Resolution to Establish Human Rights Council

United Nations A/RES/60/251
General Assembly Distr.: General
3 April 2006
Sixtieth session
Agenda items 46 and 120
05-50266
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
[without reference to a Main Committee (A/60/L.48)]
60/251. Human Rights Council
The General Assembly,
Reaffirming the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United
Nations, including developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and achieving
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,
Reaffirming also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1 and the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action,2 and recalling the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,3 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights3 and other human rights instruments,
Reaffirming further that all human rights are universal, indivisible,
interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and that all human rights must
be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same
emphasis,
Reaffirming that, while the significance of national and regional particularities
and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, all
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, have the duty to
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Emphasizing the responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the Charter,
to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any
kind as to race, colour, sex, language or religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status,
Acknowledging that peace and security, development and human rights are the
pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and
well-being, and recognizing that development, peace and security and human rights
are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,
_______________
1 Resolution 217 A (III).
2 A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III.
3 See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
A/RES/60/251
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Affirming the need for all States to continue international efforts to enhance
dialogue and broaden understanding among civilizations, cultures and religions, and
emphasizing that States, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations,
religious bodies and the media have an important role to play in promoting
tolerance, respect for and freedom of religion and belief,
Recognizing the work undertaken by the Commission on Human Rights and
the need to preserve and build on its achievements and to redress its shortcomings,
Recognizing also the importance of ensuring universality, objectivity and
non-selectivity in the consideration of human rights issues, and the elimination of
double standards and politicization,
Recognizing further that the promotion and protection of human rights should
be based on the principles of cooperation and genuine dialogue and aimed at
strengthening the capacity of Member States to comply with their human rights
obligations for the benefit of all human beings,
Acknowledging that non-governmental organizations play an important role at
the national, regional and international levels, in the promotion and protection of
human rights,
Reaffirming the commitment to strengthen the United Nations human rights
machinery, with the aim of ensuring effective enjoyment by all of all human rights,
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to
development, and to that end, the resolve to create a Human Rights Council,
1. Decides to establish the Human Rights Council, based in Geneva, in
replacement of the Commission on Human Rights, as a subsidiary organ of the
General Assembly; the Assembly shall review the status of the Council within five
years;
2. Decides that the Council shall be responsible for promoting universal
respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,
without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal manner;
3. Decides also that the Council should address situations of violations of
human rights, including gross and systematic violations, and make
recommendations thereon. It should also promote the effective coordination and the
mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations system;
4. Decides further that the work of the Council shall be guided by the
principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive
international dialogue and cooperation, with a view to enhancing the promotion and
protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development;
5. Decides that the Council shall, inter alia:
(a) Promote human rights education and learning as well as advisory
services, technical assistance and capacity-building, to be provided in consultation
with and with the consent of Member States concerned;
(b) Serve as a forum for dialogue on thematic issues on all human rights;
(c) Make recommendations to the General Assembly for the further
development of international law in the field of human rights;
(d) Promote the full implementation of human rights obligations undertaken
by States and follow-up to the goals and commitments related to the promotion and
A/RES/60/251
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protection of human rights emanating from United Nations conferences and
summits;
(e) Undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable
information, of the fulfilment by each State of its human rights obligations and
commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal
treatment with respect to all States; the review shall be a cooperative mechanism,
based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of the country concerned
and with consideration given to its capacity-building needs; such a mechanism shall
complement and not duplicate the work of treaty bodies; the Council shall develop
the modalities and necessary time allocation for the universal periodic review
mechanism within one year after the holding of its first session;
(f) Contribute, through dialogue and cooperation, towards the prevention of
human rights violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies;
(g) Assume the role and responsibilities of the Commission on Human
Rights relating to the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, as decided by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/141 of
20 December 1993;
(h) Work in close cooperation in the field of human rights with
Governments, regional organizations, national human rights institutions and civil
society;
(i) Make recommendations with regard to the promotion and protection of
human rights;
(j) Submit an annual report to the General Assembly;
6. Decides also that the Council shall assume, review and, where necessary,
improve and rationalize all mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities of
the Commission on Human Rights in order to maintain a system of special
procedures, expert advice and a complaint procedure; the Council shall complete
this review within one year after the holding of its first session;
7. Decides further that the Council shall consist of forty-seven Member
States, which shall be elected directly and individually by secret ballot by the
majority of the members of the General Assembly; the membership shall be based
on equitable geographical distribution, and seats shall be distributed as follows
among regional groups: Group of African States, thirteen; Group of Asian States,
thirteen; Group of Eastern European States, six; Group of Latin American and
Caribbean States, eight; and Group of Western European and other States, seven; the
members of the Council shall serve for a period of three years and shall not be
eligible for immediate re-election after two consecutive terms;
8. Decides that the membership in the Council shall be open to all States
Members of the United Nations; when electing members of the Council, Member
States shall take into account the contribution of candidates to the promotion and
protection of human rights and their voluntary pledges and commitments made
thereto; the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and
voting, may suspend the rights of membership in the Council of a member of the
Council that commits gross and systematic violations of human rights;
9. Decides also that members elected to the Council shall uphold the
highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights, shall fully
cooperate with the Council and be reviewed under the universal periodic review
mechanism during their term of membership;
A/RES/60/251
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10. Decides further that the Council shall meet regularly throughout the year
and schedule no fewer than three sessions per year, including a main session, for a
total duration of no less than ten weeks, and shall be able to hold special sessions,
when needed, at the request of a member of the Council with the support of one
third of the membership of the Council;
11. Decides that the Council shall apply the rules of procedure established
for committees of the General Assembly, as applicable, unless subsequently
otherwise decided by the Assembly or the Council, and also decides that the
participation of and consultation with observers, including States that are not
members of the Council, the specialized agencies, other intergovernmental
organizations and national human rights institutions, as well as non-governmental
organizations, shall be based on arrangements, including Economic and Social
Council resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996 and practices observed by the
Commission on Human Rights, while ensuring the most effective contribution of
these entities;
12. Decides also that the methods of work of the Council shall be
transparent, fair and impartial and shall enable genuine dialogue, be resultsoriented,
allow for subsequent follow-up discussions to recommendations and their
implementation and also allow for substantive interaction with special procedures
and mechanisms;
13. Recommends that the Economic and Social Council request the
Commission on Human Rights to conclude its work at its sixty-second session, and
that it abolish the Commission on 16 June 2006;
14. Decides to elect the new members of the Council; the terms of
membership shall be staggered, and such decision shall be taken for the first
election by the drawing of lots, taking into consideration equitable geographical
distribution;
15. Decides also that elections of the first members of the Council shall take
place on 9 May 2006, and that the first meeting of the Council shall be convened on
19 June 2006;
16. Decides further that the Council shall review its work and functioning
five years after its establishment and report to the General Assembly.
72nd plenary meeting
15 March 2006
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/A.RES.60.251_En.pdf

UN Sudan Bulletin Home

UN SUDAN BULLETIN
2006 UN Sudan Bulletins
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Bulletins generally sum up the main events, incidents and developments on the ground in the various areas of UNMIS operation in Sudan. As public records of occurrences, the reports include statements and accounts from a wide range of sources and witnesses such as the internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, representatives of the Government, rebel movements, non-governmental organizations and others. As such, statements and accounts cited in the Bulletin and quoted from such individuals do not necessarily reflect the views of UNMIS.
2007 BULLETINS
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UNMIS Feb. 2 Statement on Sudan

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UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SUDAN
Office of the Spokesperson
Date: 2 February 2007
Below is a near verbatim transcript of the press conference hosting Special Representative of
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, and
Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF, Ms. Rima Salah, held on 2 February 2007 at UNMIS
Press Briefing Room, Khartoum.
Spokesperson Radhia: Good afternoon everybody and thank you for joining us at this press
conference hosting Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and hosting also Ms. Rima Salah who is
the Deputy Executive Director of the United Nations Children Fund. She came with the
Special Representative during her visit to Sudan.
We already announced to you the visit of the Special Representative in a press release on the
eve of her coming to Sudan. We broadly told you what kind of activities she would be
undertaking. We already sent out to you the personal resume of the Special Representative
and we have further documentation that would help you to have the full picture about the
SRSG-CAAC, her mandate and so on.
We do have the resolution of the General Assembly that establishes the mandate of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict; and we do
also have the resolution of the General Assembly that reconfirmed the mandate and the
nomination of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. And we do also
have for you the Resolution 1612 of the Security Council adopted in 2005 on children in
armed conflict. All that is given to you for background information.
Without further ado, I would leave the floor to the Special Representative.
SRSG-CAAC: Thank you very much. I am the SRSG on Children and Armed Conflict and I
am supposed to be independent on this issue, trying to facilitate and to do political advocacy
on some of the issues for the United Nations System.
Let me begin by saying the main my reason of my visit, with Rima Salah, the Deputy
Executive Director of UNICEF, who kindly agreed to accompany me on this visit, is, because
as you know in the month of August 2006, the Security Council Working Group looked at a
report on Children and Armed Conflict in Sudan and, as a result of that report, there were
some conclusions and recommendations made by the Security Council Working Group and
UNITED NATION

