefenseUniversityStrategic EnvironmentPaul Stares, USIP SecretariatVice President, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, United States Institute of PeaceJon B. AltermanDirector, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic & International StudiesSteven A. CookDouglas Dillon Fellow, Council on Foreign RelationsJames F. DobbinsDirector, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND CorporationHillel FradkinDirector, Center for Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, Hudson InstituteChas W. FreemanChairman, Projects International and President, Middle East Policy CouncilGeoffrey KempDirector, Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon CenterDaniel C. KurtzerS. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor, Middle East Policy Studies, Woodrow Wilson School,Princeton UniversityEllen LaipsonPresident and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson CenterWilliam B. QuandtEdward R. Stettinius, Jr. Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia,and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings -InstitutionShibley TelhamiAnwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government & Politics,University of Maryland, and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy,The Brookings InstitutionWayne WhiteAdjunct Scholar, Public Policy Center, Middle East InstituteMilitary Senior Advisor PanelAdmiral James O. Ellis, Jr.United States Navy, RetiredGeneral John M. KeaneUnited States Army, RetiredGeneral Edward C. MeyerUnited States Army, RetiredGeneral Joseph W. RalstonUnited States Air Force, RetiredLieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Sr.United States Army, RetiredThe Iraq Study GroupJames A. Baker, III—Co-ChairJames A. Baker, III, has served in senior government positions under three United Statespresidents. He served as the nation’s 61st Secretary of State from January 1989 through August1992 under President George H. W. Bush. During his tenure at the State Department, Mr.Baker traveled to 90 foreign countries as the United States confronted the unprecedentedchallenges and opportunities of the post–Cold War era. Mr. Baker’s reflections on those years ofrevolution, war, and peace—The Politics of Diplomacy—was published in 1995.Mr. Baker served as the 67th Secretary of the Treasury from 1985 to 1988 under PresidentRonald Reagan. As Treasury Secretary, he was also Chairman of the President’s EconomicPolicy Council. From 1981 to 1985, he served as White House Chief of Staff to PresidentReagan. Mr. Baker’s record of public service began in 1975 as Under Secretary of Commerce toPresident Gerald Ford. It concluded with his service as White House Chief of Staff and SeniorCounselor to President Bush from August 1992 to January 1993.Long active in American presidential politics, Mr. Baker led presidential campaigns forPresidents Ford, Reagan, and Bush over the course of five consecutive presidential electionsfrom 1976 to 1992.A native Houstonian, Mr. Baker graduated from Princeton University in 1952. After twoyears of active duty as a lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps, he entered the Universityof Texas School of Law at Austin. He received his J.D. with honors in 1957 and practiced lawwith the Houston firm of Andrews and Kurth from 1957 to 1975.Mr. Baker’s memoir—Work Hard, Study . . . and Keep Out of Politics! Adventures andLessons from an Unexpected Public Life—was published in October 2006.Mr. Baker received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1991 and has been the recipientof many other awards for distinguished public service, including Princeton University’sWoodrow Wilson Award, the American Institute for Public Service’s Jefferson Award, HarvardUniversity’s John F. Kennedy School of Government Award, the Hans J. Morgenthau Award,the George F. Kennan Award, the Department of the Treasury’s Alexander Hamilton Award, theDepartment of State’s Distinguished Service Award, and numerous honorary academic degrees.Mr. Baker is presently a senior partner in the law firm of Baker Botts. He is HonoraryChairman of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University and serves onthe board of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. From 1997 to 2004, Mr. Baker served as thePersonal Envoy of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to seek a political solution tothe conflict over Western Sahara. In 2003, Mr. Baker was appointed Special Presidential Envoyfor President George W. Bush on the issue of Iraqi debt. In 2005, he was co-chair, with formerPresident Jimmy Carter, of the Commission on Federal Election Reform. Since March 2006,Mr. Baker and former U.S. Congressman Lee H. Hamilton have served as the co-chairs of theIraq Study Group, a bipartisan blue-ribbon panel on Iraq.Mr. Baker was born in Houston, Texas, in 1930. He and his wife, the former SusanGarrett, currently reside in Houston, and have eight children and seventeen grandchildren.Lee H. Hamilton—Co-ChairLee H. Hamilton became Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars inJanuary 1999. Previously, Mr. Hamilton served for thirty-four years as a United StatesCongressman from Indiana. During his tenure, he served as Chairman and Ranking Member ofthe House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations) andchaired the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East from the early 1970s until 1993. Hewas Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Select Committee toInvestigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.Also a leading figure on economic policy and congressional organization, he served asChair of the Joint Economic Committee as well as the Joint Committee on the Organization ofCongress, and was a member of the House Standards of Official Conduct Committee. In hishome state of Indiana, Mr. Hamilton worked hard to improve education, job training, andinfrastructure. Currently, Mr. Hamilton serves as Director of the Center on Congress at IndianaUniversity, which seeks to educate citizens on the importance of Congress and on how Congressoperates within our government.Mr. Hamilton remains an important and active voice on matters of international relationsand American national security. He served as a Commissioner on the United StatesCommission on National Security in the 21st Century (better known as the Hart-RudmanCommission), was Co-Chair with former Senator Howard Baker of the Baker-HamiltonCommission to Investigate Certain Security Issues at Los Alamos, and was Vice-Chairman ofthe National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission),which issued its report in July 2004. He is currently a member of the President’s ForeignIntelligence Advisory Board and the President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council, as wellas the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Advisory Board.Born in Daytona Beach, Florida, Mr. Hamilton relocated with his family to Tennessee andthen to Evansville, Indiana. Mr. Hamilton is a graduate of DePauw University and the IndianaUniversity School of Law, and studied for a year at Goethe University in Germany. Before hiselection to Congress, he practiced law in Chicago and in Columbus, Indiana. A former highschool and college basketball star, he has been inducted into the Indiana Basketball Hall ofFame.Mr. Hamilton’s distinguished service in government has been honored through numerousawards in public service and human rights as well as honorary degrees. He is the author of ACreative Tension—The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress (2002) and HowCongress Works and Why You Should Care (2004), and the coauthor of Without Precedent:The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission (2006).Lee and his wife, the former Nancy Ann Nelson, have three children—Tracy Lynn Souza,Deborah Hamilton Kremer, and Douglas Nelson Hamilton—and five grandchildren: Christina,Maria, McLouis and Patricia Souza and Lina Ying Kremer.Lawrence S. Eagleburger—MemberLawrence S. Eagleburger was sworn in as the 62nd U.S. Secretary of State by President GeorgeH. W. Bush on December 8, 1992, and as Deputy Secretary of State on March 20, 1989.After his entry into the Foreign Service in 1957, Mr. Eagleburger served in the U.S.Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in the State Department Bureau of Intelligence andResearch, in the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, and the U.S. Mission to NATO in Belgium. In1963, after a severe earthquake in Macedonia, he led the U.S. government effort to providemedical and other assistance. He was then assigned to Washington, D.C., where he served onthe Secretariat staff and as special assistant to Dean Acheson, advisor to the President on Franco-NATO issues. In August 1966, he became acting director of the Secretariat staff.In October 1966, Mr. Eagleburger joined the National Security Council staff. In October1967, he was assigned as special assistant to Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. InNovember 1968, he was appointed Dr. Henry Kissinger’s assistant, and in January 1969, hebecame executive assistant to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. In September 1969, he wasassigned as political advisor and chief of the political section of the U.S. Mission to NATO inBrussels.Mr. Eagleburger became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in August 1971. Two yearslater, he became Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Thesame year he returned to the White House as Deputy Assistant to the President for NationalSecurity Operations. He subsequently followed Dr. Kissinger to the State Department, becomingExecutive Assistant to the Secretary of State. In 1975, he was made Deputy Under Secretary ofState for Management.In June 1977, Mr. Eagleburger was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and in 1981 hewas nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. In February 1982, he wasappointed Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.Mr. Eagleburger has received numerous awards, including an honorary knighthood fromHer Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II (1994); the Distinguished Service Award (1992), the Wilbur J.Carr Award (1984), and the Distinguished Honor Award (1984) from the Department of State;the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal from the Department of Defense (1978); and thePresident’s Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service (1976).After retiring from the Department of State in May 1984, Mr. Eagleburger was namedpresident of Kissinger Associates, Inc. Following his resignation as Secretary of State onJanuary 19, 1993, he joined the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman and Caldwell as SeniorForeign Policy Advisor. He joined the boards of Halliburton Company, Phillips PetroleumCompany, and Universal Corporation. Mr. Eagleburger currently serves as Chairman of theInternational Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims.He received his B.S. degree in 1952 and his M.S. degree in 1957, both from theUniversity of Wisconsin, and served as first lieutenant in the U.S. Army from 1952 to 1954.Mr. Eagleburger is married to the former Marlene Ann Heinemann. He is the father of three sons,Lawrence Scott, Lawrence Andrew, and Lawrence Jason.Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.—MemberVernon E. Jordan, Jr., is a Senior Managing Director of Lazard Frères & Co, LLC in New York.He works with a diverse group of clients across a broad range of industries.Prior to joining Lazard, Mr. Jordan was a Senior Executive Partner with the law firm ofAkin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, where he remains Senior Counsel. While there Mr.Jordan practiced general, corporate, legislative, and international law in Washington, D.C.Before Akin Gump, Mr. Jordan held the following positions: President and ChiefExecutive Officer of the National Urban League, Inc.; Executive Director of the United NegroCollege Fund, Inc.; Director of the Voter Education Project of the Southern Regional Council;Attorney-Consultant, U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity; Assistant to the Executive Directorof the Southern Regional Council; Georgia Field Director of the National Association for theAdvancement of Colored People; and an attorney in private practice in Arkansas and Georgia.Mr. Jordan’s presidential appointments include the President’s Advisory Committee forthe Points of Light Initiative Foundation, the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee onSouth Africa, the Advisory Council on Social Security, the Presidential Clemency Board, theAmerican Revolution Bicentennial Commission, the National Advisory Committee onSelective Service, and the Council of the White House Conference “To Fulfill These Rights.”In 1992, Mr. Jordan served as the Chairman of the Clinton Presidential Transition Team.Mr. Jordan’s corporate and other directorships include American Express Company;Asbury Automotive Group, Inc.; Howard University (Trustee); J. C. Penney Company, Inc.;Lazard Ltd.; Xerox Corporation; and the International Advisory Board of Barrick Gold.Mr. Jordan is a graduate of DePauw University and the Howard University Law School.He holds honorary degrees from more than 60 colleges and universities in America. He is amember of the bars of Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Georgia, and the U.S. SupremeCourt. He is a member of the American Bar Association, the National Bar Association, theCouncil on Foreign Relations, and the Bilderberg Meetings and he is President of the EconomicClub of Washington, D.C. Mr. Jordan is the author of Vernon Can Read! A Memoir (PublicAffairs, 2001).Edwin Meese III—MemberEdwin Meese III holds the Ronald Reagan Chair in Public Policy at the Heritage Foundation, aWashington, D.C.–based public policy research and education institution. He is also theChairman of Heritage’s Center for Legal and Judicial Studies and a distinguished visiting fellowat the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. In addition, Meese lectures, writes, and consultsthroughout the United States on a variety of subjects.Meese is the author of With Reagan: The Inside Story, which was published by RegneryGateway in June 1992; co-editor of Making America Safer, published in 1997 by the HeritageFoundation; and coauthor of Leadership, Ethics and Policing, published by Prentice Hall in2004.Meese served as the 75th Attorney General of the United States from February 1985 toAugust 1988. As the nation’s chief law enforcement officer, he directed the Department of Justiceand led international efforts to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. In 1985he received Government Executive magazine’s annual award for excellence in management.From January 1981 to February 1985, Meese held the position of Counsellor to thePresident, the senior position on the White House staff, where he functioned as the President’schief policy advisor. As Attorney General and as Counsellor, Meese was a member of thePresident’s cabinet and the National Security Council. He served as Chairman of the DomesticPolicy Council and of the National Drug Policy Board. Meese headed the President-elect’stransition effort following the November 1980 election. During the presidential campaign, heserved as chief of staff and senior issues advisor for the Reagan-Bush Committee.Formerly, Meese served as Governor Reagan’s executive assistant and chief of staff inCalifornia from 1969 through 1974 and as legal affairs secretary from 1967 through 1968. Beforejoining Governor Reagan’s staff in 1967, Meese served as deputy district attorney in AlamedaCounty, California. From 1977 to 1981, Meese was a professor of law at the University of SanDiego, where he also was Director of the Center for Criminal Justice Policy and Management.In addition to his background as a lawyer, educator, and public official, Meese has been abusiness executive in the aerospace and transportation industry, serving as vice president foradministration of Rohr Industries, Inc., in Chula Vista, California. He left Rohr to return to thepractice of law, engaging in corporate and general legal work in San Diego County.Meese is a graduate of Yale University, Class of 1953, and holds a law degree from theUniversity of California at Berkeley. He is a retired colonel in the United States Army Reserve.He is active in numerous civic and educational