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one of that was that I visit Sudan to ascertain what is occurring, try to get commitments and
to report back to the Security Council Working Group in a few months’ time.
As you know, this is all under Security Council Resolution 1612 which sets up an extensive
monitoring and reporting system with regards children and armed conflict, especially child
soldiers. So this is the framework within which these reports were initially written.
The concerns that were there in the United Nations report and the concerns that bring me here
are basically three initial issues. The first is the issue of child recruitment which is of course
the issue of the highest important for the Security Council. Also secondly the issue of sexual
violence and exploitation of the issue of the Girl-child which was an issue raised in the
context of the Sudan in the report and the third is the protection of humanitarian workers
which is of concern not only to the Security Council but also to the Secretary-General.
I visited during my trip Khartoum, Juba and Darfur. I met with the ministers of defence,
foreign affairs and humanitarian affairs as well as other senior government officials. I have
met with the signatories and the non-signatories to the Darfur agreement, the SPLM and I
have met with women, youths and representatives from the communities in Juba and in
Darfur. I thought I would begin with some general conclusions to this visit and then go on to
some specific commitments that had been made by parties during this visit.
The first is that we saw very clearly in Juba and in Darfur that this war has affected
everybody and that there is in these societies the social fabric has been destroyed and so has
social control including the rule of law and, as a result, there is impunity and a measure of
non-accountability. This poses serious problems in these conflict regions.
The second conclusion coming really from the first is that there is a huge security vacuum in
Darfur. So the issue of women, child recruitment and violence against humanitarian actors is
something that deeply concerns us. It is absolutely necessary that this security vacuum be
filled as soon as possible especially if peace does not come. How to do so of course is for the
political organs of the UN and the government of Sudan but we feel it is essential.
Thirdly; in Juba we found that there was a great deal of optimism among the people but an
issue of reintegration of child soldiers and development of communities was crucial as well
as the development of a culture of peace. These issues were foremost in the minds of people
we met both in government and in the community.
Finally, I must say that there is recognition in Sudan, we found at the official levels, of the
problems of child recruitment and sexual violence. They have agreed to frameworks and they
have agreed to commitments. However, we are concerned that there is not enough
implementation and that the results are not showing on the ground and we urge them to do so.
However we welcome both their commitments and their frameworks.
Now if I could move on to the issue of child recruitment, I must say that as you know,
independent monitors have pointed to us through verified data that child recruitment is
decreasing in southern Sudan and increasing in Darfur and that all parties to the conflict
engage in child recruitment.
As a result of our visit and also because of prior negotiations by UNICEF, we are happy to
note that there have been some important commitments. The first is that all the signatories to
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the Darfur Peace Agreement as well as all the non-signatories have agreed to an action plan,
to agree to negotiate action plans with UNICEF for the demobilization of child soldiers. They
have named focal points and we shall follow up on that.
In addition, all Darfur signatories, all Darfur non-signatories, the SPLM have agreed to an
audit which is basically opening their camps to UNICEF and UNMIS Child Protection
monitors to visit their camps to see if there are any children.
In addition, this morning the Minister of Defence told us that he would open the camps of the
SLA as well as the Popular Defence Forces to allow for an audit. He named a focal point to
follow up on that commitment.
We are therefore very satisfied with these commitments and we hope that UNICEF and
UNMIS Child Protection will follow up with these commitments and that we can make sure
that there are no children left with armed groups in the near future.
Secondly on the issue of sexual violence, we found in every report to the Security Council
numbers and reports of this. There is, we must say, recognition of this issue now at the
national level. The National Council on Child Welfare as well as the Ministry of Justice have
recognized the problem and begun programs. We are particularly encouraged by the task
force set up by the National Council on Child Welfare. Even at the local level, there are
structures in place such as state committees and gender advisors. In addition, the Government
of Southern Sudan agreed to form a similar task force in its region in their conversations with
us.
However, as we said earlier, the situation on the ground does not seem to have improved
since when the Security Council report was written. Medical reports and other forms of
verifiable information show that there are high rates of sexual violence. We again repeat that
a security framework is absolutely necessary that is more protective of women and children.
An inter-agency team led by UNICEF and UNFPA will arrive in Sudan in February to deal
with this issue.
We also spoke to the Ministry of Defence about sexual violence and exploitation. We
discussed the need for all military including the UN to ensure that no kind of sexual
exploitation takes place and we pointed to evolving guidelines and programs that we have
developed to try and have a “zero-tolerance policy” on sexual violence. The Ministry of
Defence said he would work with the UN in developing guidelines also for the Government
of Sudan Armed Forces.
With regards to the safety of humanitarian workers, there is an incident in Darfur everyday
against humanitarian workers. There have been some terrible incidents in the past few weeks.
At every level we raised this issue and we were given assurances that they will try their best
to prevent such incidents from taking place. We pointed out that diplomatic immunity
attaches to the staff of the UN and if they are dissatisfied, then it is up to them to report the
staff to the UN and the UN will take corrective action. That diplomatic immunity is
absolutely crucial for the world system and not only for Sudan. We feel that we made a very
strong plea in that regard at all levels of our official meetings
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With regards to some other concerns that arose during our visit here, the first is that the
destruction of the social fabric has led to a great many orphans and street children – a new
phenomenon in Sudan. There is need for UN programmatic intervention in this regard. We
feel it is a rising issue and needs concerted attention.
Secondly; we found that reintegration of Child Soldiers are not working as well as we would
like. What happens is that children are demobilized but they come back to the armed camp
because they have nothing to do in their communities or they feel alienated from their
communities. The need therefore to develop the communities to which these children will
return and the social services in those communities so that it is a place where children will
remain, become the need of the hour. As a result, UNICEF will sponsor a study in Juba to
study these reintegration programs to find out what is going wrong, what is going right and
also to see how the community can develop with social services. We will try to do a very
quick study and the recommendations from that study will then be implemented.
Thirdly; when we met with the Vice-President of southern Sudan, we spoke about the
problems posed by the LRA rebels and he agreed to keep women and children as highest in
his agenda with the UNICEF staff members to be on his technical committee. He also agreed
to ensure that these issues will be there if talks resume under his mediation.
Finally; in our conversation with nomadic tribal leaders, we felt that there was a sense of
discrimination and marginalization by humanitarian agencies of these communities primarily
because of security reasons – many of these humanitarian agencies can’t work in those
regions. However, we feel that it is a matter of priority to have community-oriented programs
on education and health in those communities as well so that they too will benefit by many of
the humanitarian efforts. So UNICEF has began already – had begun even before we came –
to begin discussions with them on how to better their services.
Finally; what is next? When I get back to New York, I will debrief the Secretary-General and
in three months time I will report to the Security Council Working Group outlining the
commitments and follow ups of the Sudan government and also what I feel is the situation on
the ground.
In addition, UNICEF, UNMIS Child Protection and AMIS will follow up on action plans,
audits, the task forces and the study that I described. They will work closely to follow up on
these commitments
We hope to continue our dialogue with the government of Sudan especially with regard to
security and protection framework for women and children.
Thank you.
Spokesperson Radhia: Ms. Rima, the floor is yours.
Dep. Exec. Dir.: Thank you. (in Arabic)
I am pleased and honored to accompany SRSG-CAAC and to support her as UNICEF
believes it is the moral voice on children and armed conflicts the world over. You are aware
that an important aspect of UNICEF’s mandate is to encourage existence of preventive
climates for all children including children affected by armed conflict. In addition to our
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mandate and since the UNICEF has offices in every part of Sudan and in every country in the
world, this also covers monitoring of violations of the Right of the Child as cited in UN
Security Council Resolution 1612.
As for UNICEF’s obligations, for example on child recruitment, UNICEF, in cooperation
with UNMIS and AMIS, will continue to support DDR programs especially on reintegration
and to ensure that child issues remain priority issues in planning and implementation. There
also is a great need to expedite the process because children should not be left to wait. As we
did see in Juba and Darfur that children are present in the armed movements.
We say that Demobilization and Reintegration are two faces of the same coin and
demobilization of child soldiers from armed groups will adversely be affected if we are not
able to reintegrate these children. We were told in Juba that despite all the efforts made, they
are not able to reintegrate all the child soldiers as a result of poverty, lack of families and
inability to reintegrate the child soldier into the local communities and families. UNICEF will
therefore work alongside the other UN agencies to reintegrate all these children.
On sexual violence, UNICEF remains an active partner in combating Gender-Based Violence
at all levels through, for example, child-friendly spaces in camps, establishing child and
women protection units within the police forces, training of the police force and social
workers on improving of monitoring methods for all cases of GBV.
On the humanitarian side, the SRSG-CAAC mentioned that access to humanitarian assistance
is an important aspect of the activities of all agencies. It is important to ensure that IDPs and
host communities have access. The people we met, especially the nomads, said that
humanitarian assistance does not reach them. UNICEF works with them especially on
education and water and will continue to do so.
To us at the UNICEF, this was an important new visit that will enable us review our
strategies especially in reintegration of the child soldier into families and the local
communities.
Thank you and we are available to answer your questions.
Spokesperson Radhia: Thank you. The floor is now open for your questions.
Q: I have 4 questions:
What difference did you find during your visit between the facts on the ground and the report
discussed at the Security Council? It is known that Sudan had expressed strong opposition to
that past report.
The government complains of lack of funding for its DDR program. What assistance can the
UN give to facilitate this process?
Does the United Nations have specific statistics on children recruited in armed movements
and the Child Soldier in Sudan?
What impact would your report to the UN have should it contain negative issues?
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SRSG-CAAC: I think the difference is not so much a difference in reality but what has
happened in Sudan since August. There is I think greater acknowledgement and recognition
at the official level of these issues. And we welcome that. As I said there is recognition of
these issues and structures have been set in place but the situation on the ground does not
seem to have improved. But we hope that if these structures are implemented effectively, that
there will also be a difference on the ground.
With regard to funding of DDR etc. I am going to allow Rima to answer that.
On your third question, my sense is that we don’t have numbers and it will be impossible to
give you numbers for the whole of Sudan. But I think the figures given are that in southern
Sudan 7,000 have been demobilized and 3,000 are yet to be demobilized.
What are the negative consequences? Of course there is Security Council Resolution 1612
that allows the Working Group in the Security Council to engage the government in a variety
of ways if things, over a period of time, continue to be negative. I don’t know whether this
report or that report … but there is a provision in the Security Council Resolution for targeted
measures against parties if they fail to, especially, stop recruiting children. That is the issue
on which targeted measures have been assigned.
Thank you.
Dep. Exec. Rep.: Child recruitment is a big problem which not only the UNICEF works on
but, as I said, also the UNMIS, AMIS and a number of other UN agencies. We still need
funding. Our representative is here with us. We could say also that it is not on reintegration
and funding because we also have programs such as on education and protection. In Juba, for
instance, we launched a year ago the “Back to School” program, opening of schools and
providing them with health services. But the problem is that many communities, especially in
Juba, can not access these education and health services. This is why the UNICEF, alongside
other UN agencies, will focus on opening more schools in Juba and facilitating access to
social services.
Spokesperson Radhia: Thank you very much. Just for your information, copies of the
Security Council Resolution 1612 referred to by the SRSG-CAAC and Ms. Rima Salah is
available in both the English and Arabic versions for you to go through.
Any more questions?
Q: Child recruitment is in the increase in Darfur and decreasing in southern Sudan. Can you
clarify to what extent it is increasing in Darfur and decreasing in southern Sudan?
You said that the reintegration of children in southern Sudan is not going according to the UN
need. Can you clarify that point and what are you comments on this?
SRSG-CAAC: With regard to Juba, I suppose because the armed conflict has stopped for the
moment, we do not receive reports of recruitment of children and over the last year over
1,000 were actually demobilized in 2006.
With regards to Darfur, the monitors on the ground have told us that they feel that in the last
few months child recruitment has increase … though they have not given us any figures.
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With regards to reintegration, I will let Rima deal with it at length but my sense is that an
early school of reintegration which was to take children from the forces and then keep them
in transit camps and then reintegrate them and this, they felt, was not very helpful. Now they
reintegrate children into the communities immediately after tracing their families.
But even then just doing that is not enough unless you support the community to support
them. So that is where we are at now. It is all a learning process. We are learning from other
countries. There have been successful demobilizations in other countries and the UN system
as a whole is trying to understand this process and to see how we can stop the remobilization
of these children. So it is a learning process but we feel that a study in Juba … in the cultural
context of Juba … will help us understand what the situation is like over there before we go
on a massive reintegration planning.
Dep. Exec. Rep.: On reintegration, UNICEF has more than 20 programs on DDR and
reintegration. We have some achievements and were presented with some when we were in
Juba. But, however, even the Vice-President of the Government of Southern Sudan in Juba
said that we have not been completely successful in really reintegrating children in their
families and the communities.
Why? He mentioned some of the problems that are facing us. For example poverty, the
fragile social fabric in the south in general and, also, the lack of access to social services – to
education, to health services and to protection. And that is why we were so happy to have the
independent voice of the SRSG-CAAC for advocacy to be with us there because this will
give us the opportunity to review our strategies – all of us as the UN.
As I have always said, we have been maybe a little dogmatic in our reintegration strategy. So
UNICEF, UNMIS, AMIS and other UN agencies are going to look again at the lessons learnt
and the strategies of reintegration.
We are very happy that next week the SRSG-CAAC and I will be in a meeting in Paris and
exactly to discuss those issues of reintegration.
Thank you.
Spokesperson Radhia: Are there any other questions from the press?
If not, I thank you all for coming and joining us for this meeting. I would extend my sincere
thanks to the SRSG-CAAC and the Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF and we wish you
all the best and have a safe trip.
Thank you very much.