organizations. Meese is married, has two grownchildren, and resides in McLean, Virginia.Sandra Day O’Connor—MemberSandra Day O’Connor was nominated by President Reagan as Associate Justice of the UnitedStates Supreme Court on July 7, 1981, and took the oath of office on September 25. O’Connorpreviously served on the Arizona Court of Appeals (1979–81) and as judge of the MaricopaCounty Superior Court in Phoenix, Arizona (1975–79). She was appointed as Arizona statesenator in 1969 and was subsequently elected to two two-year terms from 1969 to 1975. Duringher tenure, she was Arizona Senate Majority Leader and Chairman of the State, County, andMunicipal Affairs Committee, and she served on the Legislative Council, on the Probate CodeCommission, and on the Arizona Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations.From 1965 to 1969, O’Connor was assistant attorney general in Arizona. She practicedlaw at a private firm in Maryvale, Arizona, from 1958 to 1960 and prior to that was civilianattorney for Quartermaster Market Center in Frankfurt, Germany (1954–57), and deputy countyattorney in San Mateo County, California (1952–53)She was previously Chairman of the Arizona Supreme Court Committee to ReorganizeLower Courts (1974–75), Vice Chairman of the Arizona Select Law Enforcement ReviewCommission (1979–80), and, in Maricopa County, Chairman of the Bar Association LawyerReferral Service (1960–62), the Juvenile Detention Home Visiting Board (1963–64), and theSuperior Court Judges’ Training and Education Committee (1977–79) and a member of theBoard of Adjustments and Appeals (1963–64).O’Connor currently serves as Chancellor of the College of William and Mary and on theBoard of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Executive Board of the Central Europeanand Eurasian Law Initiative, the Advisory Board of the Smithsonian National Museum ofNatural History, and the Advisory Committee of the American Society of International Law,Judicial. She is an honorary member of the Advisory Committee for the Judiciary LeadershipDevelopment Council, an honorary chair of America’s 400th Anniversary: Jamestown 2007, aco-chair of the National Advisory Council of the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, amember of the Selection Committee of the Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum, anda member of the Advisory Board of the Stanford Center on Ethics. She also serves on severalbodies of the American Bar Association, including the Museum of Law Executive Committee,the Commission on Civic Education and Separation of Powers, and the Advisory Commissionof the Standing Committee on the Law Library of Congress.O’Connor previously served as a member of the Anglo-American Exchange (1980); theState Bar of Arizona Committees on Legal Aid, Public Relations, Lower Court Reorganization,and Continuing Legal Education; the National Defense Advisory Committee on Women in theServices (1974–76); the Arizona State Personnel Commission (1968–69); the Arizona CriminalCode Commission (1974–76); and the Cathedral Chapter of the Washington National Cathedral(1991–99).O’Connor is a member of the American Bar Association, the State Bar of Arizona, theState Bar of California, the Maricopa County Bar Association, the Arizona Judges’ Association,the National Association of Women Judges, and the Arizona Women Lawyers’ Association.She holds a B.A. (with Great Distinction) and an LL.B. (Order of the Coif) from StanfordUniversity, where she was also a member of the board of editors of the Stanford Law Review.Leon E. Panetta—MemberLeon E. Panetta currently co-directs the Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy, anonpartisan study center for the advancement of public policy based at California StateUniversity, Monterey Bay. He serves as distinguished scholar to the chancellor of the CaliforniaState University system, teaches a Master’s in Public Policy course at the Panetta Institute, is apresidential professor at Santa Clara University, and created the Leon Panetta Lecture Series.Panetta first went to Washington in 1966, when he served as a legislative assistant to U.S.Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of California. In 1969, he became Special Assistant to the Secretaryof Health, Education and Welfare and then Director of the U.S. Office for Civil Rights. His bookBring Us Together (published in 1971) is an account of that experience. In 1970, he went toNew York City, where he served as Executive Assistant to Mayor John Lindsay. Then, in 1971,Panetta returned to California, where he practiced law in the Monterey firm of Panetta,Thompson & Panetta until he was elected to Congress in 1976.Panetta was a U.S. Representative from California’s 16th (now 17th) district from 1977 to1993. He authored the Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, the Fair Employment PracticesResolution, legislation that established Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for hospice carefor the terminally ill, and other legislation on a variety of education, health, agriculture, anddefense issues.From 1989 to 1993, Panetta was Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget. Healso served on that committee from 1979 to 1985. He chaired the House AgricultureCommittee’s Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition; theHouse Administration Committee’s Subcommittee on Personnel and Police; and the SelectCommittee on Hunger’s Task Force on Domestic Hunger. He also served as Vice Chairman ofthe Caucus of Vietnam Era Veterans in Congress and as a member of the President’sCommission on Foreign Language and International Studies.Panetta left Congress in 1993 to become Director of the Office of Management and Budgetfor the incoming Clinton administration. Panetta was appointed Chief of Staff to the President ofthe United States on July 17, 1994, and served in that position until January 20, 1997.In addition, Panetta served a six-year term on the Board of Directors of the New YorkStock Exchange beginning in 1997. He currently serves on many public policy andorganizational boards, including as Chair of the Pew Oceans Commission and Co-Chair of theCalifornia Council on Base Support and Retention.Panetta has received many awards and honors, including the Smithsonian Paul PeckAward for Service to the Presidency, the John H. Chafee Coastal Stewardship Award, the JuliusA. Stratton Award for Coastal Leadership, and the Distinguished Public Service Medal from theCenter for the Study of the Presidency.He earned a B.A. magna cum laude from Santa Clara University in 1960, and in 1963received his J.D. from Santa Clara University Law School, where he was an editor of the SantaClara Law Review. He served as a first lieutenant in the Army from 1964 to 1966 and receivedthe Army Commendation Medal. Panetta is married to the former Sylvia Marie Varni. Theyhave three grown sons and five grandchildren.William J. Perry—MemberWilliam Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University, with ajoint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School ofEngineering. He is a senior fellow at FSI and serves as co-director of the Preventive DefenseProject, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard universities.Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense of the United States, serving from February 1994to January 1997. He previously served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1993–94) and as UnderSecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (1977–81). He is on the board of directors ofseveral emerging high-tech companies and is Chairman of Global Technology Partners.His previous business experience includes serving as a laboratory director for GeneralTelephone and Electronics (1954–64) and as founder and president of ESL Inc. (1964–77),executive vice president of Hambrecht & Quist Inc. (1981–85), and founder and chairman ofTechnology Strategies & Alliances (1985–93). He is a member of the National Academy ofEngineering and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps of Engineers, andserved in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps in1948 and was a second lieutenant in the Army Reserves from 1950 to 1955. He has received anumber of awards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), the Department ofDefense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), and Outstanding Civilian ServiceMedals from the Army (1962 and 1997), the Air Force (1997), the Navy (1997), the DefenseIntelligence Agency (1977 and 1997), NASA (1981), and the Coast Guard (1997). He receivedthe American Electronic Association’s Medal of Achievement (1980), the Eisenhower Award(1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal Medal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal(1994). The National Academy of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal in1996. He has received awards from the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force.He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, Bahrain, France, Germany,Hungary, Japan, Korea, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. He received aB.S. and M.S. from Stanford University and a Ph.D. from Penn State, all in mathematics.Charles S. Robb—MemberCharles S. Robb joined the faculty of George Mason University as a Distinguished Professor ofLaw and Public Policy in 2001. Previously he served as Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, from1978 to 1982; as Virginia’s 64th Governor, from 1982 to 1986; and as a United States Senator,from 1989 to 2001.While in the Senate he became the only member ever to serve simultaneously on all threenational security committees (Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations). He alsoserved on the Finance, Commerce, and Budget committees.Before becoming a member of Congress he chaired the Southern Governors’ Association,the Democratic Governors’ Association, the Education Commission of the States, theDemocratic Leadership Council, Jobs for America’s Graduates, the National Conference ofLieutenant Governors, and the Virginia Forum on Education, and was President of the Councilof State Governments.During the 1960s he served on active duty with the United States Marine Corps, retiringfrom the Marine Corps Reserve in 1991. He began as the Class Honor Graduate from MarineOfficers Basic School in 1961 and ended up as head of the principal recruiting program forMarine officers in 1970. In between, he served in both the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions and hisassignments included duty as a Military Social Aide at the White House and command of aninfantry company in combat in Vietnam.He received his law degree from the University of Virginia in 1973, clerked for Judge JohnD. Butzner, Jr., on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and practiced law withWilliams and Connolly prior to his election to state office. Between his state and federal service he was a partner at Hunton and Williams.