http://www.unmis.org/english/2007Docs/PC-02Feb..pdf

UN Feb. 4 Bulletin on Sudan

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES


  

联合国
NACIONES UNIDAS
United Nations Sudan Bulletin
4 February
Highlights:
· Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Sudan.
· Appointments of leaders of SLM factions to governmental posts.
· UN, GNU and GoSS launched a joint return operation for IDPs in the North.
General:
· On 2 and 3 February, Chinese President Hu Jintao made an official visit to Sudan.
Media reported that President Hu encouraged President Bashir to co-operate with the UN in
finding a solution to the conflict in Darfur. A Chinese official news agency reported that
President Hu proposed a four-point approach which will respect Sudan's sovereignty while
acknowledging a constructive role for the AU and UN. In press statements after the
meeting, President Bashir praised China's treatment of Sudan, describing it as "more fair"
than that of Western countries. Hu also met separately with FVP Salva Kiir and VP Taha.
Media reported that he encouraged FVP Kiir to visit China.
· On 2 February, Presidents Hu and Bashir signed seven bilateral accords and contracts,
under which China undertook to build schools and a new presidential palace in Sudan,
provide 5.2 million USD of humanitarian assistance to Darfur, reduce import tariffs on 44
Sudanese commodities, and provide various grants and loans as well as cancel about 19
million USD of debt. President Hu also visited the Khartoum Oil Refinery in Al-Jaili which
is a joint project of Sudan and the China National Petroleum Corporation. On 3 February,
President Hu left Sudan for Zambia.
· On 3 February, President Bashir met with his two deputies and reviewed the status of
CPA implementation and the establishment of the Darfur Interim Authority. During the
meeting, the Presidency approved the Political Parties and the Civil Service Acts. Following
the meeting, State Minister for the Presidency Telar Deng (SPLM) said that the Presidency
would work to designate the Commission on the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National
Capital soon. The Presidential Press Secretary stated that the Presidency will reconvene on
6 February to hear a briefing by the Joint Defence Board on military and security issues. It
will also review reports on the work of the North-South technical border committee, roll-out
of the new currency and implementation of donors' Oslo pledges.
· On 3 February, the President issued a number of decrees appointing some members of
the Darfur Transitional Regional Authority, including Prof. Abdel Rahman Musa (SLM
Free Will) as State Minister in the Council of Ministers and Ibrahim Mahmoud Madibo
(SLM Peace Wing) as head of Darfur Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Commission.
Twelve seats of the National Assembly were also allocated for DPA signatories.
· On 1 February, Sudanese authorities closed an independent local paper "Al-Sudani"
because it had illegally published an article on the murder case of newspaper editor
Mohamed Taha while the case is still under investigation. Al-Sudani's editor-in-chief
Mahjoub Erwa lodged an appeal against the decision with the Ministry of Justice.
· On 3 February, Minister of Social Welfare, Women and Children's Affairs Samiya
Ahmed Mohamed stated that she expects an increase in voluntary return of IDPs in Darfur
Page 2
over the coming months, and that the Ministry will mount a series of projects to support
such returns.
· On 3 February, Minister of Foreign Affairs Akol issued a decree appointing 60
individuals from Southern Sudan to civil service positions in his ministry.
· On 3 February, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum denied a split between
"Garang" and "Kiir" wings of the party, stating that the SPLM would not be shaken by
media campaigns intended to sow division among its rank and file. Meanwhile local media
reported that SPLM sources said that the movement would convene an expanded meeting of
its political bureau on 15 February to discuss a number of key issues relating to SPLM's
relationship with the NCP and other political parties.
· On 3 February, according to local media, Eastern Front Chairman Musa Mohamed
Ahmed issued directives from Asmara dissolving the "Eastern Front" registered last week
by the Political Parties Registrar in Khartoum.
Khartoum and Northern Sudan
Returns:
· On 3 February, the first convoy of joint return operations by the UN, IOM, GNU and
GoSS, some 300 IDPs left Dar El Salam camp in Khartoum. The joint operation for 2007 is
targeting 150,000 IDPs returning to their places of origin in southern Sudan and South
Kordofan from Khartoum and other Northern States.
North Darfur
Security:
· Sources said that, on 1 February, two helicopter gunships and an Antonov plane
bombed Dirbat and Katur village.
· On 3 February, eight persons in civilian clothes robbed an INGO vehicle parked in the
INGO’ compound in Abu Shouk IDP Camp. Later the vehicle was observed moving from
Abu Shouk market to the south east of El Fasher.
· Reports indicate that, on 2 February, a GoS police with seven vehicles raided the SLA
Office in Tawilla, destroyed the office and pulled down the SLA/MM flag. In retaliation,
the SLA closed down the Police water well. On 3 February, SLA/MM reinforced their
troops in Tawila with 14 vehicles moved from Abu Zerega, 35 kilometer south of El Fasher.
South Darfur
Security:
· Tension rose when a group of IDPs in Kalma Camp stole a camel belonging to Arab
nomads and took it to Kalma Camp on 1 February. The next day, heavily armed Arab
nomads tried to enter the Camp, but the GoS Police station intervened and the camel was
retrieved peacefully.
West Darfur
Security:
· On 2 February, unknown persons reportedly killed a male IDP inside his house at
Hamadiya IDP Camp and fled.
Southern Sudan
Security:
· On 2 February, several gunshots were heard near the vicinity of SAF barracks in
Malakal, reportedly resulting from an argument between two soldiers. No injuries reported.
Both soldiers were detained for investigation.
Page 3
Civil Affairs:
· On 2 February, UNMIS was informed that the Governor of Jonglei State dismissed
the Deputy Governor and the Commissioners of Nuirol and Pibor Counties.
Returns:
· On 3 February, an IOM barge carrying over 320 Bor Dinka IDPs arrived at Bor,
Jonglei State. The barge left Juba on 2 February and was led by a speed boat with armed
SPLA in order to avoid such incident occurred on 26 January in which a barge was shot at
by SPLA soldiers at a new checkpoint. The 320 IDPs will initially be housed at the Bor way
station before being transported to their final destinations.
Humanitarian:
· As of 1 February, a total of 780 cases of meningitis have been reported in eight
Southern States. In Lakes State, 105 cases of meningitis including 35 deaths. Meanwhile,
the vaccination campaign in Kajo Keji, Central Equatoria State almost completed. 50,000
vaccines became available for Warrap State. The Ministry of Health in Western Bahr El-
Ghazal State will embark on a meningitis vaccination campaign in the affected areas in the
state such as Mapel and Atedo Masna Bira.
Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan
Civil Affairs:
· On 1 February, UNMIS in Kadugli met with SPLM politicians as part of UN effort to
implement recommendations made by 40 tribal leaders during the Dilling conflictresolution
conference on 22 January, in which UNMIS was requested to form a committee
to go and sensitize communities to end conflicts. The SPLM agreed to appoint 20 members
to meet with NCP politicians to convene such reconciliation meetings.
Safety of Personnel: NSTR
Restriction of Movement: NSTR
Casualties: No Casualties reported
Bulletins generally sum up the main events, incidents and developments on the ground in the various
areas of UNMIS operation in Sudan. As public records of occurrences, the reports include statements
and accounts from a wide range of sources and witnesses such as the internally displaced persons
(IDPs), refugees, representatives of the Government, rebel movements, non-governmental
organizations and others. As such, statements and accounts cited in the Bulletin and quoted from such
individuals do not necessarily reflect the views of UNMIS.
Unified Mission Analysis Centre (UMAC)
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
Khartoum
Sudan
Please direct enquiries to umac@un.org
http://www.unmis.org/english/2007Docs/UMAC-Bulletin-feb04.pdf

UN Feb. 2 Bulletin on Sudan

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES


  

联合国
NACIONES UNIDAS
United Nations Sudan Bulletin
2 February
Highlights:
· An AMIS officer was killed in an ambush in Kutum, North Darfur.
General:
· On 1 February, a spokesman for the US State Department expressed hope that
Southern Sudan will remain as the mediator of talks between the Government of Uganda
and the LRA. The US was concerned that a change in mediator will only delay peace in
the region.
· On 1 February, SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaraswamy met
Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol and Minister of Defence Gen. Abdel-Rahim
Hussein at the end of her visit to Sudan.
· On 1 February, according to Sudan's national news agency, movements signatory to
the Darfur Peace Agreement and some civil society forces signed a protocol committing
themselves to co-operate in implementation of the DPA. Signatories included the
Rapporteur of the Political Office of SLM-Peace Wing Ismail Aghbash, Ismail Yahya
signed for Sudan United Forces and Alyas Mohamed Ahmed signed for Future Forces
Movement.
· On 1 February, the Sudanese national news agency announced details of the
programme for President Hu Jintao, who will make his first official visit to Sudan on 2-3
February. President Hu will meet President Omar al-Bashir, FVP Salva Kiir Mayardit
and VP Taha. He is also holding events with the Chinese Community in Sudan and
visiting the Khartoum Oil Refinery. President Hu Jintao is expected to attend the signing
of a number of commerical and investment agreements between the two countries.
· On 1 February, according to regional media, Ugandan armed forces are deployed
along the Nimule-Juba road in a bid to restore security after a spate of attacks attributed
to the LRA. The report, by Uganda's leading daily newspaper New Vision, says UPDF
forces are concentrated in Nimule and have established checkpoints along much of the
route the the Southern Sudan capital. Comment: Sudan's National Assembly voted in
November not to extend the MOU under which UPDF forces are permitted to operate
inside Southern Sudan. The MOU expired on 31 December.
· On 1 February, according to local media, GOSS Minister for Transport and
Communications Rebecca Garang gave a speech encouraging South Sudanese to have
faith in the ability of the GOSS to deliver on the objectives of the CPA. Mrs. Garang
called 2007 a "year of learning", and emphasized that GOSS was still in a learning
phase. She stressed that the recently approved US$1.3 billion GOSS budget would be
used appropriately to meet the needs of the people.
Khartoum and Northern Sudan: NSTR
North Darfur
Security:
Page 2
· On 1 February, a CIVPOL officer of the AMIS was killed in an ambush by unknown
armed elements in the area of Kassab IDP Camp, north of Kutum. The AMIS vehicle he
was driving was also robbed.
· On 1 February, National Security officers at the check point at Haluf denied passage
to a UN convoy including UNMIS vehicles en route to Mellit, demanding HAC permit.
Civil Affairs:
· On 31 January, during the visit to El Fasher, the Danish Minister for Development
and Cooperation pledged 25 million USD to support longer-term development in Darfur.
She expressed to the Governor of North Darfur her concern about the limited
humanitarian access in North Darfur. The Governor emphasized there was full
humanitarian access in government-controlled areas, adding that they were not
responsible for areas controlled by the NSF.
South Darfur
Security:
· On 1 February, four armed men attacked a commercial bus en route to Nyala from El
Fasher at a location 28 km north of Nyala and robbed all the passengers of their personal
properties. There were no casualties.
Humanitarian:
· Reports indicate that new IDPs are arriving at Al Salam Camp from Al Goz (Buram
locality) on a daily basis. An INGO registered 2,356 IDPs between 15 and 30 January,
making the total number of the population in the camp 5,925. More are expected to
arrive.
West Darfur
Security:
· On 31 January, a vehicle rented by an INGO was robbed on its way to Silea from
Qawz Nginnu. The perpetrators bundled the driver and passengers, nine INGO staff
members, and drove away towards Hizilini. The vehicle was recovered later.
Southern Sudan
Security:
· On 30 January, shooting occurred involving local police and SAF soldiers at Mirmir
market and one person was reportedly killed.
· On 31 January, unconfirmed information was received on possible LRA movement to
the south of Yambio, in the areas of Nabiapai and Gangura. UNPOL, UNMOs and
BANBAT took appropriate security precautions.
Civil Affairs:
· On 1 February, at the inaugural session of the Upper Nile Legislative Assembly, the
Speaker of the assembly highlighted the assembly's achievements to date and thanked
key actors including UNMIS for their support towards peace-building and good
governance. He called for accountability vis-à-vis public funds, noting that little was
known about state revenues generated for 2006, and called on the Finance Ministry to
clarify the usage of 55 million Sudanees Dinar received from the GoSS in November
2006.
Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan: NSTR
Safety of Personnel: NSTR
Restriction of Movement: NSTR
Page 3
Casualties: No Casualties reported
Bulletins generally sum up the main events, incidents and developments on the ground in the various
areas of UNMIS operation in Sudan. As public records of occurrences, the reports include statements
and accounts from a wide range of sources and witnesses such as the internally displaced persons
(IDPs), refugees, representatives of the Government, rebel movements, non-governmental
organizations and others. As such, statements and accounts cited in the Bulletin and quoted from such
individuals do not necessarily reflect the views of UNMIS.
Unified Mission Analysis Centre (UMAC)
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
Khartoum
Sudan
Please direct enquiries to umac@un.orghttp://www.unmis.org/english/2007Docs/UMAC-Bulletin-feb02.pdf

Secretary General's Report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

United Nations S/2007/68
Security Council
Distr.: General
8 February 2007
Original: English
07-22123 (E) 140207
*0722123*
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 8 of
resolution 1698 (2006) concerning the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
I. Introduction
1. In paragraph 6 of its resolution 1698 (2006), the Security Council requested
the Group of Experts originally established pursuant to its resolution 1533 (2004) to
provide recommendations on feasible and effective measures the Council might
impose to prevent the illegal exploitation of natural resources financing armed
groups and militias in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
including through a certificate-of-origin regime.
2. In tandem with that request, in paragraph 8 of the same resolution the Security
Council requested the Secretary-General to present before 15 February 2007, in
close consultation with the Group of Experts, a report comprising an assessment of
the potential economic, humanitarian and social impact on the population of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo of the implementation of the possible measures
referred to in paragraph 6 of the resolution. The present report is submitted pursuant
to the latter request.
II. Measures proposed by the Group of Experts
3. On 25 January 2007, the Group of Experts presented its latest report
(S/2007/40, annex), as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1698
(2006). In paragraph 51 of that report, the Group of Experts stated, “urgent
intervention against all forms of illegal natural resource exploitation is required”.
The Group of Experts recommended, in paragraph 52, that “the existing laws of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly the regulations governing natural
resources and their orderly exploitation, be used as a baseline for a new sanctions
regime”.
4. The implementation of the proposed United Nations sanctions regime would
require a clear demarcation between what is and is not legal in exploiting and
commercializing natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Making this demarcation is a challenge in itself, and however the line is drawn, the
number of potentially sanctionable targets under such a proposal would be
considerable. It would include the vast majority of artisanal miners who do not have
S/2007/68
2 07-22123
the required licence, most of the middlemen who are not in possession of the
necessary permits, buyers and traders that are engaged in fraudulent activities and
members of the national police and the Forces armées de la République
démocratique du Congo (FARDC) who extort fees from miners, as well as mining
companies that have engaged in irregular payments to government officials or that
do not comply with the Mining Code of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
considerable scope of the proposed measures makes them unwieldy and difficult to
apply in a fair and non-arbitrary way.
III. Procedure and methodology
5. Referring to Security Council discussions prior to the adoption of resolution
1698 (2006) and following discussions with the Experts and others, the present
report focuses only on a limited number of natural resources that are exploited in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and relating to which the Council may consider
possible future sanctions, including gold, cassiterite, copper, cobalt and diamonds.
This assessment does not evaluate possible sanctions on other commodities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, such as timber or petroleum. Assessments of
potential impacts on those industries might be needed at a later stage, once the
Council decides on the general approach it wishes to take regarding possible
coercive measures. Furthermore, the present report assumes that only those
economic operators, that engage in conspicuous fraud, use armed groups to secure
access to concessions and/or to extort payments from miners and engage in tax
evasion and corrupt payments would become potential targets of United Nations
sanctions.
6. The methodology for this assessment is informed by the Sanctions Assessment
Handbook: Assessing the Humanitarian Implications of Sanctions1 and is designed
to examine the potential impacts of sanctions measures proposed by the Group of
Experts against economic operators deemed to be in violation of Congolese law.
Two impact questions were used in assessing the potential impact of the proposed
sanctions:
(a) What is the likely impact on the extent of armed conflict? The objective
of the sanctions proposed by the Group of Experts is to prevent the illegal
exploitation of natural resources financing armed groups and militias;
(b) What is the likely impact on artisanal miners? They are the most
numerous stakeholders and those for whom the impact of sanctions would likely be
the most severe.
7. Furthermore, two critical factors can be expected to influence the impact of the
proposed sanctions:
(a) How will the existing trading system affect the impact of the proposed
sanctions? The ability and readiness of new actors to substitute for sanctioned ones
will reduce the effectiveness of the proposed measures;
__________________
1 Manuel Bessler, Richard Garfield and Gerard McHugh, United Nations, Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in collaboration with member agencies of the
Inter-Agency Standing Committee, October 2004; available at www.humanitarianinfo.org/
sanctions/handbook/index.htm.
S/2007/68
07-22123 3
(b) What is the extent of the formal sector? Sanctions will have a meaningful
impact only when they target formal-sector actors.
8. Reports by national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
have provided information on these questions, as have reports of the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC),
journalistic articles and reports by State actors and donors. Extensive consultations,
field observations and interviews were conducted for the present assessment report
with informed interlocutors from United Nations agencies, the World Bank, NGOs,
State agents and a variety of economic actors during an assessment mission to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo from 20 November to 14 December 2006.
9. Because artisanal miners are likely to experience the most direct impact of the
proposed sanctions regime and are the most numerous stakeholders, they have
received special attention. The assessment draws upon “livelihood security”
questionnaires that were designed to elicit income and expenditure data, along with
selected demographic variables. The questionnaires were administered in all
locations visited by the assessment team with the exception of North Kivu, where
there was no access to the mining sites. The results of the 39 cases surveyed are
used throughout the assessment report in order to profile a selection of artisanal
miners. However, they should not be taken as statistically representative.
IV. The mining industry in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
10. The human development indicators for the Democratic Republic of the Congo
have declined markedly in recent years. The gross domestic product per capita, in
terms of purchasing power parity, fell from $822 in 1998 to $705 in 2006. Poverty
rates have risen, public services are limited and the human development index
declined from 0.447 in 1985 to 0.430 in 1998 and 0.361 in 20062. The country is
currently ranked 167 out of 177 countries on the human development index listing.
These development indicators are symptomatic of a country emerging from nearly a
decade of conflict.
11. If the Democratic Republic of the Congo is to embark on a process of
recovery, it will have to rely on the generation of State revenues from extractive
industries. At present such revenues are minimal for at least three reasons. First, the
formal mining sector accounts for only a modest proportion of the total production,
which remains unregulated and vulnerable to considerable interference from a
variety of military elements, rebel groups, foreign interests and unscrupulous
traders. The investigations, consultations and interviews conducted in the course of
this assessment revealed that those actors are often linked to and protected by
Congolese personalities, who are complicit in supporting dishonest business
practices. Secondly, the investigations showed that corruption and mismanagement
are widespread in the Democratic Republic of the Congo mining sector.3 As a result,
the large majority of sales and exports of the country’s minerals take place outside
__________________
2 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 2000 and 2006.
3 See also the Corruption Perceptions Index, 2006, issued by Transparency International, in which
the Democratic Republic of the Congo is ranked 156th out of 163 countries
(www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/global/cpi).
S/2007/68
4 07-22123
of the authority of the State. Thirdly, State mining companies in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, such as the Générale des carrières et des mines (Gécamines),
the Office des mines d’or de Kilo-Moto (OKIMO) and the Minière de Bakwanga
(MIBA), have difficulty securing and protecting their concessions. Therefore, large
numbers of mining concessions are exploited by “hand-pickers” or diggers whose
production is unregulated and inefficient and who pose a threat to social stability.
12. The assessment team has chosen to examine five different mining
environments separately in order to give an appreciation of the variation in mining
regimes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to provide a foundation for
articulating an overview that takes this variation fully into account. These regimes,
described more fully in the following sections, are as follows:
(a) Gold in Ituri district, Province Orientale;
(b) Cassiterite in North Kivu;
(c) Gold and cassiterite in South Kivu;
(d) Copper and cobalt in Katanga;
(e) Diamonds in Kasai Oriental.
13. The descriptions in each of those sections address the four key questions
discussed in paragraphs 6 and 7 above and are structured as follows:
(a) Extent of armed conflict;
(b) Vulnerability of artisanal miners;
(c) Structure of the trade;
(d) Formal sector;
(e) Potential impact of proposed sanctions.
V. Gold in Ituri district, Province Orientale
Extent of armed conflict
14. Today the conflicts between rebel groups and the violence against civilians
have diminished. Following the deployment of MONUC in summer 2003 and the
integration of the FARDC fourth brigade, most of the competing rebel groups have
dispersed. Where fighting does continue, it is contained, and many of the former
rebels have now entered the gold fields as artisanal miners or traders to make their
living, returning to an occupation that diminished during the war. This does not
mean however, that the population and the artisanal miners are significantly less
exposed to military pressure. The field observations and consultations carried out in
Ituri indicated that the threat of hostilities continues, as now soldiers and ex-rebels
occupy the gold fields, replacing the various militias and using force to impose
obligations and extort taxes from the mining communities.
Vulnerability of artisanal miners
15. With more calm and stability in Ituri, there are appreciably more artisanal
miners and traders, better known as négociants. A significant number of ex-rebels,
ex-police, teachers and health workers have moved into the gold fields. Estimates of
S/2007/68
07-22123 5
the number of artisanal miners in Province Orientale vary considerably, between
30,000 and 200,000, reflecting in part the variation from season to season. It is
probable that 150,000 gain some livelihood throughout the year from artisanal
mining, making it the province’s largest source of employment4. Hence, over a
million people in Province Orientale, counting family members and other
dependants of artisanal miners, may depend entirely or in part, directly or indirectly,
on artisanal mining, making it the backbone of the regional economy. The gender
balance is conspicuously skewed, since women are marginalized as fuel-gatherers
and small traders.
16. Only a very few of the miners interviewed earn more than a subsistence
income. Among 17 cases surveyed, only four had positive net incomes. Gross
incomes might be as high as $4 to $5 per day, but the high cost of living and the
numerous fees that have to be paid make it difficult for the miners to break even.
The average net income among the cases surveyed was a negative $6.5 Any
reduction in the capacity of the miners to produce and sell gold would put large
numbers of them and their dependants at risk, with the exception of those able to
fall back on alternative sources of livelihood, agriculture in particular.
Structure of the trade
17. Artisanal miners work in teams, headed by a subcontractor who presumes to
have the authority of the State company OKIMO to manage pits and collect a
portion of the production. After paying the subcontractors and protection fees to
FARDC and others, the miners sell their small amounts of gold to négociants around
the gold fields, who sell to larger traders in Bunia, the district capital, and they in
turn sell to exporters, or comptoirs. In most cases, the comptoirs sell the gold
fraudulently in Kampala or Dubai avoiding Congolese state royalties and taxes.6
The Manager of the only comptoir that is officially registered in Bunia explained to
the assessment team that he is unable to obtain sufficient operating capital and
cannot compete with the large number of unofficial, hence illegal, comptoirs. An
estimated 90 to 95 per cent of the gold from Ituri is carried fraudulently across the
borders by traders who have not been approved by authorities of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and who pay neither fees nor export duties, nor for licences.
Formal sector