Since leaving the Senate in 2001 he has served as Chairman of the Board of Visitors at theUnited States Naval Academy, Co-Chairman (with Senior Judge Laurence Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit) of the President’s Commission on IntelligenceCapabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Co-Chairman(with former Governor Linwood Holton) of a major landowner’s alliance that created a specialtax district to finance the extension of Metrorail to Tyson’s Corner, Reston, and Dulles Airport.He has also been a Fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard and at the Marshall WytheSchool of Law at William and Mary.
He is currently on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Secretary ofState’s International Security Advisory Board (Chairman of the WMD-Terrorism Task Force),the FBI Director’s Advisory Board, the National Intelligence Council’s Strategic AnalysisAdvisory Board, the Iraq Study Group, and the MITRE Corp. Board of Trustees (ViceChairman). He also serves on the boards of the Space Foundation, the Thomas JeffersonProgram in Public Policy, the Concord Coalition, the National Museum of Americans at War,Strategic Partnerships LLC, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency—and he works onoccasional projects with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is married toLynda Johnson Robb and they have three grown daughters and one granddaughter.Alan K. Simpson—MemberAlan K. Simpson served from 1979 to 1997 as a United States Senator from Wyoming.Following his first term in the Senate, Al was elected by his peers to the position of theAssistant Majority Leader in 1984—and served in that capacity until 1994. He completed hisfinal term on January 3, 1997.
Simpson is currently a partner in the Cody firm of Simpson, Kepler and Edwards, theCody division of the Denver firm of Burg Simpson Eldredge, Hersh and Jardine, and also aconsultant in the Washington, D.C., government relations firm The Tongour, Simpson,Holsclaw Group. He continues to serve on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards and travels the country giving speeches. His book published by William Morrow Company, Right in the Old Gazoo: A Lifetime of Scrapping with the Press (1997), chronicles his personal experiences and views of the Fourth Estate.
From January of 1997 until June of 2000, Simpson was a Visiting Lecturer and for twoyears the Director of the Institute of Politics at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment. During the fall of 2000 he returned to his alma mater, the University of Wyoming,as a Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department and he continues to team teach a class part-time with his brother, Peter, titled “Wyoming’s Political Identity: Its History and ItsPolitics,” which is proving to be one of the most popular classes offered at UW.A member of a political family—his father served both as Governor of Wyoming from1954 to 1958 and as United States Senator from Wyoming from 1962 to 1966—Al chose tofollow in his father’s footsteps and began his own political career in 1964 when he was electedto the Wyoming State Legislature as a state representative of his native Park County. He served for the next thirteen years in the Wyoming House of Representatives, holding the offices of Majority Whip, Majority Floor Leader, and Speaker Pro-Tem. His only brother, Peter, also served as a member of the Wyoming State Legislature.
Prior to entering politics, Simpson was admitted to the Wyoming bar and the UnitedStates District Court in 1958 and served for a short time as a Wyoming assistant attorneygeneral. Simpson then joined his father, Milward L. Simpson, and later Charles G. Kepler inthe law firm of Simpson, Kepler and Simpson in his hometown of Cody. He would practice lawthere for the next eighteen years. During that time, Simpson was very active in all civic,community, and state activities. He also served ten years as City Attorney.
Simpson earned a B.S. in law from the University of Wyoming in 1954. Upon graduationfrom college, he joined the Army, serving overseas in the 5th Infantry Division and in the 2ndArmored Division in the final months of the Army of Occupation in Germany. Following hishonorable discharge in 1956, Simpson returned to the University of Wyoming to complete hisstudy of law, earning his J.D. degree in 1958. He and his wife Ann have three children and sixgrandchildren, who all reside in Cody, Wyoming.
Iraq Study Group Support
Edward P. DjerejianSenior Advisor to the Study GroupChristopher A. KojmSenior Advisor to the Study GroupJohn B. Williams Benjamin J. RhodesSpecial Assistant to the Study Group Special Assistant to the Study GroupUnited States Institute of Peace SupportDaniel P. SerwerISG Executive Director and Political Development SecretariatPaul HughesMilitary and Security SecretariatGary MatthewsEconomy and Reconstruction SecretariatPaul StaresStrategic Environment SecretariatCourtney RusinAssistant to the Study GroupAnne HingeleyCongressional RelationsIan LarsenOutreach and CommunicationsCenter for the Study of the Presidency SupportJay M. ParkerAdvisorYsbrant A. MarcelisAdvisorCenter for Strategic & International Studies SupportKay KingAdvisor

http://www.uspoliticsguide.com/US-Politics-Directory/Iraq-Study-Group-Report.htm