18. The State company OKIMO has, over a number of years, become a more
restricted actor in Ituri’s gold production. It has not been able to purchase gold and
sell it on the market in spite of efforts over the past decade to do so. In lieu of
trading the gold obtained from its considerable holdings, OKIMO has leased
concessions and put a system in place that gives the subcontractors the role of
overseers of an area with the right to collect commissions. A portion of the
__________________
4 Karen Hayes and Kevin P. C. J. D’Souza, “Orpaillage activity in the Orientale Province,
situational analysis report”, commissioned by Angolo Gold Ashanti Ltd. and OKIMO, 19 May
2006.
5 Negative net incomes were common. This appeared to be characteristic of the rainy season,
when hand digging was more difficult. Although positive net incomes were more common
during the dry season, indebtedness was typical throughout the year, and mean annual incomes
were at the survival level.
6 Karen Hayes and Kevin P. C. J. D’Souza, op.cit., provides a thorough analysis of the dangers
posed to artisanal miners and the structure of the trade.
S/2007/68
6 07-22123
commissions has, in the past, been forwarded to OKIMO. But the practice of
providing commissions to OKIMO through appointed subcontractors continues now
in name only. At present, OKIMO relies mainly on its electricity grid and the
vestiges of its once-productive farms to sustain the remaining 1,500 employees.
Potential impact of proposed sanctions
19. The plethora of traders, including négociants and comptoirs, and the
considerable range of export possibilities mean that sanctioning one or two of them,
no matter the size of their operations, will result in others emerging with little
interruption in the fraudulent flow of gold. Hence, sanctions are unlikely to help
significantly in regulating the trade, nor are they likely to make a noticeable
difference in the artisanal miners’ livelihoods. Nonetheless, some reduction in
income may be felt from sanctioning one or another trader, and this may have
certain limited consequences, particularly for the most vulnerable among the miners.
Among these, women are likely to be more affected than men because of their
marginal and dependent role in the artisanal mining process. Any measures that
reduce the incomes of artisanal mining, however modestly, could be met with social
protest triggering a return to some of the fighting that much effort has sought to
dispel.
VI. Cassiterite in North Kivu
Extent of armed conflict
20. The security situation in North Kivu remains volatile. Conflicts are fuelled by
the spillover of Rwandans into the region and ethnic tension. Resentment of Tutsis
and, more generally, of Rwandophone influence persists among Congolese in the
region. The Tutsi-dominated Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma
(RCD-Goma), which portrayed itself for the last five years as the “government” in
North Kivu and imposed tax schemes to extort funds from the population, has
fuelled this resentment (see S/2002/1146, annex, paras. 65-96). Furthermore, the
presence of Interahamwe has intensified ethnic friction. At the same time, large
numbers of Rwandophones consider the Democratic Republic of the Congo their
home and are prepared to secure their “homeland” against an antagonistic
population, even by violent means.
21. Around Walikale, in the west of North Kivu, a dispute broke out over the
valuable cassiterite mines in the area. The local communities are concerned that
Rwandophones and Rwanda’s agents will manoeuvre themselves into a position to
benefit while the local population gains little.7 Two corporate entities are now vying
for access to the Walikale mines: one, Mining Processing Congo (MPC), is a South
African company that played an integral role in Rwanda’s military commercialism
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the war; the other, Groupe Minier
Bangandula, is a Rwandophone company with close ties to members of the Rwandasupported
rebel group RCD-Goma.8 Each of these companies has engaged its own
__________________
7 Extensive background to the conflict over access to natural resources is provided in
Undermining Peace: The Explosive Trade in Cassiterite in Eastern DRC, Global Witness,
June 2006.
8 MONUC has produced a special report on this conflict: “Competing mining companies at Bisie
spark insecurity”, November 2006.
S/2007/68
07-22123 7
protection force to defend the company’s interests and to extort payments from the
local population.9
Vulnerability of artisanal miners
22. Although a team of 10 miners can bag cassiterite worth on average $100 per
day, the pay for transporters and the string of fees artisanal miners must pay cuts
deeply into their earnings. After making regular and irregular payments plus
transportation charges and extortions imposed by police and military personnel, an
artisanal miner can earn up to $50 to $60 per month ($2-$3 per day). The assessment
team was unable to administer questionnaires to artisanal miners on site and instead
conducted inquiries in Mubi, the selling point for cassiterite. These off-site
interviews indicate that artisanal miners around Walikale, as elsewhere, are unable
to cover their expenses and are often in debt to local entrepreneurs. Their
vulnerability is magnified by their isolation from the outside world and by the fact
that there is essentially no farming or other alternative occupation in the mining
areas. This dependency also has gender implications: women’s work outside the
family is limited to petty trading or prostitution near the mines, and inside the
family to marginal domestic chores.
Structure of the trade
23. The off-site interviews in Mubi also revealed the working environment of the
miners: they work in groups of 5 to 10 under an entrepreneur who finances the
preparation of the ground until a vein is located. Once the pit produces, the
entrepreneur takes a major share of the miners’ production. As the ore leaves the
site, miners are required to pay a string of charges, first to the local chief, then to
FARDC (the non-integrated 85th Mayi-Mayi brigade) and subsequently to the
Mining Police. The bags of ore are carried 50 km on foot out of the forest by
transporters. A reported average of 7 to 10 planes daily,10 each carrying two tons of
ore, fly the cassiterite from Mubi to Goma, where the ore is purchased by comptoirs
for official export or, as apparently is often the case, to unofficial négociants who do
not have the required export licences and smuggle the ore at night across the border
to Rwanda. In the consultations held in Goma for this assessment, several actors
involved in the mining or processing industry indicated that government troops
stationed at the borders are often complicit in such smuggling. In Rwanda, where
there are no export duties, cassiterite is processed or shipped directly abroad for
processing.
24. The practice of smuggling large amounts of cassiterite to Rwanda is so
lucrative that fraudulent exporters buy up most of the cassiterite at prices legitimate
exporters cannot afford to pay, making it difficult for legal comptoirs, who pay
border taxes and royalties, to compete with the fraudulent ones. The role of
fraudulent operators increased during the transition period.11 The proportion of the
total trade controlled by fraudulent operators increased to an estimated 50 to 60 per
__________________
9 Consequences of the battle for mining rights in North Kivu are explored in depth in a Pole
Institute report by Dominic Johnson and Aloys Tegera, “Digging deeper: how the DR Congo’s
mining policy is failing the country” Regards Croisés, No. 15, December 2005.
10 The numbers vary greatly from month to month.
11 “Congo: staying engaged after the elections”, Africa Briefing No. 44, International Crisis Group,
January 2007.
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cent between 2000 and 2003, and then further increased to an estimated 70 to 75 per
cent in 2005.12 Reliable Congolese traders claim that the amount passing
fraudulently across the border to Rwanda has increased dramatically in the last 18
months.13
Formal sector
25. In North Kivu as in South Kivu, the State company Société minière et
industrielle du Kivu (Sominki) held mining rights until the war. Claims and
counterclaims have since produced contesting demands by an array of companies as
they bid to control the concessions once held by Sominki. This has largely
dismembered Sominki, which exists now in name only. One of the claimants is
Société minière du Congo (Somico), a legal entity created by former President
Laurent-Désiré Kabila to replace Sominki. Another is the above-mentioned South
African company MPC, which, according to the information obtained in Mubi and
Goma, assisted Rwanda’s commercial military wing to funnel the Democratic
Republic of the Congo’s mineral wealth across the border during the war and which
has recently purchased claims to cassiterite sites around Walikale. MPC claims to
sites around Walikale have been aggressively contested by the other economic
operator, GMB, which is owned by the wealthy Makabuza brothers and has relied on
the non-integrated 85th Mayi-Mayi brigade and other Mayi-Mayi armed groups to
impose its claim.14 None of these competing companies or the other comptoirs
operating in North Kivu contribute to the building of a formal mining sector.15
Potential impact of proposed sanctions
26. Sanctioning one or two of these illegal négociants who fraudulently export
cassiterite may possibly demonstrate to others that punitive measures can be taken.
However, most economic operators in the area know that these measures are rarely
applied. Even if sanctions target one or two notorious operators with financial or
travel restrictions, this would most probably not effect a change in overall
behaviour, since the elimination of one makes room for others. Therefore, it is
difficult to imagine how sanctions would have any far-reaching consequences in
North Kivu. However, if they did, and if as a consequence even a modest reduction
in the cassiterite trade resulted, artisanal miners in the remote interior would
experience negative consequences because of their dependence on the cassiterite
trade for a large portion, if not all, of their livelihood.
__________________
12 These percentages are informed guesstimates derived from the number of known fraudulent
operators year to year and their level of commercial activity verified in interviews with Gomabased
cassiterite exporters.
13 Cassiterite export strategies and amounts change year by year as new operators enter the market
and old ones discover new ways to circumvent State obligations. Three recent studies of export
fraud provide guesstimate figures: (a) Dominic Johnson and Aloys Tegera, op. cit.; (b) “Congo:
poches trouées, province de Sud Kivu: flux et fuite des recettes douanières”, Observation
governance et paix, November 2006; and (c) “Les dynamiques transfrontalières dans la région
des Grands Lacs: Burundi, République démocratique du Congo, Ouganda et Rwanda” Initiative
for Central Africa (INICA), Laboratoire d’analyse et d’expertise sociales, March 2006. All three
studies attest to fraud being practiced in a variety of forms along the border.
14 Interviews with traders and transporters on site at Mubi, outside of Walikale, 29 November
2006.
15 Conflicting demands over Sominki concessions are discussed in Undermining Peace, op. cit.,
and Dominic Johnson and Aloys Tegera, op. cit.
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27. Possible sanctions measures would also be much less effective than any
concerted governmental reform initiatives of departments such as the Ministry of
Mines, the Mining Police, the intelligence services and/or the Customs. Those
departments are charged with monitoring the production of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo’s minerals and regulating the cross-border trade. If they functioned up
to their potential, they would be capable of promoting legitimate trade, reducing
criminal involvement and raising public revenues.
28. Another concern must also be raised: there is the possibility of a backlash
against the highly visible United Nations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
if United Nations sanctions were to be imposed on the country’s mining industry.
When the North Kivu NGO Tout pour la paix et le développement was placed on the
United Nations sanctions list, there was an immediate reaction from the local
population, and protesters blockaded the MONUC compound in Goma and shouted
anti-United Nations slogans. In the event of a more comprehensive United Nations
sanctions regime, the Congolese population, possibly manipulated and agitated by a
public information campaign, would likely hold the United Nations responsible for
any negative consequences suffered as a result of the sanctions.
VII. Gold and cassiterite in South Kivu
Extent of armed conflict
29. The Hutu Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) groupings
continue to occupy mining sites in remote areas of South Kivu, defending their
claims and preying on local communities. These groups purchase arms and
munitions with funds obtained by controlling access to cassiterite sites. They also
pillage villages in the region and occasionally kidnap civilians. There are reported
attempts by FARDC to dispel FDLR, but the latter is strong enough to repel FARDC
troops and continue its war economy around mining centres. According to wellinformed
sources, FDLR controls between 7 and 10 mining sites16 in South Kivu,
where it has established its bases. Other mining sites where gold is extracted, such
as Kamituga, experience little conflict apart from that resulting from the frustration
among artisanal miners at the large number of illegal taxes and levies.
Vulnerability of artisanal miners
30. No information could be obtained on the cassiterite artisanal miners operating
in the remote areas of South Kivu under FDLR control. However, a study of the
impact of cassiterite mining in Maniema province, north-east of Kindu, where
comparable conditions exist, reports low and variable incomes of artisanal miners,
high living expenses, high rates of malnutrition and no health or any other social
services.17
31. In most gold-mining towns in South Kivu, of which Kamituga is characteristic,
there is virtually no livelihood except artisanal mining and a modest amount of
agriculture that supplements the unpredictable incomes from digging for gold. The
__________________
16 This information was obtained from Undermining Peace, op. cit., supplemented by interviews
with commercial operators.
17 “Impact de l’activité minière au Maniema”, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
working paper, August 2005.
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disorder, criminal elements, luxury goods and malnutrition are signs of a mining
town with pockets of wealth amid generalized poverty. Some miners earned in
excess of $200 a month, but the majority have nothing for months on end. Out of
seven cases surveyed, two had no income at all in the past month. After expenses
and fees, the average income of the cases surveyed in the previous month was a
negative $21. Consultations with a local artisanal mining cooperative confirmed the
pattern in these few cases to be representative of Kamituga miners generally. Local
health workers reported a high rate of chronic malnutrition among children. Unlike
at other sites, however, the majority of those artisanal miners, 63 per cent of the
cases that were interviewed, owned plots of farmland operated by their families
within a day’s walk, which provided at least a modest safety net.
Structure of the trade
32. In Kamituga, as in other mining areas of South Kivu, 50 to 100 unregistered
négociants purchase modest amounts of gold that they sell to local exporters such as
Delta Force, the principal exporting company in the area. According to miners and
négociants interviewed in Kamituga, Delta Force is the preferred exporter because it
is known for its skills in smuggling large amounts of gold across the border to
Burundi. Smuggling is rampant, as export taxes on gold are 4.5 per cent in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, whereas they are only 1.5 per cent in Burundi.
In addition, official Congolese exporters are obliged to pay a minimum of $75,000
to operate.
33. There is only one officially registered comptoir in Bukavu, the capital of South
Kivu, and it is well known that no more than 10 per cent of that comptoir’s exported
gold goes through official channels. According to information obtained from the
Fédération d’entrepreneurs du Congo in South Kivu, of the estimated 500 kilograms
of gold leaving the Democratic Republic of the Congo each month, valued at $8
million, 80 to 90 per cent leaves the country fraudulently.
34. Cassiterite’s bulk makes it more difficult to smuggle. It is, however,
systematically undervalued by customs authorities, who do so in exchange for
rewards from the traders, essentially sharing the savings that the operators realize by
officially reducing the value and quantity of their exports.18 For that reason there
are a number of official cassiterite buyers in South Kivu, at least half a dozen, who
have paid the fee of $6,000 to obtain the required licence. The cassiterite passes
formally through official channels, but the effect is the same as smuggling, since the
State misses out on revenues. Undervaluation results in the loss of an estimated 50
to 60 per cent of the value of royalties, taxes and fees due to the State.19
Formal sector
35. Sominki, the State company in the Kivus, was sold in 1995 to Banro, a
Canadian company that created Société aurifères du Kivu et du Mariema (Sakima), a
Congolese subsidiary of Sominki. In 1998 Sakima was dissolved, but Banro, in a
series of legal actions, recuperated its gold concessions. Sominki is currently
__________________
18 An in-depth study has been made of fraudulent practices in South Kivu cross-border trade:
“Congo: poches trouées”, op. cit.
19 Estimate provided by Eric Kajemba, director of the Observatoire gouvernance et paix’s recent
research on customs fraud in South Kivu.
S/2007/68
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dormant. Banro has emerged as potentially the main industrial mining company in
the region with the intention of producing and exporting gold by 2008.
Potential impact of proposed sanctions
36. A few cassiterite traders might be encouraged to pay the full and fair amount at
the borders if they feared reprisals for their fraudulent activities. Sanctioning one or
two prominent gold exporters, such as Delta Force, might reduce the level of
smuggling and increase State revenues by allowing greater control over gold
exports. An equally likely outcome, however, is that Delta Force or other sanctioned
gold smugglers would simply disregard the international restrictions and continue
smuggling gold. Therefore, targeting specific operators with United Nations
sanctions would probably have little effect in the absence of resolute government
action along the borders, accompanied by law enforcement and monitoring.
37. Some, though not all, artisanal gold miners in South Kivu have alternative
occupations. Farming is practised around most of the gold sites in the region, unlike
the remote cassiterite mines in the province. Should targeted sanctions reduce the
capacity of artisanal miners to dispose of their gold, many miners would turn to
farming as an alternative livelihood. This is not the case for cassiterite miners, who
work in remote locations where farming has lapsed and where there are very limited
opportunities to engage in alternative income-generating activities.
VIII. Copper and cobalt in Katanga
Extent of armed conflict
38. Katanga remained under government control and was spared the direct effects
of the 1996-2002 war, while the other eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo fell to rebel groups and militias. According to the October 2002 report
of the Panel of Experts, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
relied on Zimbabwe’s troops to secure Katanga militarily and, in exchange, granted
mining concessions on favourable terms to prominent Zimbabwean businessmen
(see S/2002/1146, annex, paras. 22-64). This furthered the practice of giving away
pieces of the State-owned mining conglomerate Gécamines in exchange for military
or personal favours, contributing to the decline of Gécamines.20
39. The once sizeable workforce of Gécamines has become a mass of unemployed
who have little choice but to work as artisanal miners on concessions belonging to
Gécamines or to private firms that have gained access to former Gécamines
concessions. Consultations and interviews conducted in Kamituga showed that the
number of these artisanal miners has grown dramatically in recent years, as other
unemployed, including ex-army personnel, ex-rebels and government officials
without pay have joined, swelling their ranks and turning them into an aggressive
social mass quick to defend their ill-gotten ore with arms. The principal source of
violence in Katanga is therefore the swelling mass of artisanal miners who, for want
__________________
20 The privatization of the mining sector in Katanga had already begun in 1994 in an effort to stem
the decline of the Congolese economy, but it was the vulnerability of the Congolese State in
1998 during the war that gave the impetus to unbalanced contracts; see Eric Kennes, “Le secteur
minier au Congo: déconnexion et descente aux enfers” L’Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire
1999-2000 (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2000).
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of other means of making a living, occupy the mineral concessions and defend their
occupation as if it were their right.21
Vulnerability of artisanal miners
40. The growing mass of artisanal miners in Katanga is now estimated at
150,000,22 and very few of the mining companies in Katanga know how to respond
to such large numbers. Some companies finance alternative income-earning
schemes, but others ignore the miners, profit from them and would probably deny
that there is a connection between the unbalanced contracts that gave them access to
the assets of Gécamines and the mushrooming number of artisanal miners.23 The
privatization of State assets has taken a great deal of valuable resources away from
Gécamines and pushed all but a fraction (30 per cent) of its workforce and their
families into the streets and mining sites.
41. Even though they earn more than they would in government services or in
petty commerce, the mean income of the artisans in Katanga is low and inconsistent.
The average monthly gross income was nearly $200 for the nine cases surveyed,
even though net incomes after expenditures and fees averaged a negative $15. The
young and strong among them can make money. But the work is dangerous: deaths
and injuries occur often as the handmade shafts and galleries cave in and trap
miners. They are economically vulnerable, and, as stated above, they are also
volatile. Any United Nations sanctions regime that had a negative impact on the life
and income of the artisanal miners would be likely to trigger social unrest.
Structure of the trade
42. Artisanal miners work in teams of 10 to 15 headed by a boss who pays for
food and incidentals while the team digs in search of a vein. Once the pit produces,
the bags of minerals are divided, half for the boss and half for the miners. After they
have paid obligatory fees and bribes, the miners sell to whomever they can. They
may sell to the owner of the site, though they are often more inclined to sell to
illegal négociants or brokers off site. According to several local actors in the mining
industry in Katanga, these illegal buyers pay higher prices and export the ore
fraudulently without paying fees, royalties or duties to the State. The mining
companies may lawfully own the site, but the illegal buyers also have permission to
operate, which they reportedly obtain by bribing officials. According to the British
non-governmental organization Global Witness, it is also these unscrupulous buyers
__________________
21 On 28 December 2006, at least three people were killed and about 20 injured in the southeastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo as police broke up a protest by artisanal miners
wanting access to a copper mine in Ruashi, near Lubumbashi. Tensions have been high for
several months between Chemaf, the mining company that obtained a concession to part of the
copper mine from Gécamines, and local diggers because of their being blocked from entering
the mines.
22 Digging in Corruption: Fraud, abuse and exploitation in Katanga’s copper and cobalt mines,
Global Witness, July 2006.
23 The link between the unbalanced contracts and the worsening of socio-economic conditions has
been described in The State vs. the People: governance, mining and the transitional regime in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Amsterdam, Fatal Transactions, 2006).
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whose practices defy national and international law, who turn a blind eye to hiring
children and who engage in corrupt payments and extensive tax evasion.24
Formal sector
43. The mining economy in Katanga, unlike that in Ituri and the Kivus, has a
significant formal sector, including foreign mining corporations, a few local
companies and the once powerful State company Gécamines. However in recent
years, many of the valuable resources of Gécamines have been transferred into the
holdings of private companies. The Lutundula Commission, an inquiry body of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo National Assembly,25 has examined a total of 40
such contracts that were signed with Gécamines, in addition to 10 with the
Congolese State, and has raised a number of concerns, recommending that some of
those contracts be cancelled or renegotiated. From more than 35,000 workers 30
years ago, Gécamines now employs fewer than 12,000, and according to mining
experts who are familiar with the company’s current situation, there is the risk that
this number will diminish even further over the next few years as the company
dwindles to a fraction of its former size and public enterprises are progressively
replaced by private ones.
44. Diverse industrial mining corporations are growing rapidly in Katanga, and,
though they will never absorb all the workers left over from Gécamines, some will
go into industrial production, hire workers and initiate much-needed social
programmes. There are some mining companies in Katanga that try to set reasonable
standards for corporate social responsibility. However, there are also other
companies that flout the law and undermine such attempts
Potential impact of proposed sanctions
45. The most logical targets for sanctions would be the three large mineral-buying
houses26 that do not extract copper or cobalt ore themselves but make arrangements
with artisanal miners to get the ore from their own or others’ concessions. They
engage a few hundred salaried workers and purchase ore from large numbers of
artisanal miners. Sanctioning these companies might discourage fraudulent
practices, but it would also jeopardize the livelihood of their salaried workers and
oblige the artisanal miners to sell their ore and labour elsewhere. A further
consequence of such sanctions would be that artisanal miners would find fewer
buyers and therefore be forced to accept lower prices. Hence, they would experience
a reduction in earnings. Such an impact might be less in Katanga than elsewhere,
but negative consequences would be unavoidable. A further concern is the social
unrest that is likely to follow such consequences. Even if United Nations sanctions
did not threaten their livelihoods directly, the measures would pose a risk for the
image and acceptance of the United Nations in the region.
__________________
24 Two Global Witness reports have documented these fraudulent practices in detail: Rush and
Ruin: the devastating mineral trade in southern Katanga, DRC, September 2004, and Digging in
Corruption, op. cit.
25 The Lutundula Commission is formally known as the Commission spéciale chargée de l’examen
de la validité des conventions à caractère économique et financier conclues pendant les guerres
de 1996-1997 et de 1998.
26 Chemaf, Somika and Groupe Bazano.
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IX. Diamonds in Kasai Oriental
Extent of armed conflict
46. Kasai Oriental was spared the direct effects of the war, but the indirect effects
are still felt, especially in the city of Mbuji-Mayi, with its State diamond company,
MIBA. Substantial resources were requisitioned from MIBA to finance the war,
including cash and large pieces of its concession that were given to Zimbabwean
businessmen in recognition of Zimbabwe’s military support.27 The surrounding
population flooded into the city of Mbuji-Mayi to escape the plundering gangs of
combatants. The city had already experienced rapid growth following the expulsion
of Kasaian workers from Katanga some years before, and now the number of
inhabitants has risen to over 2 million, most of whom are unemployed28 and a large
number of whom resort to clandestine digging for diamonds on MIBA territory.
47. The State company MIBA is unable to protect its concession against invading
artisanal miners who remove substantial amounts of its diamond resources on a
daily basis. The miners work even at night, frequently forced by armed gangs,
known as suicidaires, who coerce them to share portions of their booty. There are
regular armed clashes for access to particularly valuable veins. According to sources
on the ground, deaths and injuries in the MIBA concession are routine. Last year the
MONUC Human Rights Section registered 38 deaths in the MIBA concession, and
these were only the officially reported ones. An undetermined number of additional
deaths go unreported. This small-scale war between artisanal miners, the MIBA
administration and armed groups for control over their booty perpetuates a pattern
of conflict over access to natural resources.
Vulnerability of artisanal miners
48. According to estimates, the number of artisanal miners working in the two
Kasais may be as high as 1 million.29 There is little else to do in the region. Mbuji-
Mayi is cut off from the rest of the country because of a dysfunctional railway and
impassable roads. Even petrol arrives by plane. Artisanal miners earn very little for
their efforts and the risks they take. Those who venture into areas not controlled by
MIBA and who work the hillsides or riverbeds as divers can make somewhat more,
and there are even a few lucky ones who find large gems. But most of the miners,
including many women and children, are working in adverse and highly risky
conditions.30 The gross monthly incomes of the seven cases surveyed working
outside the MIBA concession averaged $179, which is higher than in Province
Orientale and South Kivu, but their net income after fees and expenses was the
lowest of all, a negative $45. Households are large, expenses are high, and most of
the miners are in debt.
__________________
27 S/2002/1146 provides a number of instances. One of the most notorious is the transfer of
Sengamines, an 800-km2 concession, to Oryx, a front company for ranking members of the
Zimbabwe Defence Forces.
28 MONUC briefing kit for the Security Council delegation, November 2005.
29 Estimates have been compiled by Pact Congo in Lubumbashi drawing on a multitude of sources.
The same figure of 1 million has also been given in “Reforming the DRC diamond sector”, a
briefing document by Global Witness, June 2006.
30 “Le travail des enfants dans les mines de diamants au Kasaï Occidental”, report on research
carried out during the nineteenth session of the Observatoire de changement urbain, June 2006.
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Structure of the trade
49. There are scores of négociants even in small mining towns outside the main
cities, and according to the Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de certification
(CEEC), in Mbuji-Mayi there are hundreds of them. Officially, they can sell their
diamonds only to the 25 or so registered comptoirs with licences, who pay export
taxes and record the exported diamonds with CEEC as part of the Kimberley
Process. MIBA diamonds are similarly processed through CEEC in Kinshasa. But
there are also a number of fraudulent export channels. An estimated 20 per cent of
all diamonds bought and sold by the comptoirs in Mbuji-Mayi are sold illegally,
without the obligatory presence of CEEC agents. Another large portion of all
diamond exports bypass the comptoirs altogether and are sold by large-volume
négociants, who pay no duties or fees and thus have more capital at their disposal to
trade in larger amounts.31 CEEC keeps relatively close track of registered comptoirs
as part of its participation in the Kimberley Process, but it keeps no track of the
négociants since that is not part of its mandate. This makes it easier for négociants
to avoid taxes and smuggle diamonds to locations outside the country, from where
they are shipped abroad to markets where Kimberley Process certificates are not
always required. CEEC estimates that a minimum of 40 per cent of all diamond
exports exit the Democratic Republic of the Congo illegally.
Formal sector
50. MIBA continues to function, but according to the Managing Director and
experts familiar with the mining situation in Kasai Oriental, the company has been
severely weakened by the war, mismanagement, continuing looting of its
concessions and joint-venture partnerships, which have either performed poorly or
given partners overly favourable terms. During the war, MIBA was subject to
requisitions, but even before, the company had ceased to operate at a profit. The
company has operated at a loss for all but 2 of the past 20 years. The majority of its
production is low-quality diamonds: only 6 per cent are gem quality. Therefore,
MIBA has to rely on high volume, which is a difficult challenge when capital is
modest, requisitions are frequent, debt interest is high and resources for investment
are nil.
51. The flood of artisanal miners and suicidaires skim off much of the MIBA
concessions valuable reserves, reducing year by year the company’s long-term
viability. According to its own officials, MIBA has neither the resources to keep the
looters away nor the support of the Government to respond appropriately to this
threat. Like other State companies, MIBA appears to be in decline. Four prominent
joint ventures have recently taken significant portions of MIBA holdings, some in
the area of Mbuji-Mayi.32 It remains to be seen whether these become viable
partners with the capacity to provide employment and contribute to the well-being
of the communities in which they operate. In any case, it is unlikely that they will
absorb many of the MIBA employees who have lost their jobs.
__________________
31 CEEC, “Rapport d’activités”, September 2006.
32 First African Diamonds has access to the 800-km2 Sengamines concession; BHP Billiton and
Southern Era Diamonds have access to a 16,000-km2 concession; De Beers, along with 12 local
companies, has access to concessions covering an area of 60,000 km2; and Emaxon Diamonds
and Dan Gertler have a contract to market 88 per cent of MIBA production in exchange for a
$15 million loan.
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Potential impacts of proposed sanctions
52. It is difficult to envisage how targeted sanctions imposed on the ailing MIBA
would reduce violence or diminish illegal activities taking place inside the company
or on its concessions. A United Nations sanctions regime targeting MIBA would
only further diminish the company’s capacity to limit the looting on its concessions,
which already compromises its viability. Sanctioning one or two of the 20 to 30
registered comptoirs identified by the CEEC/Kimberley agents as fraudulent
operators is conceivable, but such measures are not likely to do more than the
Kimberley Process already does. CEEC/Kimberley agents are already mandated to
call attention to diamond sales that take place outside of the Kimberley Process.
Although the Kimberley Process is currently not meeting expectations in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,33 a targeted sanctions regime is not likely to
help.
53. Another possibility would be to impose sanctions on one or two of the
hundreds of négociants who do not have the required licences but who nevertheless
export at a larger volume than official comptoirs because their capital is not reduced
by duties or fees. However, this is unlikely to diminish the fraudulent diamond
exports, because, again, the elimination of one or two of these would only make
room for others. Thus, it is difficult to imagine that such sanctions would have any
noticeable influence on the level of conflict associated with natural-resource
exploitation or on the level of fraudulent and illegal activities.
X. Summary and conclusions
54. Pursuant to the request in Security Council resolution 1698 (2006), the present
report assesses the potential impact of measures proposed by the Group of Experts.
The investigations for this report have been carried out in five separate areas and
have focused on four key issues deemed relevant to gauging the feasibility of the
proposed measures and the potential impact on the economic actors participating in
the mining and marketing of natural-resource commodities. The following
paragraphs summarize the findings.
Extent of armed conflict
55. In most of the areas where rebel or foreign forces previously controlled mining
sites, the level of violence has diminished. However, field observations and the
numerous consultations carried out for the present assessment report revealed that
the population and the artisanal miners are still exposed to tension and hostilities. In
particular, the poor conduct and discipline of FARDC troops, who occupy many
mining sites, collecting taxes and preying on the artisanal miners, is a matter of
concern. The Government’s integration process with FARDC is proceeding slowly
in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Approximately 63 per cent of the
armed forces ordered to be integrated remain unintegrated in Katanga and South
__________________
33 “Reforming the DRC diamond sector”, op. cit., summarizes the achievements and the
inadequacies of the Government’s participation in the Kimberley Process and calls on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo Government to “Increase controls from mine to export,
including controls at production sites, and ensure that the origin of rough diamonds presented
for sale to comptoirs can be identified”.
S/2007/68
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Kivu, and over 90 per cent are yet to be integrated in North Kivu.34 Informed
observers link this slow progress to the desire among non-integrated brigades to
maintain their access to mining sites where they can extract irregular payments or
can themselves mine, or where private firms may use them as mercenaries to secure
their control over valuable sites. Coercive measures against these irregular armed
groups or firms employing or buying from them are unlikely to contribute to a more
regulated trade in natural resources.
Vulnerability of artisanal miners
56. The number of families supported by artisanal mining continues to grow. As
State companies decline, previously salaried workers swell the ranks of artisanal
miners. In areas once held by rebel forces, their dissolution has also brought
ex-rebels into the pits, where they are joined by badly paid or unpaid soldiers,
policemen, teachers and health workers. Nationwide estimates place the number of
artisanal miners in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at 2 million. With each
miner supporting a household of six to seven, the number of persons directly
dependent on artisanal mining rises to between a fifth and a quarter of the national
population.35
57. The livelihood of the vast majority of the artisanal miners is precarious, often
in the extreme. Out of the 39 cases surveyed, 75 per cent were unable to cover
minimal family expenses with their earnings. The average monthly net income for
all cases was a negative $18.36 The frequency of negative net incomes was
attributed to the rainy season, but this should not obscure the fact that indebtedness
is high and annual average net incomes are barely above the survival level.
Thirty-six per cent of the cases surveyed had access to farm plots of various sizes,
and an additional 30 per cent had at one time engaged in commerce. The remaining
34 per cent had no farmland or any previous occupation. This shows the
considerable dependence on artisanal mining, which exposes these miners to
potentially severe consequences should measures be taken that could threaten an
already vulnerable livelihood.
Structure of the trade
58. The number of private economic operators in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo’s mining sector that operate in conformity with the relevant laws and
regulations may be increasing slowly. However, there remain a large number of
shady operators who purchase ore from sites that do not belong to them and who
either smuggle the mined minerals to neighbouring countries or fraudulently
undervalue the material’s worth or quantity at the borders.
59. In Ituri district and the Kivus, there are rarely more than one or two comptoirs
exporting through official channels, and those who choose to do so exclusively
cannot compete. Primary and secondary sources everywhere report increasingly
large amounts of fraudulent exports, estimated between 50 per cent and 90 per cent
of all exports. Both non-registered and registered comptoirs export fraudulently,
__________________
34 “Memo regarding the situation report of the third wave of the ‘Plan de relance’”, Centre de
coordination des operations conjoints, 9 December 2006.
35 These figures are based on a recent review of NGO, government and private-sector literature
informally compiled by Pact Congo in Lubumbashi.
36 See footnote 5 for an explanation of these findings.
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some by outright smuggling and others by undervaluing the quantity and quality of
exports. In areas bordering Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi this is often done with the
complicity of public- and private-sector actors from those neighbouring countries.
Given the large number of illegal actors and the quasi-criminal commerce at all
levels, a targeted sanctions regime against one or two selected operators is unlikely
to have much of an effect.
Formal sector
60. State companies such as OKIMO, Sominki, Gécamines and MIBA provided
previously salaried work as well as social services in their respective areas. Those
companies are in various stages of decline, and the social services they once
provided have largely disappeared. Many of the private firms that have taken the
State companies’ place have done so through dubious joint ventures that have
contributed in various ways to the removal of the assets of the State companies,
hastening their demise.
61. In Katanga, a few private mining firms that respect the relevant laws and
regulations moved quickly into production, engaged labourers and supported unions
while putting in place social programmes for populations in the vicinity of their
mining sites. However, there are also other companies that are slow to go into
production, preferring to use their stake for speculative purposes. Still others show
little interest in social investments or corporate responsibility and do not hesitate to
strip assets from public companies, circumvent social commitments and/or benefit
from opportunities to engage in illegal business activities. A considerable portion of
economic transactions are informal, unreported and unofficial. As a consequence,
those economic actors that ought to be sanctioned are also those that are most likely
to avoid the restrictions that such measures would impose.
Potential impact of proposed sanctions
62. While sanctions may inconvenience their targets, the general effect will be to
diminish only marginally the general practices they are designed to curtail. In most
of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, they will do little to reduce the
use of force in extracting minerals, diminish fraud and encourage responsible
corporate behaviour, since the regulatory environment where such measures would
be imposed is too weak and lacking in effective enforcement mechanisms for the
actors to care much about international pressure. And where the mechanisms of
international control would make a difference or would tarnish an operator’s
reputation severely, other equally unscrupulous actors would readily fill the void. In
rare cases, internationally imposed sanctions may block the activities of a
significant operator and, in doing so, diminish the commerce overall. When this
happens, artisanal miners, labourers and small sellers will have less of an outlet for
what they market, harming those whom the sanctions regime is largely meant to
protect.
63. At this time, there is also a more general concern about possible United
Nations sanctions against the Democratic Republic of the Congo: on 6 December
2006 the country’s first democratically elected President was sworn into power
following a lengthy election process that, according to the majority of observers,
was generally free of irregularities. The international community is inclined to
reinforce the hard-won legitimacy of the new Government with collaboration and
S/2007/68
07-22123 19
support, not threats and conditions. Imposing United Nations sanctions now may be
perceived as punitive, whether they target State actors or not and whether they are
intended to reflect on the capacity of the State to manage its affairs or not. This
might be another reason why United Nations sanctions may not be advisable at the
present time.
XI. Alternative measures
64. The question remains: what is likely to bring more order to the production and
marketing of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s natural resources in a way that
will allow greater security for the artisanal miners, less exposure to extortion by armed
groups and the assurance of more revenues for the State and its public services?
65. Alternative measures need (a) to reduce the level of conflict in the eastern
provinces by diminishing the influence of economic operators that use proceeds
from natural-resource exploitation to buy and import arms, and (b) to promote a
business climate that discourages extortion, fraud and other illegal practices that
compromise the Government’s capacity to raise public revenues. Meeting these
objectives means acknowledging and acting on two critical areas of responsibility:
the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
the responsibility of the private sector.
66. In the first area of responsibility, I recommend that the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo initiate good-governance reform in two
high-priority domains: (a) security sector reform, with specific attention to
implementing reforms in the police and the military, and (b) improving trust and
transparency in the Government by monitoring and fighting corrupt practices and
taking effective action against violators. With the conclusion of elections and the
end of the transition, the stakes for meeting these responsibilities are high.
67. Based on security and trust, a good-governance programme should create an
economic climate in which reputable private-sector actors can function. Here it is
important that two additional domains receive focused attention. Since naturalresource
exploitation constitutes the Government’s most promising source of public
revenues, I suggest that the Government make sure (a) that natural-resource
investors and other economic actors meet specific conditions and adhere to
regulations in contracting, exploring for and exploiting natural resources, and that
the revenues from these activities are closely monitored, and (b) that government
budgets prioritize expenditures in ways that discourage corruption and provide basic
services to address poverty.
68. For these reasons, I strongly support the collaboration between the
Government and its stakeholders in acting on the principles of the document
“Towards a governance compact in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from
elections to governance”,37 which states that the first four priorities are (a) security
sector reform, (b) transparency, (c) natural resource management and (d) public
finance management. That proposed compact has been developed by the World
Bank, the European Commission, the United Nations and major bilateral partners. It
recognizes the urgent need to control revenue flows in the Democratic Republic of
__________________
37 Informal background paper prepared on the basis of an informal donor meeting held on 6 July
2006 in Brussels.
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the Congo, to reform the country’s mining sector, including a review of all mining
contracts signed during the transition and oversight over new contracts, to reduce
the level of illegal exploitation and to ensure compliance with Congolese law,
government codes and regulations. The United Nations is ready to play a significant
role in supporting and promoting the reforms outlined in the proposed compact.
69. Obviously, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
responsible for regulating business conduct in the country and, together with its
international partners, will have to take the lead in the implementation of the
proposed governance compact. However, the private sector will also have to play a
role in this regard. Therefore, I recommend that the second area of responsibility
must be assumed by the private-sector actors, with the objective of improving
business practices and raising the level of corporate social responsibility among the
growing numbers of economic actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s
extractive industry.
70. Private-sector actors must help to set standards for business practices and
corporate social responsibility in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and develop
mechanisms to ensure that such standards are adopted and implemented. Initially,
some among them might be reluctant to do so, but this might change as greater
numbers of private actors realize the benefits not only of having international
financial and moral support, but also of collectively addressing critical corporate
problems that they encounter in the high-risk environment for investment that exists
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A few private companies already do this, and
they should be supported. They honour the provisions of the Congolese Mining Code,
along with other national laws and internationally recognized guidelines and norms.
71. Yet private actors should have an interest in confronting the problem that
enterprises of good standing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo operate at a
disadvantage. At present there is not a level playing field in the country. Fraud at the
borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a common practice. Those who
do not practise it pay substantially higher fees for marketing and exporting their
products. Hence, they are unable to compete with fraudulent actors. Also, corruption
and the frequent use of force to secure concessions and/or to extort levies favour
those who support illegal activities over those who do not. As long as these practices
continue unchecked, business in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will bias the
market against those committed to improving the business climate in favour of those
who seek to perpetuate a quasi-criminal environment. As a consequence,
Government revenues will continue to be compromised.
72. Therefore, efforts to regulate the market and reduce the use of force in the
extractive industry need also to ensure that business practices and standards that are
in compliance with the relevant laws and regulations prevail. Three initial steps in
this direction may have such results.
73. As the first initiative in this regard, I propose to promote the drafting of a code
of conduct uniquely designed for private actors in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Such a code would include recognized standards and practices, notably the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),38 the voluntary principles on
__________________
38 The Democratic Republic of the Congo Ministry of Planning currently supports a technical
committee to investigate how EITI could be implemented for the country’s natural-resource
sector.
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security and human rights and other international instruments appropriate to
regulating business activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A report
detailing compliance with such a code of conduct would be prepared annually and
publicized.
74. The second proposal would be to spearhead the formation of a cross-border
commission for the purpose of stemming fraudulent exports. The cross-border
commission would engage government and private-sector actors in encouraging the
alignment of Democratic Republic of the Congo export taxes with those of
neighbouring countries and in promoting trade pacts among the countries in the
region in order to establish ground rules among trading partners. The improvement
of border surveillance would also have to be addressed by the commission. In the
long term, this will require security-sector reforms to provide the appropriate
training and management of national customs and police officers at key crossing
points. However, to address the problems at the borders in the short term,
collaboration between the new Government and key private actors could be
envisaged to establish a presence of private security personnel at selected border
posts to track commodity flows, verify traders’ credentials, collect revenues and
ensure that revenues reached the proper government authorities.39
75. The third proposal would address the important issue of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo’s artisanal miners. To get a better understanding of this
widespread phenomenon, the United Nations would promote and support the
undertaking of a survey of artisanal miners in key areas of the country.40 Such a
survey would be conducted in collaboration with Democratic Republic of the Congo
authorities, private actors and other international organizations and would be aimed
at developing strategies that promote secure artisanal mining in selected areas, apply
the relevant provisions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Mining Code to
regulate the work and working conditions of artisanal mining and identify viable
alternatives for miners willing to accept alternative employment.
76. The United Nations stands ready to take action in each instance. In
consultation with all parties involved, the United Nations could encourage and
support the proposed initiatives by drawing on its expertise, human resources and
experience in bringing private-sector influence to bear on security and development.
__________________
39 Two initiatives currently provide research and diplomatic support for such a commission: (a) INICA
has recently concluded an in-depth study of cross-border dynamics for the Great Lakes region in
“Les dynamiques transfrontalières dans la région des Grands Lacs”, op. cit., and (b) as part of
the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, the second Summit
of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region has established a regional
Subprogramme of Action on the Joint Security Management of Common Borders.
40 Other international organizations have already shown interest in such a survey, though no action
has yet been taken.

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